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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

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TURKEY

PART X

JULY TO DECEMBER 1925

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Further Correspondence respecting Turkey.

Part X.

[E 3830/32/65] No. 1.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Hoare (Constantinople).

(No. 649.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, July 3, 1925.*

I HAVE received your despatch No. 500 of the 24th June relative to the continued anti-British campaign in the Turkish press, and I approve your action as reported therein.

I am, &c.
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[E 3970/362/65] No. 2.

Mr. Hoare to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 7.)

(No. 511. Confidential.)

Sir, *Therapia, June 30, 1925.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 87 of the 17th instant regarding Turkish troop movements, I have the honour to transmit herewith a despatch from the military attaché reporting that, according to such information as he has been able to obtain, there are at the present time over 50,000 troops in the eastern vilayets.

2. Major Harenc reports that he is now of opinion that the Turks may be contemplating, in the event of the Mosul frontier question being decided in favour of Irak, an attempt to effect a practical reversal of that decision by creating strong "Chetta" bands, which would presumably be recruited from the troops in the neighbourhood of the frontier, the men being especially "demobilised" for that purpose. No doubt the Turkish political conscience is sufficiently plastic to reconcile an unofficial invasion of Irak by such bands with the very categorical assurances given in the note enclosed in Sir R. Lindsay's despatch No. 469 of the 10th June.

3. However, it is certainly too soon to conclude that there is any intention to take or even to threaten any action against Irak. The proceedings of the Independence Tribunal at Diarbekir and the savagery of Turkish justice against the Kurdish sheikhs condemned for participation in the recent rising, on which I am reporting separately, afford an entirely sufficient reason for the maintenance of strong forces in that part of the country. If nothing happens in Kurdistan during the next few weeks and there is no sensible diminution in the number of troops within reach of the Irak frontier it will no doubt become necessary to ask for something more concrete than friendly assurances. For the present I would suggest that the less we say the better in order not to weaken, by dilution, the force of any representation that may become necessary.

4. I should add that twice within the last fortnight prominence has been given in the press to the return westwards of troops for demobilisation. References to troop movements are never allowed, and in these cases there can be little doubt that they were inserted, not too ingenuously, for our benefit.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to Bagdad and Beirut.

I have, &c.
R. H. HOARE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 2.

Major Harenc to Mr. Hoare.

(No. 16.)

Sir,

Therapia, June 25, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith an estimate of the Turkish forces, in what is known as the eastern vilayets, on the 20th instant.

2. This is based on the strength as known to the War Office of the Turkish Army Corps in that area prior to the outbreak of the Kurdish rebellion, and the figures, given by reliable sources, of the troops that moved into that area since the outbreak. This includes the Vth Corps, which is, according to the papers, being sent back to its peace stations, but has not yet passed over that portion of the Bagdad Railway which lies in French mandated territory.

3. The total estimate is: sabres 1,750, rifles 49,000, guns 108. In my previous despatches Nos. 5, 7 and 14 to His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador in Constantinople, I have discussed the uses to which such a large body of troops could be put. I came to the conclusion that, from the Turkish point of view, it is not worth while to make an attack on Irak, and the retention of these troops after the rebellion had been declared at an end was due to the necessity of keeping a large force in the country while the reforms in the administrative system were being instituted, the communications improved and the country generally civilised. I also envisaged the possibility that the Turkish authorities had at the back of their mind the moral effect that a large force in the vicinity of the Mosul frontier would have on the decisions of the Council of the League of Nations.

4. When my despatches Nos. 5 and 7 on this subject were written, the Turkish press, which is an organisation more or less inspired by the Government, was issuing articles expressing the most complete confidence in a decision in Turkey's favour of the question of the Mosul frontier. But yesterday, from a source which has hitherto been absolutely reliable, I received information to the effect that, those responsible for the direction of Turkey's policy were not only doubtful of the issue of the Mosul question, but were practically convinced that the decision would be favourable to Irak.

5. If this information is correct it is a possible solution of the problem. The Turkish High Comm and considers that it was the presence of a large Turkish force in the neighbourhood of Chanak which forced on the negotiations at Mudania. Kemal-ed-din Sami Pasha practically said that we had been frightened out of Chanak. The French were obliged to withdraw from Marash and Aintab in 1921 by reason of the tactics employed by the Turks, namely, the formation of a large number of "Chetta" bands, equipped with machine guns, rifles and ammunition supplied by Government, with a stiffening of regular officers and backed up by a strong Turkish regular force behind them. It would appear at least possible that, with these two operations as a precedent, the Turkish High Command is contemplating a repetition of the manœuvres which, from their point of view, were so successful in 1921 and 1922.

6. Unless definite information is received of the return of the Vth Corps and the 5th Division to their peace stations I submit that it is necessary to consider the possibility of the Turks carrying out a "Chetta" attack on Irak similar to the one they made in Northern Cilicia.

I have, &c.
R. E. HARENC.

Enclosure 2 in No. 2.

ESTIMATE of the Turkish Troops in the Eastern Vilayets, June 20, 1925.

1. *Force in the Eastern Vilayets, February* 15, 1925.

—	Sabres.	Rifles.	Guns.
VIIth Corps—			
8th Cavalry Division	500	..	8
28th Infantry Regiment	..	500	..
1st Cavalry Division	500	..	8
14th Cavalry Division	500	..	8
2nd Infantry Division	50	3,000	24
17th Infantry Division	50	3,000	24
	1,600	6,500	72

2. *Forces moved into that Area by Rail.*

—	Sabres.	Rifles.	Guns.
Vth Corps—			
7th Infantry Division	50	6,750	24
41st Infantry Division	50	6,750	24
Corps troops	.	1,500	..
Reinforcements to VIIth Corps—			
To make up their infantry regiments to war strength	.	9,250	..
For 1st Cavalry Division (nearly wiped out at commencement of rebellion) ..	500	..	..
	600	24,250	48

Taking personnel of a battery at 100; add to this figure for personnel of artillery 1,200, which gives a total of forces moved over the Bagdad Railway of 25,450, which is approximately the same as the figure given by the liaison officer, Beirut.

3. There is no doubt that the 5th Division from the Tokat area also took part in the operations, presumably at war strength; this would give for the forces employed:—

—	Sabres.	Rifles.	Guns.
Vth Corps..	100	13,500	48
5th Division	50	6,750	12
VIIth Corps	1,600	15,750	48
Corps troops	..	3,000	..
3 Frontier battalions	..	3,000	..
Gendarmerie	..	7,000	..
	1,750	49,000	108

Add for personnel of artillery 2,700; gives a total of 49,450.

This is considerably lower than the figure given by General Sarrail (telegram No. 287 from Highcoma, Bagdad, to Secretary of State for Colonies, dated the 4th June, 1925, repeated to Constantinople, No. 195). But I think that the French Intelligence have always put the strength of the infantry units of the VIIth Corps at too high a figure.

[**E 3974/1091/44**] No. 3.

Mr. Hoare to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received July* 7)

(No. 522.)

Sir,

Therapia, July 1, 1925.

IN continuation of Sir Ronald Lindsay's despatch No. 468 of the 9th ultimo, I have the honour to report that the trial before the Diarbekr Independence Tribunal of Sheikh Said and of other persons implicated with him in the Kurdish rebellion was terminated on the 28th ultimo, after lasting nearly a month. No details of any serious public interest regarding the evidence produced during these proceedings have been published. Sheikh Said and more than forty of the other accused were condemned to death, a smaller number were condemned to terms of penal servitude and imprisonment, while the tribal Major Kassim, who gave State evidence during the trial, and fifteen or twenty others were acquitted. In addition, the tribunal ordered that the monasteries and convents in the eastern vilayets should be closed down on the grounds that they had been used by the sheikhs to establish over the ignorant population an ascendancy based on the grossest superstition.

2. After pronouncing sentence, the president of the tribunal is reported by the Anatolian agency to have addressed the condemned as follows:—

> "Certain of you banded yourselves together to advance your personal interests, while others were guided by foreign propaganda and political ambition. You all worked for the same object, namely, the foundation of an independent Kurdistan. In bringing about the general rising, which you had meditated for years, you left

this region in fire. Owing to the energetic action of the Government of the republic, your reactionary revolt was immediately suppressed by the deadly blows of the republican army, and you were all captured and brought here to render an account in the presence of justice. Everyone must know that the Government of the young republic will not tolerate sedition, reaction or any kind of evil activity, and that by decisive measures it will afford neither time nor place for such crimes. The wretched population of these regions, who for years have been crushed under the tyranny of the sheikhs, aghas and beys, and whose property and lives have been sacrificed to the whims of these persons, delivered at last from your evil power, will advance along the roads of prosperity and progress of our republic in peace and happiness, while you will pay with your lives on the gallows of justice for the blood you have shed and the homes you have destroyed. This is the dread, but just, sentence of the laws of the republic."

3. The Public Prosecutor having informed the tribunal that he renounced his right of delaying for three days the carrying out of the sentence, those condemned to death were hanged before dawn on the 29th June in an open space near the old Aleppo Gate at Diarbekr.

4. The local Turkish newspapers publish in tones of ferocious exultation gruesome details received from their special correspondents of the executions, describing how those present—journalists, artisans and others—competed to take a personal part in the hangings, and report at length the remarks made by the condemned and their demeanour. In recording the execution of these leaders of the Kurdish race, the press has followed to the end the line mentioned in His Majesty's Ambassador's despatch No. 435 of the 2nd June of holding them up to public ridicule.

5. It is reported that the Tribunal of Independence for the Eastern Vilayets will shortly transfer its seat to Urfa.

I have, &c.
R. H. HOARE.

[E 4099/4099/44] No. 4.

Mr. Hoare to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received July* 13.)

(No. 538.)

Sir, *Therapia, July* 8, 1925.

WITH reference to Sir Ronald Lindsay's despatch No. 721 of the 1st October last, reporting that a Treaty of Friendship had been signed by Turkey and Spain on the 27th September, 1924, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of this treaty, which I have received from the Spanish Legation, and to report that the exchange of ratifications provided for in article 3 took place at the delegation of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on the 6th instant. The ratifications of the similar Treaties of Friendship concluded by Turkey with Czechoslovakia, Holland and Norway were also exchanged at the delegation on the 6th instant.

I have, &c.
R. H. HOARE.

Enclosure in No. 4.

Treaty of Friendship between Turkey and Spain.

L'ESPAGNE d'une part, et la Turquie d'autre part, animés du désir d'établir et de consolider les liens de sincère amitié entre le Royaume d'Espagne et la République turque et pénétrées de la même conviction que les relations entre les deux États, une fois établies, serviront à la prospérité et au bien-être de leurs nations respectives, ont résolu de conclure un Traité d'Amitié, et ont à cet effet nommé pour leurs plénipotentiaires, savoir :

Sa Majesté le Roi d'Espagne : son Excellence Don Juan Servert y Vest, Envoyé extraordinaire et Ministre plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté le Roi d'Espagne ;

Le Président de la République turque : son Excellence Tewfik Kiamil Bey, Sous-Secrétaire d'État au Ministère des Affaires étrangères ;

Lesquels, après avoir échangé leurs pleins pouvoirs, trouvés en bonne et due forme, ont convenu des dispositions suivantes :

ARTICLE 1er.

Il y aura paix inviolable et amitié sincère et perpétuelle entre le Royaume d'Espagne et la République turque ainsi qu'entre les citoyens des deux parties.

ARTICLE 2.

Les hautes parties contractantes sont d'accord pour établir les relations diplomatiques entre les deux États, conformément aux principes du droit des gens. Elles conviennent que les représentants diplomatiques de chacune d'elles recevront, à charge de réciprocité, dans le territoire de l'autre, le traitement consacré par les principes généraux du droit international public général.

ARTICLE 3.

Le présent traité sera ratifié et les ratifications en seront échangées à Constantinople le plus tôt que faire se pourra.

Il entrera en vigueur le quinzième jour après l'échange des ratifications.

En foi de quoi les plénipotentiaires respectifs ont signé le présent traité et y ont apposé leurs sceaux.

Fait en double à Angora, le 27 septembre 1924.

JUAN SERVERT.
TEWFIK KIAMIL.

[E 4100/544/44] No. 5.

Mr. Hoare to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received July* 13.)

(No. 540.)

Sir, *Therapia, July* 8, 1925.

IN his despatch No. 460 of the 8th June, His Majesty's Ambassador reported the stage which had been reached in the Turco-German negotiations for a commercial treaty.

2. Shortly after this despatch was written the German Ambassador proceeded to Angora and the negotiations continued until last week, when the Bairam holidays made a suspension necessary. Herr Nadolny then returned to Constantinople, and leaves again to-morrow morning in order to attend the next plenary sitting, which takes place on the 11th instant.

3. I am not aware as to the exact stage which has been reached in the negotiations, but, as you will have seen from Sir R. Lindsay's despatch, the German Government were endeavouring to conclude a *modus vivendi* in order that trade should not be hampered. Herr Nadolny had almost given up hope of obtaining even this until he was suddenly informed by Nusret Bey on the 6th instant that the Turkish Government had now agreed to the conclusion of a *modus vivendi* arrangement, under which German goods will be admitted under the tariff of the Lausanne Treaty, and Turkish imports into Germany will enjoy most-favoured-nation treatment. On reading the note in which this information was conveyed, Herr Nadolny saw to his surprise that the consent of the Council of Ministers to this arrangement had been given as long ago as the 19th February. Herr Nadolny further told me that he expects his further negotiations to be long and arduous, but that, having got his *modus vivendi*, he was in no hurry. He had tried, but quite in vain, to remove their objections to a most-favoured-nation treaty, which they regard as savouring of Capitulations.

4. It is almost incredible that the Turkish administrative machinery should have worked in the disorganised manner indicated above, but as I obtained this information from Herr Nadolny himself I can only believe it is true.

5. Whatever may be the reason for such action, I can only suppose that the Turks, who have infinitely more to lose than the Germans by the absence of any agreement, were thoroughly frightened by the agreement which the German and Greek Governments had concluded, and suddenly realised that they must put into force the concession for which the final consent had already been granted.

I have, &c.
R. H. HOARE.

No. 6.

Sir M. Cheetham to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received July* 15.)

(No. 120.)

(Telegraphic.) *Athens, July* 14, 1925.

ON news of private telegram from Germanos, Minister for Foreign Affairs approached me with request for intervention by His Majesty's Government. I said this was quite out of the question and that Greece and Turkey must settle their own difficulties. I advised Minister for Foreign Affairs, in spite of provocation, to persevere in recent Greek policy of agreement with Turks. He thought that in that case it would be best to go the whole way and to ratify as they stood protocols signed by late Government, which it was proposed to modify. He said he would advise Prime Minister in this sense.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 21.)

[**E 4245/4099/44**] No. 7.

Mr. Hoare to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received July* 21.)

(No. 542.)

Sir, *Therapia, July* 13, 1925.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 538 of the 8th instant, transmitting a copy of the Treaty of Friendship signed by Turkey and Spain on the 27th September, 1924, I have the honour to report that the information given in that despatch respecting the exchange of ratifications, although obtained from the delegation of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, is not altogether correct. The delegation now inform me that the ratifications of the Treaty of Friendship with Spain and of the similar treaties with Czechoslovakia and Sweden, not Norway as stated, were exchanged at the delegation on the 6th instant. The ratifications of the Treaty of Friendship with Holland have not yet been exchanged, as Holland has not yet ratified. Ratifications of the Treaty of Friendship between Turkey and Denmark were exchanged at the delegation on the 7th instant.

I have, &c.
R. H. HOARE.

[**E 4230/109/44**] No. 8.

Mr. Hoare to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received July* 20.)

(No. 547.)

Sir, *Therapia, July* 14, 1925.

WITH reference to Sir R. Lindsay's despatch No. 333 of the 28th April regarding the residence of the foreign representatives in Turkey, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of the reply which I have received to the note of the 26th April, a copy of which was enclosed in the despatch under reference.

2. This reply appears to me to be quite satisfactory and does not, in my opinion, call for any further action on the part of His Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
R. H. HOARE.

Enclosure in No. 8.

Nousret Bey to Mr. Hoare.

M. le Chargé d'Affaires, *Constantinople, le 12 juillet* 1925.

EN réponse à la note que son Excellence Sir R. Lindsay a bien voulu m'adresser le 26 avril 1925, j'ai l'honneur de vous faire savoir que la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie ayant voté la loi autorisant le Gouvernement à offrir aux missions diplomatiques étrangères des terrains pour la construction de leur Ambassade ou Légation, ces terrains seront mis prochainement à la disposition des susdites missions.

En ce qui concerne le second alinéa de la note susmentionnée de son Excellence Sir R. Lindsay, sans vouloir entrer en discussion sur le principe reconnu suivant lequel

c'est pour l'établissement des relations internationales et pour les besoins réciproques des États intéressés, que ceux-ci se font représenter dans leurs capitales respectives, je crois devoir préciser que dans la note du 19 mars 1925 de M. le Ministre des Affaires étrangères il n'a pas été question de mettre en doute le fait également reconnu de la liberté de déplacement ainsi que de séjour temporaire dans telle ou telle localité que possèdent naturellement les Ambassadeurs ou Ministres et leur suite.

En outre, en tenant compte des difficultés matérielles du moment et dans le but de donner aux représentants étrangers le temps voulu pour s'assurer le comfort personnel qui leur est nécessaire, le Gouvernement de la République a laissé provisoirement à Constantinople un fonctionnaire du Département des Affaires étrangères en qualité de délégué; mais il ne saurait, naturellement, être question de maintenir indéfiniment une telle délégation.

Je suis chargé par mon Gouvernement de vous assurer qu'il n'a en vue que de resserrer encore davantage les bonnes relations existant actuellement entre les deux pays.

Veuillez, &c.
M. NOUSRET.

[**E 4233/55/44**] No. 9.

Mr. Hoare to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received July* 20.)

(No. 553.)

Sir, *Therapia, July* 15, 1925.

WITH reference to Sir R. Lindsay's despatch No. 434 of the 2nd June, I have the honour to inform you that Mgr. Basil, Metropolitan of Nicæa, was elected Œcumenical Patriarch on the 13th instant by 13 votes to 2. I enclose a record of his life which has been supplied to me by the dragoman of the Patriarchate.

2. The election did not proceed without incident, for shortly before it was due to start a party of men led by a certain Damaniadis, who in 1923 had attempted a *coup* against the Patriarch Meletios, tried to rush the Patriarchate, stating that they had come to elect the Patriarch themselves. However, with the help of the police, who arrived quickly on the scene, order was restored and the election took place.

3. Another incident, which occurred on the eve of the election, is perhaps worth mentioning. Shortly before midnight three individuals went to the house of Mgr. Germanos, Metropolitan of Sardis, and told him that the Vali and the director of the police wished to see him. He duly complied with these instructions, but after the party had been driving a short distance the car suddenly stopped at a lonely spot, the prelate was seized and his assailants proceeded to cut off his beard and hair. Having done this they left him and departed. I am not aware that he was a likely candidate for the patriarchal throne, but it is possible that the three individuals, who have not been caught, thought that by their action they might prejudice his chances of election.

4. Yesterday morning an official of the Patriarchate called at the Pera Embassy and stated that he had been instructed to announce the election of the Patriarch. There would be no written announcement. At the same time his Holiness would be glad to receive the congratulations of the heads of the diplomatic missions. After consulting one or two of my colleagues, I have decided to confine my greetings to an ordinary "p.f." card.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Athens.

I have, &c.
R. H. HOARE.

Enclosure in No. 9.

Biography supplied by the Patriarchate.

SA Sainteté Basile III, élu Archevêque de Constantinople, Nouvelle-Rome et Patriarche œcuménique le 13 juillet 1925, est né en 1850 à Scutari de Constantinople. Appartenant à une famille notable des Géorgiadès, il a fait ses premières études à Constantinople et puis en Grèce. Diplômé de la Faculté de Théologie de l'Université d'Athènes, il a été nommé en 1893 Professeur de Théologie et de Philosophie et de l'ancien Hébreu à l'École théologique de Halki, charge qu'il a remplie pendant sept ans avec beaucoup de succès. En 1880, il s'est rendu en France, en Angleterre, en

Allemagne et en Italie. A Londres, il a fait des études approfondies sur différents manuscrits grecs théologiques et byzantins.

Rentré à Constantinople en 1884, il a été nommé Directeur de l'École patriarcale du Phanar (séminaire), qu'il a complètement réformée et réorganisée.

En 1889, il a été élu Métropolitain d'Anchialos et en 1895 il a été invité à Constantinople comme membre du Saint-Synode du Patriarcat œcuménique pour la première fois. Il fit partie avec le Métropolitain de Nicomédie, Mgr. Philothée, de la délégation patriarcale qui s'est rendue en Russie pour assister au couronnement de Sa Majesté le Tsar Nicolas II. Il a gouverné le diocèse d'Anchialos jusqu'à 1906, date à laquelle ont eu lieu les événements connus contre les Grecs orthodoxes de Bulgarie et la destruction de la ville, dont à peine a-t-il réussi à se sauver. Rentré à Constantinople du temps de sa Sainteté le Patriarche Joachim III, il a été envoyé peu après à Chypre en mission spéciale comme Exarque patriarcal. En 1909 il a été élu Métropolitain de Pélagonie (Monastir, Macédoine), diocèse qu'il a gouverné jusqu'à 1910. En cette année-ci il a été élu Métropolitain de Nicée, charge qu'il a occupée jusqu'à ce jour. Pendant qu'il gouvernait ce diocèse, il a été invité une première fois du temps de sa Sainteté le Patriarche Germanos V, et une dernière fois du temps de sa Sainteté le Patriarche Mélétios IV, comme membre du Saint-Synode, charge dont il a été investi jusqu'à son élection au siège patriarcal œcuménique.

Sa Sainteté Basile III est connue pour sa haute et profonde érudition. On peut dire de lui qu'il est le plus savant parmi tous les prélats du trône œcuménique. Il a publié de nombreux ouvrages ecclésiastiques. D'un caractère droit et ferme, il est connu pour ses sentiments de compassion envers les pauvres et les nécessiteux.

Le 14 juillet 1925.

[**E 4235/109/44**] No. 10.

Mr. Hoare to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received July* 20.)

(No. 555.)

Sir, *Therapia, July* 15, 1925.

WITH reference to Sir R. Lindsay's despatch No. 436 of the 2nd June, I have the honour to inform you that the French Ambassador returned to Constantinople from Angora on Saturday last. The immediate cause of his return was his desire to be present at the 14th July celebrations at his Embassy in Constantinople.

2. I have been unable to see his Excellency since his return owing to a slight indisposition from which he is suffering, but from an interview which he has given to the press, and from some remarks made to the counsellor of the Italian Embassy, I should not gather that he has achieved much, if anything.

3. In his statement to the press M. Sarraut remarked that he had not settled anything sensational, and that he had discussed many outstanding questions with the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, who had promised to look into them, and that he was now awaiting their solution. As regards the "coupons" question, he said that he had mentioned it incidentally to Tewfik Rushdi Bey, but that, as it was not for them to discuss, nothing had been settled. He added, "if negotiations on this subject are to be opened, they can only take place directly between the bondholders and the Turkish Government or its delegates. Turkish delegates have gone to Paris to discuss the division of the debt, and it is they who should be approached directly for discussion and negotiation. Personally, I regard this question from the point of view of Turkish interests as well as of French interests. But that is my personal point of view, and once more it is not for me to negotiate this question." Other statements in this interview are hardly worth reporting.

4. To M. Talliani the Ambassador expatiated at considerable length on the lines of his interview with His Majesty's Ambassador, as reported in his despatch No. 440 of the 2nd June. I gather that he is considerably perturbed by the position which the Soviet Ambassador has won at Angora, and that, in his opinion, it will be necessary for Western European nations to exercise the utmost patience in dealing with the Turks lest Bolshevik influence acquire a dangerous ascendancy in this country.

5. I hope to see M. Sarraut in the course of the next few days.

I have, &c
R. H. HOARE.

[**E 4261/821/44**] No. 11.

Mr. Scott to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received July* 21.)

(No. 182.)

Sir, *Copenhagen, July* 13, 1925.

WITH reference to Lord Granville's despatch No. 24 of the 4th February, I have the honour to report that a Danish Foreign Office communiqué has appeared in the press stating that, according to telegraphic information received from the Danish Legation at Constantinople, the ratification documents of the Danish-Turkish Treaty of Friendship were exchanged at Constantinople on the 6th instant.

2. The treaty was signed at Angora on the 26th January.

I have, &c.
O. A. SCOTT.

[**E 4379/1895/44**] No. 12.

Mr. Hoare to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received July* 27.)

(No. 567.)

Sir, *Therapia, July* 20, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that since the end of the trial of Sheikh Said (reported in my despatch No. 522 of the 1st instant) the press has devoted a good deal of its space to another conspiracy which the Government claims to have unearthed, and with the investigation of which it has entrusted the Angora Independence Tribunal. It is stated that under the auspices of the ex-Sultan Vahideddin, an organisation which calls itself the "Reform Order" or "Reform Sect" has been working for his re-establishment on the throne. From the fragmentary reports which are made public it is difficult to form a cohesive idea even of the Government's view of the case, but it appears to be somewhat as follows:—

2. The Reform Order was, it is stated, founded in 1920 by Kiraz Hamdi Pasha, then Minister of War, for the purpose of raising the fallen prestige of Islam by means of a world-wide Moslem union or freemasonry. Its basis was religious and its first principle loyalty to the Sultan Caliph. The order was framed with a hierarchy of many degrees, the highest of which belonged to the Sultan. Its centres were given religious names, such as "tekkieh" and convent. It took cover behind a number of anti-Kemalist organisations, such as the "Association of Freedom and *Entente*," the "Resuscitation of the Fatherland Association," the "Friends of Anatolia," the "Mentors," and it embraced members of dervish orders. It sent emissaries to Egypt, India, Irak and Syria. But the whole movement came to a halt with the victory of the Kemalist forces and the flight of Sultan Vahideddin.

3. The Government asserts that the Reform Order has recently been active again, that its adherents in Turkey have been in touch with the ex-Sultan at San Remo, with Prince Selim and Prince Nizameddin in Syria, and with Kiraz Hamdi Pasha, Mehmed Ali Bey (an ex-Minister of the Interior), Ismail Bey of Gumuljina and other political refugees in Roumania, Greece, Cyprus, Syria and Irak, and that their object is to bring Vahideddin back again to the throne, even at the cost of foreign intervention. Further, it is asserted that Sheikh Said and his fellow rebels were working in accord with the Reform Order, and that contact was kept up between the conspirators in different parts of Anatolia by means of agents who hawked patent medicines. Of all this the Government claims to have documentary or oral evidence, and the press reports at intervals the imminent publication of sensational details. Certain cafés and other meeting places here have been raided, and, it is said, details of the organisation have been found. The distance from the Independence Tribunal to the gallows, too, has latterly proved so short that prisoners are apt to make very full confessions in the hope of saving their necks.

4. There cannot, I think, be much doubt that for personal reasons, from habitual discontent and from conservatism, a large section of the population would like to see the end of the Kemalist régime. But that there has been afoot such an active conspiracy as the Government alleges is less likely. It is possible that the ex-Sultan and his scattered followers have been in correspondence from abroad with persons in Turkey. But they could hardly hope to restore the Sultan without the co-operation of Rauf Bey and the leaders of the now extinguished Opposition. These latter appear to have been lying very low, in view of the great activity of the secret police

and the independence tribunals. Perhaps the Opposition leaders would be prepared at a favourable moment to bring the Sultan back on terms, but there has been no indication that they have been seeking the help of the Reform Order.

5. I incline rather to the belief that there has been some ineffectual correspondence between the ex-Sultan's followers abroad and in Turkey, and that he lent some moral support to the Kurdish rebellion. The Government having at hand the convenient instrument of the independence tribunals, would naturally take the opportunity of dealing in exemplary fashion with all persons whom it had any reason or pretext for suspecting as reactionary. The accounts which appear are very vague, and I fancy that many of the offences under enquiry are old enough to be covered by the amnesty; but this plea, if invoked, is not published.

6. The Angora Independence Tribunal has also had before it the case of an Arab philanthropic association. I am not sure what association this is, and I hesitate to show any interest in it. It seems to have been suspected of being in touch with political societies, and the house of Emin Pasha, who was once, I believe, in command of the Dardanelles and now lives in Irak, was raided. But neither there nor otherwise does any evidence seem to have been found, and those who were arrested have now been released.

7. In other fields the Government has been equally ruthless. A week or so ago a simultaneous strike broke out among the telegraphists at Adana, Samsun and Trebizond. They were at once sent to the Angora Independence Tribunal, and it was said that they were acting at Communist instigation. This has since been denied, and it seems that they were merely suffering from gross overwork, underpay and neglect. However, whatever the result of the trial, it will doubtless be some time before any Government employees strike again.

8. The Independence Tribunal, which moved from Diarbekir to Urfa, has now gone on to the Vilayet of Mamuret-ul-Aziz, and thither half-a-dozen Constantinople journalists will be sent on for trial. They were arrested many weeks ago on the absurd charge that their barely expressed criticism of the Government had helped to promote the Kurdish rebellion. Meanwhile, their colleagues, who have been unmolested, are too terrified in any way to discuss internal politics.

I have, &c.

R. H. HOARE.

[E 4380/3822/44] No. 13.

Mr. Hoare to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 27.)

(No. 568.)

Sir, *Therapia, July 20, 1925.*

WITH reference to paragraph 2 of my despatch No. 489 of the 22nd June, I have the honour to report that, according to an American missionary who has recently arrived from Mardin, the conditions under which the non-Moslem population of that place live have very much improved in the last year or two. They are almost entirely Syrian Jacobites, and their better relations with the authorities are due very largely to the tact of the Assyrian Patriarch, who lives at Mardin. They are under no disability in the matter of trade or of movement in the district, and are fairly prosperous. The Vali is a competent man, and treats them properly. The American missionaries, who are the only foreigners, are only allowed to communicate with the outside world in Turkish, but this seems to be a censorship measure due to the Kurdish rebellion.

I have, &c.

R. H. HOARE.

[E 4387/109/44] No. 14.

Mr. Hoare to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 27.)

(No. 575.)

Sir, *Therapia, July 21, 1925.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 555 of the 15th instant, I have the honour to report that I called on the French Ambassador yesterday with a view to ascertaining the results of his recent negotiations at Angora. His Excellency had not much to say on the subject beyond what I have already reported. His main impression appeared to be that it was impossible to try and hurry the Turks, who were intensely

suspicious and cautious in negotiation, because they realised the inferiority of their mental equipment and were consequently afraid of "giving themselves away." His present intention is not to return to Angora until October.

2. It will be seen that M. Sarraut has reconsidered his first intentions, as reported in Sir R. Lindsay's despatch No. 436 of the 2nd June, either to achieve a prompt result or to return to France.

3. M. Sarraut then proceeded to discuss the state of Anglo-Turkish relations, saying that he had endeavoured to make the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs realise that Turkey had everything to gain and nothing to lose by placing her relations with Great Britain on a satisfactory footing. The Turks should understand that the policy of His Majesty's Government in the Near East had been entirely reconsidered within the last two years, and especially since you had taken charge of British foreign relations. It was perfectly evident from all that you had said and done that all your efforts were devoted to healing the wounds of the war. He said that he thought he had made some sort of impression, though of course the atmosphere of suspicion which he had already described was a great difficulty and, moreover, the Turks were obsessed by the question of Mosul.

4 M Sarraut explained, speaking on the lines reported in Sir R. Lindsay's despatch No. 440 of the 2nd June, that he had pressed Tewfik Rushdi Bey somewhat vigorously on this subject, because, as he told the latter, of Russian aggression in Asia. Tewfik Rushdi Bey replied that it was fully realised in Turkey that the old struggle between "the whale and the bear" was again engaged, and perhaps with greater intensity than ever before. Turkey was determined to maintain her independence and had no intention of being reduced to the state either of a mandated territory or to that of a federated Sovietic republic. He was greatly preoccupied by news of the spread of Bolshevism in Chinese Turkestan.

5. M. Sarraut then said that he wondered whether, whatever the decisions of the League of Nations regarding the Irak frontier, His Majesty's Government could not find means, after it had been announced, to make a spontaneous concession to Turkish aspirations; such a *geste* would have an enormous effect. I said that I did not know enough about the ethnographic and other considerations to have the slightest idea whether such a step would be even remotely possible and he replied that he was in the same position.

6. I then managed to bring the conversation back to his direct negotiations at Angora and he told me that he had tried and failed to induce Tewfik Rushdi Bey to discuss the question of the coupon with him; he had pointed out that the present régime in Turkey depended to an almost perilous extent on one man; that régime was living on its great achievements in driving out the Greeks and winning a satisfactory peace at Lausanne. The popularity thus acquired was evidently on the wane. The recent political trials and the forcible elimination of the opposition, which had been considered necessary, showed that this was the case. If, therefore, the Administration did not take early steps to improve the economic conditions of the country, a collapse, owing to public discontent, was to be foreseen. The only way any rapid improvement could be secured was by attracting foreign capital. Foreign capital could not be attracted unless the Turkish Government showed a desire to meet its creditors in a reasonable spirit. Tewfik Rushdi Bey had, however, refused to be drawn, saying that the negotiations would be conducted between the Turkish representatives in Paris and the representatives of the bondholders.

7. It is perhaps worth recording that a few weeks ago the German Ambassador talked to me on the subject of Anglo-Turkish relations in a strain very similar to M. Sarraut. He did not refer specifically to Mosul, but declared emphatically that "eine freundliche Geste" by us would produce a marked effect and would be to the general advantage. It is curious that the French and German Ambassadors should hold language quite similar to that used by the Turkish Ambassador at his first conversation with you as recorded in your despatch No. 638 of the 29th June.

I have, &c.

R. H. HOARE.

[E 4414/1601/44] No. 15.

Mr. Eyres to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received July 28.)

(No. 92.)

Sir, *Durazzo, July 18, 1925.*

WITH reference to Mr. Parr's despatch No. 89 of the 16th December, 1923, and to my annual report for 1923, paragraphs 31 and 32, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of the Treaty of Friendship which was made between the Albanian and Ottoman Governments in the autumn of 1923, and which has now been ratified by both parties on the 31st May last.

2. The Consular Convention has not been carried through, owing to the dilatoriness and hesitation of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs at Angora. The Albanian delegate, M. Recuf Fitzo, finding that negotiations would be prolonged to an abnormal length, left Angora in despair of attaining this object of his mission.

3. Diplomatic relations are to be established between the two countries, and I learn that the Turkish Minister at present in Belgrade is to be appointed to Tirana, and a Turkish consul will be appointed at Valona. I am not yet informed as to the Albanian nominations.

I have, &c.
H. C. A. EYRES.

Enclosure in No. 15.

Traité d'Amitié entre l'État albanais et la République turque.

L'ÉTAT albanais, d'une part, et la République turque, d'autre part,

Considérant l'intimité des liens et attaches qu'ont laissé cinq siècles d'unité politique dans la vie et les traditions des deux peuples ;

Mus par le désir réciproque de consolider et d'établir des relations de sincère amitié aussitôt que possible ;

Convaincus qu'une fois établies, les relations entre les deux États serviront la prospérité et le bien-être de leur nation respective ;

Ont décidé de conclure un Traité d'Amitié et ont, à cet effet, nommé pour leurs plénipotentiaires, savoir :

L'État albanais :

Echref Bey Fracheri, Président de la Chambre et de la délégation albanaise ;
Djaffer Bey Villa, Secrétaire général du Ministère des Affaires étrangères albanais ;
Nezir Bey Leskovik, membre de la délégation albanaise ;

La République turque :

Chukri Kaya Bey, Député de Mentécha à la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie ;

Lesquels, après avoir exhibé leurs pleins pouvoirs, reconnus en bonne et due forme, sont convenus des dispositions suivantes :

ARTICLE 1er.

Il y aura paix inviolable et amitié sincère et perpétuelle entre l'État albanais et la République turque, ainsi qu'entre les citoyens des deux États.

ARTICLE 2.

Les hautes parties contractantes sont d'accord pour établir des relations diplomatiques entre les deux États, conformément aux principes du droit des gens.

Elles conviennent que les agents diplomatiques et consulaires de chacune d'elles jouiront, dans le territoire de l'autre, des privilèges, honneurs et immunités conformément aux principes susénoncés et à charge de réciprocité.

ARTICLE 3.

Les hautes parties contractantes sont d'accord pour conclure, à la date de ce jour, une Convention d'Établissement et un Arrangement concernant la Nationalité.

ARTICLE 4.

Le présent traité sera ratifié et les ratifications en seront échangées à Angora le plus tôt que faire se pourra. Il entrera en vigueur le quinzième jour après l'échange des ratifications.

En foi de quoi, les plénipotentiaires respectifs ont signé le présent traité et y ont apposé leurs sceaux.

Fait en double à Angora, le .

Convention d'Établissement entre l'Albanie et la Turquie.

L'État albanais d'une part, la République turque d'autre part, animés du désir de fixer les conditions d'établissement des ressortissants albanais en Turquie et des ressortissants turcs en Albanie, ont résolu de conclure une convention et à cet effet ont nommé pour leurs plénipotentiaires, savoir :

L'État albanais :

Echref Bey Fracheri, Président de la Chambre et de la délégation albanaise ;
Djaffer Bey Villa, Secrétaire général du Ministère des Affaires étrangères albanais ;
Nezir Bey Leskovik, membre de la délégation albanaise ;

La République turque :

Chukri Kaya Bey, Député de Mentécha à la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie ;

Lesquels, après avoir exhibé leurs pleins pouvoirs, reconnus en bonne et due forme, sont convenus des dispositions suivantes :

ARTICLE 1er.

Les ressortissants de chacune des parties contractantes auront le droit de s'établir et de séjourner sur le territoire de l'autre et pourront, en conséquence, aller, venir et circuler librement, en se conformant aux lois et règlements en vigueur dans le pays.

ARTICLE 2.

Il est entendu que les dispositions de la présente convention, n'ayant pas pour objet la question d'immigration, ne portent pas atteinte au droit de chacune des parties contractantes d'autoriser ou d'interdire librement l'immigration dans son pays.

ARTICLE 3.

Les ressortissants de chacune des parties contractantes auront sur le territoire de l'autre, à l'égal des nationaux, le droit d'exercer toute espèce d'industrie et de commerce et de se vouer à tout métier et profession quelconque, exceptés ceux réservés aux seuls nationaux en vertu des lois et règlements respectifs, ou bien en Turquie en vertu d'un long usage (débardeurs, mahoniers, &c.).

Les ressortissants de chacune des parties contractantes n'auront à payer pour séjourner et s'établir sur le territoire de l'autre ainsi que pour l'exercice, sur ce territoire, de tous genres de commerce, industrie, métier ou profession, aucun impôt, taxe ou charge, de quelque nature que ce soit, autres ou plus élevés que ceux perçus des nationaux.

Les ressortissants de chacune des parties contractantes ne seront soumis sur le territoire de l'autre, quant à leur personne, leurs biens, droits et intérêts et quant à l'acquisition, possession, mutation ou héritage, à aucune charge, taxe ou impôt direct ou indirect, autres ou plus élevés que ceux qui pourront être imposés aux nationaux.

Article 4.

Dans le cas où l'une des parties contractantes, soit à la suite d'une sentence légale, soit d'après les lois ou règlements sur la police des mœurs, sur la police sanitaire ou sur la mendicité, soit pour des motifs de sûreté intérieure de l'État, expulserait par mesure individuelle les ressortissants de l'autre partie contractante, celle-ci s'engage à les recevoir, eux et leurs familles. Le transport jusqu'à la frontière des personnes expulsées sera à la charge de la partie qui expulse.

Article 5.

Les ressortissants de chacune des parties contractantes auront sous condition de réciprocité, sur le territoire de l'autre, le droit d'acquérir, de posséder et d'aliéner toute espèce de biens mobiliers ou immobiliers, à l'exception des biens ruraux, en se conformant aux lois et règlements du pays. Ils pourront en disposer par acte de vente, échange, donation, testament ou autre acte quelconque, ainsi qu'entrer en possession par voie de succession en vertu de la loi ou par suite des dispositions entre vifs ou testamentaires.

Ils ne seront assujettis dans aucun des cas susmentionnés à des charges, taxes ou impôts, sous quelque dénomination que ce soit, autres ou plus élevés que ceux qui sont ou seront établis pour les nationaux.

Article 6.

Les ressortissants de l'une des parties contractantes ne seront astreints sur le territoire de l'autre à aucun service militaire, soit dans les armées de terre et de mer, soit dans les gardes ou milices nationales, ni à aucune obligation ou charge remplaçant le service militaire.

Ils seront exempts de tout emprunt forcé. Ils seront également exempts de toute autre prestation pécuniaire levée pour des buts de guerre et qui ne serait pas imposée légalement aux nationaux.

Article 7.

Les sociétés anonymes ou autres, commerciales et industrielles, qui ont leur siège social sur le territoire de l'une des parties contractantes et qui sont constituées conformément aux lois de cette partie, seront reconnues également comme dûment constituées sur le territoire de l'autre partie, et leur capacité et le droit d'ester en justice seront déterminés par les lois de leur pays d'origine. Elles auront, à condition de réciprocité et en se soumettant aux lois du pays, le droit de s'établir, d'exercer sur le territoire de l'autre partie toute espèce d'industrie et de commerce et d'y acquérir toute sorte de biens mobiliers, ainsi que les biens immeubles nécessaires au fonctionnement de la société, étant entendu, dans ce cas, que l'acquisition n'est pas l'objet même de la société. Les sociétés anonymes ou autres, commerciales ou industrielles, de chacune des parties contractantes ne pourront, dans aucun cas, être soumises pour l'exercice du commerce et de l'industrie, dans le territoire de l'autre, à des droits, taxes, impôts ou charges, sous quelque dénomination que ce soit, autres ou plus élevés que ceux qui sont ou seront exigés des sociétés nationales.

Il est, toutefois, entendu que l'exception prévue au premier paragraphe de l'article 5 s'applique également aux biens immobiliers que pourront acquérir les sociétés en vertu du paragraphe précédent.

Article 8.

Les ressortissants de chacune des parties contractantes ne pourront, sur le territoire de l'autre, être expropriés de leurs biens ni privés, même temporairement, de la jouissance de leurs biens que pour cause légalement reconnue d'utilité publique et contre remboursement de la valeur.

Article 9.

Les ressortissants de chacune des parties contractantes jouiront sur le territoire de l'autre en tout ce qui concerne la protection légale et judiciaire de leur personne et de leurs biens du même traitement que les nationaux.

Article 10.

La présente convention entrera en vigueur un mois après la date de l'échange des ratifications et aura la durée de deux ans. Si la convention n'est pas dénoncée par l'une ou l'autre des hautes parties contractantes au moins six mois avant l'expiration de ladite période de deux ans, elle restera en vigueur jusqu'à ce qu'elle soit dénoncée; en cas de dénonciation, cette denonciation ne doit produire ses effets qu'après l'expiration d'un délai de six mois.

La présente convention sera ratifiée et les ratifications en seront échangées à Angora, aussitôt que faire se pourra.

Fait en double à Angora, le .

Arrangement concernant la Nationalité.

Article 1er.

Les personnes originaires des territoires de l'État albanais et domiciliées sur le territoire dudit État au moment de l'entrée en vigueur du présent arrangement deviendront sujets de l'État albanais.

Article 2.

Les personnes originaires des territoires de l'État albanais domiciliées en Turquie au moment de l'entrée en vigueur du présent arrangement resteront sujets turcs.

Article 3.

Les personnes originaires des territoires de l'État albanais, âgées de plus de 18 ans, domiciliées en Turquie, pourront dans le délai d'un an à partir de l'entrée en vigueur du présent arrangement abandonner la nationalité turque pour opter en faveur de la nationalité albanaise.

Les personnes qui de cette façon voudraient opter pour la nationalité albanaise devront dans l'année qui suivra la mise en vigueur de cet arrangement se dessaisir de tous leurs biens mobiliers et immobiliers, acquitter toutes dettes fiscales ou particulières, rompre tous leurs rapports et quitter la Turquie à condition de ne plus y retourner.

Il est toutefois entendu que ces personnes seront considérées comme sujets turcs jusqu'au moment où, exerçant leur droit d'option, elles quitteront les frontières de la Turquie.

Article 4.

Les Turcs âgés de plus de 18 ans, domiciliés sur le territoire de l'État albanais et qui conformément aux dispositions du présent arrangement auraient acquis la nationalité albanaise auront, dans l'année à dater de l'entrée en vigueur de cet arrangement, la faculté de réintégrer la nationalité turque et seront soumis aux dispositions de l'article 3.

Article 5.

Les personnes originaires des territoires de l'État albanais qui, tout en restant en Turquie, garderaient la nationalité turque, ainsi que les personnes originaires de la Turquie, conserveront tous leurs biens et propriétés se trouvant en Albanie. De même, ceux ayant la nationalité albanaise garderont tous leurs biens et propriétés en Turquie.

Article 6.

Les femmes mariées suivront la condition de leurs maris et les enfants âgés de moins de 18 ans suivront la condition de leurs parents, pour tout ce qui concerne l'application des dispositions des articles précédents.

Article 7.

Les ressortissants des territoires de l'État albanais qui, à la date de la mise en vigueur du présent arrangement, gardant la nationalité turque se trouveraient en dehors des territoires turcs et albanais seront libres d'opter en faveur de la nationalité albanaise, en remettant aux autorités consulaires turques une déclaration dans les six mois à partir de l'entrée en vigueur de la présente convention.

[E 4708/1091/44] No. 16.

Mr. Hoare to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received August* 10.)

(No. 602.)

Sir, *Therapia, August* 3, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to report that a meeting of a rather unusual character was held in the building of the Grand National Assembly at Angora on the 27th ultimo, to which all Deputies belonging to the People's party and then at Angora were summoned by urgent letter. The President of the Republic, the Prime Minister and such Ministers as were at Angora attended the meeting, which lasted the whole afternoon. Ali Saib Bey, Deputy for Kozan and a member of the Tribunal of Independence for the Eastern Provinces, and Feizi Bey, Deputy for Diarbekr, who was Minister of Public Works in Fethi Bey's Government which preceded the present Government, were among those present. As the Grand National Assembly is now having its long vacation, and no one will live in Angora during this season who can avoid doing so, the number of persons attending the meeting was comparatively small.

2. According to the reports which have reached Constantinople, the meeting discussed in general the line to be followed by the tribunal in dealing with "feudalism," and in particular an incident which had arisen out of evidence given before the Tribunal of Independence during a sitting at Diarbekr on the 22nd June last.

3. The following is a short account of the incident referred to: Koghulu Hussein, one of the persons accused of participation in the Kurdish rebellion, when brought before the Tribunal of Independence and questioned by Ali Saib Bey, declared that Feizi Bey had had a conversation with a villager of the Diarbekr region, and in answer to questions respecting the new republican régime had stated that religion had been separated from the State, and that the Ghazi Pasha did not pray, but drank spirits. Other questions of Ali Saib Bey were calculated to elicit information showing that Feizi Bey was concerned in the rebellion. Feizi Bey issued a denial of these allegations on the 24th June last, and there matters rested for a month, during which time the Government were, presumably, debating whether or not to bring Feizi Bey to trial. Apparently it was decided that, as he is a native of Diarbekr, a more effective course would be to provide him with a suitable and solemn occasion to make a public profession of loyalty and to show that the Deputy for Diarbekr had no sympathy with the ideas which prompted the Kurdish insurrection. He was accordingly invited to address the meeting, and in a long speech he duly repeated his denial and expressed his respect for the President of the Republic and Ismet Pasha.

4. The meeting then proceeded to discuss the situation in the eastern vilayets and is reported to have taken a unanimous decision to extirpate "the remnants of feudalism" in those parts.

5. The "Vakt" of the 29th July and the "Aksham" of the 30th July devoted their leading articles to this subject. The former stated that if the Government made it clear that there did not exist, and could not exist, any power in this country other than law and justice, "feudalism" would be smashed beyond repair, while the latter pointed out that the beys, aghas and sheikhs were not only superfluous, but were disturbing factors in the social system. It would be an easy matter to get rid of them, the Turkish revolution having already abolished more important relics of the past such as the Caliphate. It congratulated the Government on its decision.

6. In this connection I would mention that Jemil Bey, Minister of the Interior, who left Angora in the first week of July accompanied by Refik Bey, Minister of Public Health, on a tour of the eastern vilayets, held a conference at Diarbekr on the 17th July with the valis of the region, Zeki Bey, commandant of the gendarmerie, and Midhat Bey, civil inspector, who was studying the most appropriate manner of dividing up the region for administrative purposes. Jemil Bey returned to Angora on the 2nd instant, and his views will no doubt carry weight when the measures to be introduced in the eastern vilayets, which Ismet Pasha foreshadowed in his speech to the Grand National Assembly on the 7th April last, are decided upon (Sir R. Lindsay's despatch No. 289 of the 8th April last).

I have, &c.
R. H. HOARE.

[E 4704/3831/44] No. 17.

Mr. Hoare to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received August* 10.)

(No. 605.)

Sir, *Therapia, August* 4, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Turkish Aeroplane Association, which was founded four or five months ago, has been very active recently in collecting subscriptions for the purchase of aeroplanes and other purposes connected with the development of aviation in this country.

2. The president of the association is Jevad Abbas Bey, who sits as Deputy for Bolu in the Grand National Assembly. He is at present making a tour of aeroplane factories in Europe with a view to purchasing a number of planes for the association. Although not a department of the Government, the Aeroplane Association enjoys the full support of the Government. Ministers occasionally preside at its meetings, and many of its members are Government officials and officers of the army and navy. Its activities recall the activities of the Navy Association during the years preceding the great war, particularly in the methods employed to obtain subscriptions. Pressure is, when necessary, exercised on persons with fixed incomes to bring them to contribute a definite proportion to the association. Merchants and trading concerns are assessed and firmly made to contribute in accordance with their supposed means. Propaganda is unceasing even among the poorer classes of the population, and no subscription is too small to be accepted. The association has opened branches throughout the country, and the press contains almost daily references to the sums subscribed by remote towns and villages. A sum of £T. 2,500,000 has already been subscribed, and Jevad Abbas Bey stated publicly a few weeks ago that the association was confident of receiving at least £T. 6,000,000 before the end of the year.

3. In the years 1912–14 no one doubted that the object of the Navy Association was to purchase "Dreadnoughts" as a menace to Greece. At the present time there is no reason to doubt that the activities of the Aeroplane Association are, within the limits indicated in the last paragraph of Sir Ronald Lindsay's despatch No. 305 of the 15th April, directed against Irak.

I have, &c.
R. H. HOARE.

[E 5025/109/44] No. 18.

Mr. Hoare to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received August* 24.)

(No. 634.)

Sir, *Therapia, August* 17, 1925.

IN his despatch No. 333 of the 28th April, His Majesty's Ambassador forwarded to you copies of the notes which the French and Italian Ambassadors addressed to the Turkish Government on the subject of residence of foreign representatives at Angora.

2. I have now obtained from these Embassies copies of the replies which they have received and of which I have the honour to transmit copies herewith.

3. The reply to Sir R. Lindsay's note was enclosed in my despatch No. 547 of the 14th July.

I have, &c.
R. H. HOARE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 18.

Nosret Bey to M. Sarraut.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Angora, le 6 juillet* 1925.

EN réponse à la note du 24 avril 1925, remise par M. Jessé-Curély à Nousret Bey, j'ai le plaisir d'informer votre Excellence que la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie a voté la loi autorisant le Gouvernement de la République à mettre à la disposition des missions diplomatiques étrangères des terrains pour la construction de leur Ambassade ou Légation et que prochainement ces terrains seront offerts aux susdites missions.

Le Gouvernement turc a été très heureux de recevoir les assurances relatives au désir qu'a le Gouvernement français de donner le plus grand développement à ses

relations avec le Gouvernement turc. C'est précisément parce qu'il est animé du même désir que le Gouvernement de la République voudrait voir le Corps diplomatique s'installer le plus tôt possible dans la capitale de la Turquie.

Mon Gouvernement n'a naturellement jamais songé à restreindre, comme semble le croire le Gouvernement français, la liberté de résidence et de mouvement des représentants étrangers: il a seulement voulu rappeler que la capitale de Turquie est à Angora et que les facilités actuellement accordées par suite des nécessités matérielles du moment et qui se manifestent par le maintien d'une délégation de mon département à Constantinople ne pouvaient être indéfiniment prolongées.

Mon Gouvernement ne peut naturellement accepter le parallélisme entre la situation du Gouvernement français ayant résidé provisoirement à Versailles et celle du Gouvernement de la République turque.

En outre, Constantinople ne pouvant en aucune façon être considérée comme une capitale, il n'a pas été possible de saisir à quoi se rapportait la phrase de la note susmentionnée de M. Jessé-Curély relative aux États entretenant un même agent diplomatique accrédité dans plusieurs pays, mais ne résidant que dans un seul.

Il est possible et il est d'usage dans tous les pays qu'un fonctionnaire d'une Ambassade ou Légation entre pour des affaires courantes en contact avec le fonctionnaire compétent du Ministère des Affaires étrangères et facilite de la sorte la solution de la question. L'agent ayant toute la confiance de l'Ambassadeur et toute qualité pour parler en son nom mentionné à la fin de la susdite note ne peut naturellement être qu'un fonctionnaire de cette sorte, mais il est évident qu'il ne pourrait avoir auprès du Gouvernement de la République le même caractère qu'un Ambassadeur ou un représentant diplomatique dûment accrédité.

Le Gouvernement français peut être assuré que le Gouvernement turc n'a en vue que de resserrer encore davantage les bonnes relations existant entre les deux pays.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

NOUSRET.

Enclosure 2 in No. 18.

Nosret Bey to M. Montagna.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Constantinople, le 12 juillet* 1925.

EN réponse à la note du 30 avril 1925 de votre Excellence, j'ai l'honneur de porter à sa connaissance que la loi autorisant le Gouvernement de la République à offrir des terrains aux missions diplomatiques étrangères en vue d'y construire leur Ambassade ou Légation a été votée par la grande Assemblée nationale de Turquie et que, par conséquent, des terrains seront sous peu mis à la disposition des susdites missions.

Mon Gouvernement n'a pas songé à demander dans la note dont parle votre Excellence un engagement quelconque au sujet du séjour plus ou moins prolongé des représentants diplomatiques étrangers dans n'importe quelle résidence. Il a seulement voulu exposer que la capitale de la Turquie est à Angora et que les facilités actuellement accordées et qui se manifestent par le maintien d'une délégation du Ministère des Affaires étrangères à Constantinople ne pourraient être indéfiniment prolongées.

Mon Gouvernement estime, en outre, qu'il est possible et qu'il est d'usage dans tous les pays qu'un fonctionnaire d'une Ambassade ou Légation entre pour les affaires courantes en contact avec le fonctionnaire compétent du Ministère des Affaires étrangères et facilite de la sorte la solution de la question. Le fonctionnaire jouissant de toute la confiance de l'Ambassadeur mentionné à la fin de la susdite note ne peut naturellement être qu'un fonctionnaire de cette sorte, mais il est évident qu'il ne pourrait avoir auprès du Gouvernement de la République le même caractère qu'un Ambassadeur ou un représentant diplomatique dûment accrédité.

Le Gouvernement de la République a été heureux des assurances que votre Excellence a bien voulu lui donner au sujet de la volonté nourrie par le Gouvernement royal d'assurer que les relations entre les deux pays acquièrent tout le développement nécessaire et soient empreintes de sentiments de sincère amitié, et M. le Dr. Tevfik Ruchid Bey m'a chargé de vous assurer que tel est également le désir le plus sincère du Gouvernement turc et qu'il n'a en vue que de resserrer encore davantage les bonnes relations existant actuellement entre les deux pays.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

M. NOUSRET.

[**E 5029/194/44**]

No. 19.

Mr. Hoare to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received August* 24.)

(No. 638.)

Sir, *Therapia, August* 17, 1925.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 623 of the 11th instant, I have the honour to report that the Angora Tribunal of Independence has now finished the trial of some seventy persons on charges relating to their activities in connection with the "tarikat-i-selahieh" and directed against the republic. The decision of the tribunal, which was read in court, referred at length to the objects of the "tarikat-i-selahieh," and emphasised the fact that only offences and acts of treason committed subsequently to the coming into force of the Declaration of Amnesty annexed to the Treaty of Lausanne had been taken into consideration. A letter addressed to the court by Mustafa Kemal Pasha, stating that he renounced his right to sue Lutfi Fikri Bey personally, was also read, and this display of "magnanimity" is greeted with fulsome approval by the entire press. In addition to Lutfi Fikri Bey, thirty-five of the accused were acquitted; the trial of Muzaffer Emin Bey, "who is pursuing at Bagdad and Mosul his activity against Turkey," was transferred to the Tribunal of Independence for the Eastern Provinces; Mustafa Bey, ex-Deputy for the Yemen, was deprived of his Turkish nationality and banished; seven of the accused were condemned to five and six to ten years' imprisonment; seven were condemned to sixteen years' penal servitude, and eleven to death. It was further decided by the tribunal that "the assassins of the late Dr. Reshad Pasha" should be tried separately.

2. The eleven persons condemned to death were publicly hanged on the morning of the 16th instant in a garden opposite the building which was formerly used as the meeting-place of the Grand National Assembly, and now serves as headquarters of the People's party. Among them are Kemal Bey, a former president of the Municipality of Yenikeui; Ismet Bey, an aide-de-camp of Kiraz Hamdi Pasha; a Christian named Christaki, and Nuri and Osman Daver, vendors of the patent medicine "dystol."

3. During the past week the Angora Tribunal also concluded the trial of some twenty persons charged with Communist propaganda. Three of the accused were acquitted, the others being sentenced to terms of imprisonment ranging from seven to fifteen years. They are obscure persons with the exception of Dr. Shefik Husni, who obtained notoriety by the publication some months ago of a pamphlet entitled "The First of May," inciting the workers of Turkey to revolt. He was sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment by default.

4. The Tribunal of Independence for the Eastern Provinces has during the past week held a few sessions, at which the journalists Fevzi Lutfi, Sadri Edhem, Abd-el-Kadir Kemali and Velid Beys were examined. The accounts of the proceedings which appear in the press are utterly bewildering, but the main intention is clear, namely, to fix on them a measure of responsibility for the Kurdish rising as in the case of Hussein Jahid Bey reported in Sir Ronald Lindsay's despatch No. 386 of the 20th May.

I have, &c.

R. H. HOARE.

No. 20.

Sir E. Drummond to Sir W. Tyrrell.—(*Received August* 31.)

(Unnumbered.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Geneva, August* 31, 1925.

I HAVE received the following telegram from the Acting Foreign Minister, Angora:—

"Mouvements flotte britannique depuis 23/24 août dans mer Égée et à proximité côtes turques ont une signification qui ne peut pas être attribuée à un hasard. En effet, une escadre anglaise a été aperçue le 23/24 août près côte Ayvadjik, et le 24/25 bâtiments de guerre britanniques mouillés devant Mitylène ont continuellement dirigé leurs projecteurs sur nos côtes aux environs de Dikili, Sarmsakli et Coum Bourouni. Le 25 août, des coups de canons ininterrompus ont ont été entendus à l'entrée des Dardanelles, et le même jour cinq avions venant direction île Imbros ont survolé Seddul Bahr. Une autre escadre anglaise venant également le 24/25 août, direction Chios, est approchée

port Kara-Bouroun et a exécuté exercices dans ces parages et, s'avançant vers port Smyrne, a dirigé ses projecteurs sur nos fortifications aux environs de Fotheaï, Atik et Nadjilar et île, contraire règles droit international, en abordant localités fortifiées zones interdites par Turquie. Torpilleurs britanniques arrivés avec notre permission pour débarquer dans presqu'île Gallipoli soldats non armés devant visiter lieux sépultures interrogent navires commerce traversant eaux turques sur leurs lieux départ et destinations. Toutes ces circonstances étudiées ensemble avec notre télégramme 26 août soir relatif violation ligne conventionnelle Bruxelles 24 août matin démontrent clairement que Gouvernement britannique faire pression sur décision Conseil Société Nations au début même discussion question Mossoul. Flotte britannique viole ouvertement dispositions premier paragraphe article 13, Traité Lausanne, interdisant utilisation îles grecques démilitarisées comme base navale ainsi que dernier alinéa article 6, Convention concernant Régime Détroits, qui interdit utilisation îles susdites comme base pour concentration. J'ai l'honneur par conséquent y attirer de nouveau attention Conseil."

It would seem desirable to communicate this telegram to the Council at once. Would be grateful if I could be put in possession of any comments the British Government may wish to make for the information of the Council with the least possible delay.

[E 5221/32/65]

No. 21.

Ahmed Ferid Bey to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received September* 1.)

Ambassade de la République turque, Londres, le 31 août 1925.

M. le Ministre,

SELON les instructions de mon Gouvernement, j'ai l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de votre Excellence les faits suivants :

1. Une escadre britannique a été aperçue, le 23/24 courant, à proximité de la côte d'Aïvadjik. Le 24/25 courant, des vaisseaux de guerre britanniques, devant Mitylène, dirigèrent leurs projecteurs avec persistance sur Dikili, Sarmousakli et Goum Bournou. Le 25 août, on entendait sans cesse des bruits de canon à l'entrée des Dardanelles. Le même jour, des avions britanniques venant de la direction de l'île Imbros survolèrent Sed-el-Bahr.
2. Le 24/25 courant, une autre escadre navale anglaise venant de la direction de l'île de Chios s'approcha de la baie de Kara Bouroun et se livra dans ses environs à des exercices de tir. Elle s'approcha aussi du port de Smyrne et dirigea ses projecteurs sur les fortifications de Focée, Hadjilar et de l'île de Keusten. En pénétrant ainsi les zones prohibées, cette escadre s'est livrée à des démonstrations qui sont contraires aux règles du droit international.
3. Des torpilleurs britanniques qui débarquèrent des matelots non armés, qui avaient obtenu la permission de visiter les cimetières à Gallipoli, firent des enquêtes au sujet de la provenance des navires de commerce qui passaient les détroits.

Ces événements, qui ne peuvent être considérés comme des coïncidences fortuites, prise en considération avec l'attaque dirigée le 25 courant contre nos postes militaires situés au nord de la ligne conventionnelle de Bruxelles, font croire à mon Gouvernement que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique par de telles actions voudrait influencer la décision du Conseil de la Ligue des Nations au moment où celui-ci va commencer à discuter la question de Mossoul.

Je serais vivement reconnaissant à votre Excellence si elle voulait bien me donner l'occasion d'éclairer mon Gouvernement sur ce sujet.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

A. FÉRID.

No. 22.

Mr. Wellesley to Consul London (Geneva).

(No. 179.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September* 1, 1925.

FOLLOWING for the Secretary of State :—

"Delegation's telegram of 31st August (Turkish complaints against activities of British fleet) received this morning by telephone from Paris.

"Movements of Mediterranean fleet in Ægean are merely part of normal summer exercises, which ordinarily include this area.

"Use of demilitarised ports in connection with such exercises can in no sense be regarded as 'establishment of naval base' or 'use as base of operations against Turkey' or 'concentration against Turkey' as prohibited by Lausanne settlement.

"Searchlights are normally used by all vessels during exercises, and are naturally visible at long distances in all directions. They cannot, however, be used effectively at range exceeding 2 miles, and distance in present case appears to have been at least 10 miles.

"There is no suggestion that firing practice referred to took place within Turkish or demilitarised waters, and Turkish complaint is not, therefore, understood.

"Telegraphic enquiries are being made regarding alleged aeroplane flights both at Seddul Bahr and at Smyrna. Turkish complaint regarding latter has appeared in to-day's 'Times.'

"It is normal practice of British men-of-war on meeting British merchant vessels at sea to carry out exercise of signals, which for convenience usually takes form of enquiry as to route.

"We can only surmise that Turkish telegram is attempt to prejudice atmosphere at Geneva on eve of Council meeting."

No. 23.

Consul London to Mr. Wellesley.—(*Received September* 2.)

(No. 275.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Geneva, September* 2, 1925.

YOUR telegram No. 179.

Following from Cadogan :—

"Can it be stated categorically that when British squadron approached Aivali coast 23rd August–24th August and ports of Kara Burnu and Smyrna 24th August–25th August territorial waters were not entered? Was there any communication with the shore at Mitylene 24th August–25th August, and, if so, of what nature?"

[E 5221/32/65]

No. 24.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Ahmed Ferid Bey.

Your Excellency, *Foreign Office, September* 3, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 31st August, communicating certain complaints put forward by the Turkish Government in regard to the movements and activities of the British Mediterranean fleet in the Ægean Sea.

2. In reply, I beg leave to inform your Excellency that these movements of His Majesty's fleet in the Ægean Sea form part of the normal summer exercises of the fleet which take place each year and which ordinarily include this area.

3. His Majesty's Government are at a loss to understand the reference in the second paragraph of your note under reply to the penetration by His Majesty's ships of a prohibited zone or to a violation of the provisions of international law, since no evidence has been brought forward to show that any of the actions complained of took place within Turkish territorial waters.

4. As regards the use of searchlights by His Majesty's ships in the direction of the Turkish coast, I would explain that searchlights are normally used by all ships of war

during exercises, and are naturally visible at long distances in all directions. They cannot, however, be used effectively at a range exceeding 2 miles, and the vessels whose lights are stated to have been seen from the Turkish coast would appear, in the cases referred to, to have been lying at a distance of at least 10 miles from the latter.

5. Your note makes no mention of the exact position of the vessels from which firing appears to have been heard. Firing practice is, of course, a normal and necessary part of all fleet exercises, and the sound of guns would inevitably carry a considerable distance. In the absence of any evidence to show that the firing practice referred to took place within Turkish waters, it is difficult to know what grounds of complaint the Turkish Government can legitimately put forward in this matter.

6. As regards the statement that British torpedo-boats interrogated merchant vessels at the mouth of the Dardanelles, I may explain that it is the normal practice of a British man-of war on meeting a British merchant vessel at sea to carry on an exercise of signals which, for convenience, usually takes the form of an enquiry as to the route which the merchant vessel concerned is taking.

7. Telegraphic enquiries are being addressed to the commander-in-chief of the Mediterranean squadron regarding the alleged flight of British aeroplanes over Seddul-Bahr, and a further communication on this subject will be addressed to you in due course.

8. In view of the foregoing explanations, I feel sure that you will realise that the complaints of the Turkish Government on this subject are based on a complete misapprehension of the facts, which were matters of routine and which had not the slightest connection with any impending discussion at Geneva.

I have, &c.
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN

No. 25.

Sir R. Lindsay (No. 2) to Consul London.—(Repeated to Foreign Office; Received September 4.)

(No. 114.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, September 4, 1925.*

FOLLOWING for Mr. Chamberlain :—

"According to press, Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs is complaining about British naval demonstrations in the Levant. Following is all that has happened :—

"1. Mediterranean fleet is making cruise in Ægean according to programme settled months ago.

"2. Two cruisers passed through the Straits 29th August on visit to Varna, Constantza and Galatz.

"3. Visits to Gallipoli cemeteries are being made by four successive parties of men from the fleet. Two have been completed, one is due to-morrow, and last on 12th September.

"I spoke to Minister for Foreign Affairs about these visits on 23rd August, explaining that I did not wish to ask permission for them if Turkish Government felt any hesitation about granting it. Minister for Foreign Affairs felt sure there would be no objection; he said he could not issue any orders, as another Minister had been appointed to act for him while absent, but he would telegraph his favourable recommendations to Angora. Permission was granted with unusual alacrity.

"There are signs of considerable nervousness here, and Turkish authorities may wish to cancel last visit. I shall not press them in any way.

"I am in touch with Commander-in-chief."

[E 5375/194/44] No. 26.

Mr. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received September 8.)

(No. 678.)
Sir, *Therapia, September 1, 1925.*

I HAVE the honour to offer some observations on the internal political situation in Turkey at the present moment.

2. Weeks ago the Opposition party was crushed, and now it is not only not talked about, but it may be supposed almost not to exist. Ali Ihsans, Kiazim Karabekirs, Refets and Reoufs certainly still have being, but their names are almost forgotten. If they ever move, which to my mind is doubtful, their movements are veiled behind curtains of impenetrable privacy, and certainly impart no impulse to the body of the State. Political comment in the press is almost completely silenced and survives only in the Government-controlled "Hakkimiet-i-Millié," whose vigorous articles printed at Angora are subserviently echoed by the journals of Constantinople. When on the 29th August the Government not only closed the Bourse here but also forbade all foreign exchange operations, the boldest observation made was that of the "Journal d'Orient," which wrote: "it goes without saying that this energetic gesture of the Government can only meet with approval"; and yet this gesture has rendered all business at Constantinople impossible just at the moment when Turkey's most important crops are coming forward for export.

3. Indeed, the Government's determination to maintain the present régime of repression shows no sign of abating, and the Tribunals of Independence continue to grind out sentences, mostly political, though occasionally a case of common law crime is also taken, and accused persons continue to be arrested in Constantinople and the provinces and forwarded to the seat of the courts. The Public Prosecutor has a vast number of dossiers ready or in preparation for trial, and it is clear that they will not have been disposed of by December, when the period for which the courts have been constituted terminates. Many think that the court's life will be prolonged; some suggest that when the Assembly meets again in November a dissolution and new elections will be ordered. This would automatically abolish parliamentary immunity and enable the Government to prosecute Deputies of the ex-Opposition in comfort.

4. The President of the Republic has spent the last ten days in a tour through the Castamouni region to Ineboli on the Black Sea and back to Angora. He has taken the opportunity to make a number of speeches, which are not lacking in interest, and of which the most important was delivered at Ineboli. The general purport of these utterances is somewhat as follows: he glorifies the army and extols the innate civilisation and alertness of the Turkish nation; what has so far been accomplished towards liberating and renovating the country has been achieved by the army, but only under the inspiration of the nation. Just as the army, therefore, must be kept in the highest state of efficiency, so the nation must be modernised and kept alert, bright and free from rust. The laic and secular spirit is emphasised in a short but rather violent diatribe against dervish orders and their "tekkes" (convents) and the Caliphate, but the speaker has been laying most stress on dress, a subject which for some weeks has excited the interest of a press, unable to occupy itself with more immediately important topics. The Ghazi's pronouncements are very uncompromising: "our costume is neither national nor international"; "the Turkish nation is like a diamond in a setting of mud"; "the proper dress of civilisation consists of boots, trousers, shirt, collar and tie, waistcoat and jacket, and on the head a covering with a brim, which is called 'chapeau,' just as the other garments are called 'la redingote,' 'le bonjour,' 'le smocking' and 'le frac.'" He rated women for still veiling themselves, pointing out that the family is the heart of civilisation, and some hojas for wearing turbans, which, he said, could only be worn by those employed at the Directorate of Religious Affairs. The result is said to be a run on the hat shops (though no great revolution is yet noticeable here in Constantinople) and the authorities are talking of controlling prices to save the public from exploitation.

5. The Ghazi, however, is no idle talker, and his speeches are usually found afterwards to have been good pointers in the direction in which he means to move. I should surmise that, having disembarrassed himself of the Opposition, he means to devote the political campaign of the coming winter to a process of intensive modernisation. He is said often to model himself on Napoleon, and he may now be taking a page out of the history of Peter the Great, who sheared off the boyars' beards and dragged the women of Russia willy-nilly into society. His efforts deserve an equal meed of praise, and I doubt not they will be extended to wider fields than that of mere costume.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 5376/58/44] No. 27.

Sir R. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received September* 8.)

(No. D.O.T. (A) 2.)

Sir, *Therapia, September* 2, 1925.

IN confirmation of my telegram No. 113 of the 29th August relative to the closing of the Constantinople Bourse, I have the honour to inform you that this measure was applied on Saturday morning, the 29th August, on the instructions of the Minister of Finance, the following being a translation of the notification posted outside the Bourse :—

"Ayant été constaté que la spéculation trouve son jeu en provoquant une émotion artificielle en Bourse, il est décidé que celle-ci sera fermée pour le moment à partir du 29 août pour une période d'une semaine.

"Il est communiqué que le Ministère des Finances a donné ordre de déférer au Tribunal de l'Indépendance pour perturbation de la sécurité de l'État toute personne qui fera des spéculations de Bourse hors de l'enceinte de celle-ci."

2. The immediate result of the closing of the Bourse was the virtual stoppage of all commercial and banking transactions, the majority of which, especially at this time of the year, which is the opening of the export season, are based on exchange operations in foreign currency.

Moreover, advances against foreign currency being equally prohibited, the commercial community is restricted to operations in Turkish currency only based on deposits or to loans advanced in the same currency at a purely fictitious rate.

3. The local banks, who have been in close touch with the Commissaire of the Bourse, have protested by telegram to Angora, pointing out the disastrous effect that the cessation of exchange operations will have on economic and commercial activity, and I am informed that the Commissaire of the Bourse has himself telegraphed in the same sense to the Ministry of Finance.

4. Instructions were received from Angora on the 31st ultimo for transmission to all banks in Constantinople to the following effect :—

"Les jours pendant lesquels la Bourse se trouvera fermée, les banques existantes à Constantinople doivent montrer aux commerçants des facilités au plus haut degré, et les banques qui dans les opérations de change montreront des difficultés seront poursuivies très sévèrement."

The banks having received within three days what would appear to be two diametrically opposite sets of instructions, the first of which threatened them with the Tribunal of Independence if they did carry out exchange operations, and the second invoking severe penalties if they refused to do so, are completely at a loss to know what action to take, and are therefore acting independently. Some banks are prepared to receive sterling deposits, against which they make advances in Turkish currency at a rate fixed by themselves, although ostensibly these advances are treated as overdrafts and the current rate of interest of 9 per cent. is charged on them.

Other banks decline to make any advances whatever on foreign currencies.

5. The Government Commissioner of the Bourse gave me yesterday to understand that no material alleviation of the present state of affairs is to be expected till the full week for which the Bourse has been closed has elapsed.

6. It is generally assumed in the commercial world that the closing of the Bourse is directly due to the fear entertained by the Government that the imminent negotiations in regard to Mosul may give rise to marked fluctuations in the lira.

Whatever the motive, the Government has once again shown a lamentable disregard of its own economic welfare.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 5527/4706/44] No. 28.

Sir R. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received September* 14.)

(No. 694.)

Sir, *Therapia, September* 9, 1925.

I MENTIONED in my despatch No. 678 of the 1st instant, that in his speech at Ineboli the President of the Republic, besides advocating the use of modern dress, had indulged in a diatribe against Dervish orders and monasteries. He had scarcely returned to Angora when a Council of Ministers met under his presidency, and three decrees were promulgated by which Dervish orders are dissolved and their property confiscated to the State, and the dress of the clerical and official classes is regulated. I have had careful translations made of these important decrees, and I enclose them to you herewith.*

2. The first observation that occurs to one is that these decrees, while they recite certain reasons for the action taken, quote no constitutional authority on which it is based, and I am at a loss to surmise what article of the Constitution authorises the Council of Ministers, without any sanction from the Assembly, to take such far-reaching action as the dissolution of religious bodies and the disposal of their property. This question may conceivably in the future have importance, but for the present it is entirely academic; for it is not to be imagined that any person or journal will openly question or any law court refuse to apply a decision to which the Ghazi has set his signature.

3. Even in January of this year when Mustafa Kemal spent a few days at Konia, it was reported that the Turkish Government was thinking of laying hands on the valuable properties of the Mevlevi order of Dervishes; and when I was in the same town in May I heard that the Buyuk Chelebi, the head of the order, though he liked seeing visitors, preferred that they should stay away because their visits could only have the result of exciting the suspicions of the civil authorities. The blow that has now fallen, though sudden, is hardly surprising. As to the causes of the action taken, the decree itself mentions the observations of the Independence Tribunals made after the Kurdish insurrection, and doubtless the Dervish orders, the tekkes and zaviehs, constituting as they do rallying points for the religiously minded, have contributed somewhat to the movement of last spring; but they are not political organisations properly so-called; and if in the East religion and politics could be divorced, I have no doubt that the Buyuk Chelebi himself would have welcomed a decree of divorce. The Government in its passion for secularisation has had good reason for the action it has taken if it can afford to despise the possible bye-products of that action, and mere police considerations have doubtless reinforced its determination; for apart from the regular and unrolled members of the orders there are vast numbers of unorganised adepts all over the country, inscribed on no lists and bound by no fixed formula or obligation, yet held together by a vague kind of *esprit de corps* and mutual sympathy. To a policeman the whole affair must be redolent of secret societies.

4. I need hardly dilate on the pecuniary attraction of the policy adopted. For its programme the Government cannot have too much money; and even if much of the loot passes to education, some will be left over for railways and other purposes.

5. I have heard of no reaction against this decree. None could possibly be expected at the present moment.

6. As to the hat and coat decrees, they are of less importance, but enable the press to print columns about the measures taken by the authorities to provide hats cheap and about the persons who are wearing them. Officials have to incline the head, *nolens volens*, and Nusret Bey looks sheepish in a natty little felt *couvre-chef*, as it is called here. Careful observation in the streets of Pera fails to disclose any perceptible change in the habits of the people, except perhaps that a number of cloth caps of villainous cut have made their appearance. The hat movement here may be compared to the more majestic movement in England towards Oxford trousers.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

* Not printed.

[E 5675/32/65] No. 29.

Sir R. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received September* 21.)

(No. 704.)

Sir, *Therapia, September* 14, 1925.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 692 of the 8th instant regarding the Irak frontier question, I have the honour to report that the general tone of the Turkish press remains to-day much the same as therein described. Perhaps the volume of comment may have diminished in the last two or three days, but its substance is still entirely uncompromising. I need hardly say that the anti-Irak articles in the "Daily Mail," "Daily Express" and other London journals of the same way of thinking are freely reproduced. They lead the Turkish public to believe that His Majesty's Government are not serious in pressing their claims at Geneva; but I also think that without them the expressions of opinion in the Turkish press would be quite strong enough to induce undesirable excitement.

2. I admit to some surprise that the Turkish authorities should have allowed the public to be brought to its present state of exaltation, and I attribute this, in the main, to two forces at work. They are probably connected with each other, and both are at present somewhat obscure. The first is the growth of Russian influence at Angora. I can quote no definite incident, and no single action by either Government in illustration of the closer relations that have come into being between the two States; and, in particular, I am unaware that any of the outstanding questions between them, such as the commercial convention or the treatment of shipping, have received solution; and from this fact we may perhaps draw comfort in the hope that the rapprochement is brought about by the circumstances of the moment and has not been allowed by the Turks to compromise the future. It is, indeed, not surprising that the Turkish Government, preparing for a contest with His Majesty's Government, should draw closer to Russia; and it is equally natural that any desire Turkey may evince in that direction should meet with a ready response from Moscow. All my colleagues, therefore, who have been at Angora lately tell me that Comrade Suritz has never been as influential in the capital as he is to-day, and that Russia is occupying the position of a guide, comforter and friend.

3. The second reason is connected with internal politics of Angora, and is a good deal more obscure—possibly more important if it tends, as apparently is the case, to weaken the position of Ismet Pasha. I write of it only with diffidence, as my information is vague and even contradictory, and I hardly venture to do more than point hesitatingly at the direction in which movement may be taking place.

4. It cannot be said that anyone at Angora is really pro-British or pro-Russian, or, indeed, anything but pro-Turk; and in internal politics, too, all active politicians alike are pledged to a policy of uncompromising secularisation, "Turkification," and nationalism, with repression all round as the principal means of carrying that policy through. Yet, roughly speaking, and with many reservations which I need not develop, there do exist two more or less distinct groups in Angora, which we call the Moderates and the Extremists, and these, while they follow identical specific aims, differ from each other, not in opinion, but in the degree of violence with which they hold their views and with which they are prepared to carry them into execution; so that it is more the quality rather than the substance of opinion that separates men from each other. Roughly speaking, and again with reservations, the dividing line between Moderates and Extremists tends to coincide with that between pro-British and pro-Russians; or, as Turks call it, between the western and eastern orientation of policy. Now, Ismet Pasha is classed as a Moderate, and he has the further advantage of possessing some ideas of statesmanship. I heard rumours last spring that some distrust was growing up between him and the President of the Republic, and it is suggested to me now that he is still further losing influence. I have heard that he used to find an important ally in Latife Hanem, and that her divorce has shaken his position. It is not necessary to suggest that the lady concerned herself too closely with politics, or that she identified herself in any way with this or that politician; but she certainly created in the Ghazi's household an atmosphere of sanity and moderation, and her influence was all in favour of those normal habits of life and of thought which are wanted for facing the problems arising from day to day. If the division between parties here is to be found not so much in men's political tenets as in the quality of their mental processes, then the disappearance of Latife Hanem is a distressing

symptom, for the Ghazi's mental processes will deteriorate and his natural inclination to violent and arbitrary courses will increase. The matter is the more important if, as I have been told, Ismet advocated studious moderation at Geneva in the pleading of Turkey's cause, and it was Tewfik Rushdi who won the day for no compromise. If the latter wins a real success before the League, Ismet's position may become still more difficult. These are developments which must be welcome at the Russian Embassy.

5. Yet, I have not thought that, with a League decision in favour even of the Brussels line, things would come to an actual breach. It has seemed to me that a "war that is no war"—somewhat similar to the condition of affairs that prevailed for some years between Poland and Lithuania over the Vilna business—represents the utmost limit to which either Russia or Turkey would be prepared to push matters for some time to come. The situation would be highly unpleasant, not to say dangerous, at times, but I think that, with patience and firmness, things might get better rather than worse, and the Turks might in time forget their grievance. Looking at things from the point of view of Anglo-Turkish relations, I think that something resembling the Brussels line was the best thing we could hope for.

6. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Bagdad.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 5676/32/65] No. 30.

Sir R. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received September* 21.)

(No. 705.)

Sir, *Therapia, September* 14, 1925.

I HAVE read with concern telegram No. 301 of the 10th instant in which Mr. Amery foreshadows the possibility that the sub-committee of the Council, impressed by Tewfik Rushdi's legalism or frightened at his threats, may award Irak territory as far as the Lesser Zab to Turkey. I venture to give expression to some observations on this subject which occur to me.

2. In the first place, what do the Turks really want? The simplest answer, and one that only gives a small part of the truth, is that they want a success. The Government feel that for the first time since Lausanne they are figuring on the grand stage of international affairs; they are conscious that their vigorous measures of modernisation are not very popular in the country; they have over the Mosul question nevertheless succeeded in evoking strong feelings of patriotism in the educated classes; and they fear that these sentiments will not have the effect of rallying public opinion behind the Government for other purposes unless they are crowned with success. I think the Lesser Zab line could be made to appear as all that the Turkish Government ever wanted; they would regard it as a success, accept it at first, at any rate, as a satisfactory solution, and perhaps even would be willing to give the League some more of those assurances of which their predecessors have been so lavish ever since the days of the Hatt-i-Shereef of Gulhane. Unfortunately, there is more to it than this. Turks are concerned over the new form of their old minorities question.

3. For Europe the minorities question was how the native Christians were to be treated, and with the virtual disappearance of Greeks and Armenians everywhere except in Constantinople, this Christian question has lost importance. So, too, for the Turks, whose efforts now are only directed to completing the task in the old capital and securing in other parts of the country the results already achieved. Yet the Kurdish rebellion of last spring shows clearly enough that double attention must henceforward be paid to the other half of the old minorities question, viz., how are the different Mahometan races of Turkey to live together. If we could have a Turkish Republic with no Arab citizens at all within its boundaries, the minorities question would be nothing but a Kurdish question; and if, furthermore, the republic could incorporate within its frontiers all Southern Kurdistan, then it would be in the most favourable possible position for dealing freely and undisturbed with its Kurds. Unfortunately, the Lesser Zab line excludes from Turkey Suleimanieh and a good area of Kurdish land. It also presents Turkey with a great wad of unwanted Arabs.

4. I think that the question of the Southern Kurds disquiets the Turkish authorities—whatever they may say to the contrary—more than anything else; and if Southern Kurdistan, however small its area, is to become a prosperous and orderly region with local autonomy under a few chosen British officers, the Turks cannot fail to dread the effect on their own discontented Kurdish tribes. So long as His Majesty's Government are resolved to give autonomy to the Kurds of Irak, there can have been no chance of His Majesty's Government and the Turks coming voluntarily to terms over the Irak frontier. I have always assumed that our pledges to these mountaineers, and the traditional liberalism of our policy—not to mention any obligations the League might impose—must make it impossible for us to make any concession to Turkey in this direction.

5. You are already aware that the whole tendency of the modern Turkish State is towards "Turkification" and secularisation, and even allowing for the harshness, precipitation and blunderings with which the Turks pursue these aims, there is much that must command the sympathy of those who desire Turkey to become a strong and prosperous State. Under the most favourable possible conditions there may have been just a chance that the Turks would succeed in Turkifying—perhaps even in secularising—their Kurds, for the latter are a primitive race, and possess no strongly-marked culture of their own. Yet the task is in every respect difficult, and the addition of any Kurds to the existing population merely adds difficulty. What, then, are we to say of a proposal to add Arabs too, who have a very distinctive native culture, a literary language, and an intense devotion to the religion of their ancestors?

6. I have expressed the view that the Turkish Government would be inclined to accept the Lesser Zab line if the League should decide on it; yet I can imagine that in the first moments of excitement and consternation, Mosul, anxious to conciliate the new rulers, would receive the incoming Turks with flags; that Kirkuk would burst out in agitations, and that even further south unstable politicians would reinsure themselves by violent attacks on the mandate. With the best will in the world the Turks might find it hard to hold their hand on the Lesser Zab, and His Majesty's Government might fail to find any basis at all for maintaining the British connection south of the river. Still, first enthusiasms would not conjure away the inevitable difficulties of later days. The further south the frontier is pushed into Arab lands the greater do the difficulties become, and the more probable is it that the Turks will either exhaust themselves in attempting an impossible task or they will abandon the struggle and allow themselves once more to be converted to Islam by the Arabs.

7. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Bagdad.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[**E 5687/194/44**] No. 31.

Sir R. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received September* 21.)

(No. 717.)

Sir, *Therapia, September* 16, 1925.

THERE have been signs in the last few days that the Turkish Government is somewhat diminishing the severity of its repressive policy.

2. Firstly, the journalists who were put on trial before the Independence Tribunal of the East for having by their writings encouraged the Kurdish rebellion (see Mr. Hoare's despatch No. 623 of the 11th August last) have, with one exception, been acquitted. The exception is the editor of the Adana "Tok Seuz," who, the court rather tardily discovers, should have been brought before the Angora Tribunal, to which his case is now transferred. As to the other journalists, it transpires that, in the early days of their arrest, four of their leaders telegraphed to the President of the Republic a long appeal, amounting almost, though not quite, to a confession. With sycophantic flattery of the Ghazi they protested the purity of their republicanism and of their devotion to the Government; they admitted the misguided nature of some of their writings, and protested that if they had realised the truth at the time they would not have so written; they declared their intention of abandoning journalism. This telegram nevertheless, had no effect, and the trial proceeded for several days, during which

the accused were questioned and cross-questioned as to their thoughts and writings in the usual manner. Just as the trial was drawing to a close, the journalists despatched a second telegram to the Ghazi, signed this time by all ten of them. It is much shorter and contains far less in the way of admission than the first telegram, and, indeed, in one respect runs counter to it; the signatories declare themselves faithful workmen and servants of the republic, they appeal to the President's nobility and generosity in order that, with vigilance and pure intentions, they may resume their duties, and they protest that the acquittal that is doubtless about to be pronounced will be imperfect without his Excellency's grace and favour. The acquittal was pronounced forthwith.

3. Now, far the most interesting of these ten journalists is Velid Ebuziazade, editor of the suppressed "Tewhid-i-Efkiar," the former Conservative, Islamic, Nationalist paper; he is a stubborn fellow, and there is bad blood between him and the President, for it may be remembered that in January 1924, when Mustafa Kemal, preparing to expel the Caliph, summoned all the journalists of Turkey to meet him at Smyrna, Velid alone was excluded because "he refused to ask to be received." Velid signed the second shorter telegram mentioned above, but did not sign the first. I would surmise that the Government had been anxious to acquit these journalists, but that it insisted on having first some kind of recantation. The first telegram was deemed inadequate because Velid's signature was lacking. In the second Velid's name was attached and the Government overlooked the absence of aroma in the incense. Velid himself doubtless was unwilling to involve his fellow prisoners in a common fate with himself by displaying too much obstinacy.

4. The other *cause célèbre* of the day, the trial of the members of the Arab Charitable Society, has also resulted in wholesale acquittals. The details of this case are as obscure as those of all others, and we here cannot understand them, though the press filled columns with the questions and answers. Nothing of great interest was allowed to transpire.

5. Kilidj Ali has produced a curious article in the "Hakimiet-i-Millie." He is a swashbuckling friend of Mustafa Kemal Pasha, a member of the Angora Independence Tribunal, and is known as the "Hero of Aintab," though I suspect he has caused more deaths by the gallows than by the sword. He now roars like any sucking dove, and tells the press of Turkey that they are maintaining an unnatural calm—an undesirable hesitation. Avoiding blackmail and personalities, they must nevertheless follow the social and administrative life of the country, and especially expose abuses by individual Government officials. Of course, the tribunals must see that the path of progress is not blocked, but about the little affairs of every day the press has been too silent.

6. The Government's tendency to moderation is just sufficiently marked to merit passing notice, though at the moment its importance cannot be assessed. Perhaps they think that a sedative is required after the strong medicine of closing the tekkes; perhaps they are now forgiving enemies in order not to appear too vindictive if when the Assembly meets they decide to prosecute the leaders of the defunct Progressive party. Only the future can show the truth.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

No. 32.

Sir R. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received September* 21.)

(No. 119. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September* 21, 1925.

ITALIAN Embassy tell me well-equipped troops with some artillery are sent by train eastward from Adana in small quantities almost every day. I presume that liaison officer, Beirut, reports this if true.

For some days Anatolian Railway east of Konia has been forbidden to foreigners of all nationalities indiscriminately.

To-day British subject has been refused leave to proceed to Trebizond.

Two Russian destroyers arrived on visit to Constantinople 19th September. This is obviously a demonstration, but only a small one, and has not created much interest here.

No. 33.

Mr. Keeling to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received September* 25.)

(No. 146. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, September* 24, 1925.

GREEK Minister for Foreign Affairs told me yesterday that while at Geneva Italian Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs expressed to him desire of Italian Government for further rapprochement between the two countries with a view to eventual collaboration in Asia Minor. Conversation was only in general terms, and there was no suggestion of events in immediate future

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No. 34.

Mr. Keeling to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received September* 25.)

(No. 147. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, September* 24, 1925.

MY immediately preceding telegram.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said friendship of nearest Great Power was of such obvious benefit in every way to Greece that he could not but welcome any rapprochement with Italy, nor did he like to reply in the negative, lest when the time came Greece might be left out. As it was, she would have *of course* to content herself with less than before.

His Excellency requested me to inform you of above confidentially, and to say he would welcome any expression of your views. He promised to keep me informed of any further development.

(Repeated to Rome, No. 7.)

No. 35.

Mr. Keeling to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received September* 25.)

(No. 148.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, September* 24, 1925.

ITALIAN Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs intends, according to Minister for Foreign Affairs, to visit Greece again in the near future to continue discussion.

(Repeated to Rome, No. 8.)

No. 36.

British Delegation to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received September* 26.)

[By Bag.]

(Unnumbered.)
(Telegraphic.) *Genera, September* 24, 1925.

FOLLOWING from Lord Cecil:—

"My despatch No. 10.

"The Armenian Sub-Committee presented this afternoon to the Fifth Committee its conclusions regarding Dr Nansen's scheme for settlement of refugees in Armenia. The principal conclusion based on the advice offered to the sub-committee in his personal capacity by M. Dubois, chairman of the Financial Committee of the League, was that the guarantees offered by the Armenian Government and people would be insufficient to secure the floating of a loan on a commercial basis, and that additional guarantees were required from Governments or individuals outside Armenia.

"The Belgian delegate, as *rapporteur*, explained that the proposed resolutions, the text of which follows, reserved full liberty of action to all Governments and did not engage the League financially beyond the small sum of 50,000 fr. required by Dr. Nansen in order to pursue his enquiries and negotiations.

"The following resolutions were unanimously adopted by the committee:—

"'(Translation.)

"'*League of Nations: Fifth Committee of the Sixth Assembly.*

"'*Armenian Loan: Draft Resolution presented by the Sub-Committee.*

"'The Sixth Assembly,

"'In view of the resolution adopted by the Fifth Assembly at its meeting on 25th September, 1924, inviting "the International Labour Office, in collaboration with Dr. Nansen, to institute an enquiry with a view to studying the possibility of settling a substantial number of Armenian refugees in the Caucasus and elsewhere";

"'In view of the reports by Dr. Fridtjof Nansen and by the experts who were sent with him to Armenia;

"'In view of the fact that those reports are unanimous as to the possibility of carrying out irrigation works which would allow of the settlement in Armenia under good conditions of at least 15,000 Armenian refugees, now in Greece and Constantinople, as also of 10,000 refugees already repatriated, on condition that the sum of 9 million gold roubles (£900,000 sterling) is forthcoming for the execution of the necessary work;

"'Desirous of availing itself of every practical opportunity of giving effect to the resolution so often renewed by former Assemblies regarding the return of Armenian refugees to a national home;

"'Invites the Council to appoint at once not more than five commissioners whom it would empower—

"'(*a.*) To ascertain finally the technical possibility of the proposed undertaking;

"'(*b.*) To exchange the views as may be necessary with the organs of the League of Nations, the Government of the Armenian Republic, and the other Governments, the associations and private individuals whose help would appear useful for the realisation of the scheme;

"'(*c.*) If their findings are favourable, to propose to the Council the constitution of a body of trustees to whom its statutes would give especially the following powers:—

"'1. To conclude with all authorities, public and private, all necessary contracts with the execution of the plan for settling the refugees; to accept, if necessary, from the Armenian Government a concession of the areas to be irrigated;

"'2. To negotiate, if necessary, the issue of a loan; and, in that case, to act as trustees of the funds, and to assure the financial arrangements.

"'3. The Assembly invites the Council to place at the disposal of the commissioners the sum required in 1925 for the execution of the above resolution, this sum to be entered in the budget under "unforeseen expenditure."

"'It decides to enter an item of 50,000 fr. in the 1926 budget for the same purpose.'"

[**E 5859/5859/44**] No. 37.

Sir R. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received September* 28.)

(No. 720.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith a report by Mr. Helm on his visit to Angora.

Constantinople, September 22, 1925.

Enclosure in No. 37.

General Notes on a Visit to Angora, September 16–17, 1925.

Foreign Ministry.—Tewfik Kiamil Bey will not go to Geneva for the Red Cross Conference, though he wished to do so. It is expected that he will give up his present post about the end of the year. He told me that he intends to take a rest. Yussuf Hikmet Bey has been succeeded as Director of Political Affairs by Nusret Saadullah Bey, for long Turkish Minister at The Hague. He is stated to be very pleasant to deal with. Jelal Bey is now "chef du protocol." He was aide-de-camp to the Caliph before the latter's departure. He is a tall man with good manners and speaks English well.

Cabinet.—Nothing apparently known about alleged differences between Mustafa Kemal and Ismet Pashas. Said that a group in the Cabinet led by Tewfik Rushdi Bey is seeking to undermine Ismet's position, but no sign of a break between him and the Ghazi; though it is believed that Ismet made every effort to effect a reconciliation between the latter and Latife Hanum. Ismet still very popular. Jemil Bey (Interior) has made a good name for himself, and Ali Jenani Bey (Commerce) is said to be influential.

The President and his Entourage.—Mustafa Kemal absented himself on the day of Latife Hanum's departure. Ismet Pasha saw her off at the station, and Mme. Ismet accompanied her to Smyrna. The Ghazi is said to be more powerful than ever. Divorce of Latife Hanum said to have been due to her persistent interference in political affairs. The President now attends nearly every Cabinet meeting, and even the most trivial affairs must be referred to the Cabinet. It is stated that a certain lady, whose name I could not ascertain, is much in the Ghazi's company, *e.g.*, she has several times accompanied him on visits to his model farm. One of the most powerful men outside the Cabinet is said to be Safvet Bey, secretary of the People's party. After him come men like Rushen Eshref, Kilij Ali, &c.

Mosul.—Practically nothing was heard about Mosul, with which Angora is tired. Nobody regards the threat of war as serious. (Information obtained from Mr. Treat, the American Embassy's liaison officer at Angora.)

Wireless.—According to Mr. Lander, a £T. 1 million contract has been signed with a French company. It is reported that a transmitting station will be built on the Kalejik road about two hours' distance from Angora, and a receiving station on the Kir Shehr road.

Building and Reconstruction.—Building operations are everywhere in progress. A large building has been completed at the station to house the Angora–Sivas Line Administration. Seven new Evkaf houses, larger than the four old ones, but situated near to them, are nearing completion, as is also the new post office, which is next to the Ministry of National Defence. The workmen on this building only spoke German. Committee rooms are being added to the Assembly building. The houses along the street running up to the burnt-out area have all been demolished and are being rebuilt, leaving a wider street which is being paved. The street in front of the Assembly is also being paved, its level being raised 2 feet in the process, but the supply of stones has given out. A number of new shops and houses has been built on the left of the Tchan Kaya road, about a mile from the town. No arrangements have been made for water or drainage. About a dozen houses are being built on the Chan Kaya slopes. The marsh on the left of the road between the town and the station has been partially drained and is to become a public park. A number of tracks have been made across it, and about sixty men are engaged in digging and other operations. Work on the Ghazi's model farm and village, about 10 kilom. from Angora, is actively in progress under German supervision.

Health.—There is still no system of drainage, but I noticed few mosquitoes. This may be partly due to the fact that Angora has had a hot summer and no rain since May. The majority of the houses now have mosquito screens on the windows.

Climatic Conditions.—The journey to Angora was very hot, the temperature in the wagons-lits all afternoon being from 93° to 95° Fahr. Also very hot at Angora on the 16th, with clouds of dust everywhere. On the 17th there were again dust clouds, but the temperature was much lower. The nights were cool and even cold. During my stay the temperature variation was nearly 50° (91° maximum, 42° minimum).

Railway.—The permanent way has been relaid in many parts, particularly between Angora and Eski Shehir, and work on the bridges is nearing completion. Two large wagons-lits have recently arrived. I returned in one of them and found

it clean. The old ones have suffered from their few months' stay in Angora, and judging from my experience on the way up, a journey in them is not to be recommended. They are gradually to be transferred to the Haidar Pasha–Adana section, on which a few wagons-lits are already running. All trains and wagons-lits that I saw were crowded.

Hats.—The wearing of hats at Angora is not so general as might be expected from the press. Most of the officials still wear the fez, but the old method of salutation is no longer affected. The new headgear order is unpopular. Though the number of hats is comparatively small, there is certainly no lack of variety.

Hotels.—The large new hotel seems to have made very little progress since I saw it in March last, and there is apparently no real expectation that it will be finished before next summer. A new hotel has, however, been opened at the station in a house formerly occupied by Kilij Ali Bey. The proprietor is a Turk. A restaurant and kitchen occupy the ground floor. There are seven bedrooms in all—five on the first and two (attics) on the second. None of these rooms is large, and all, except two, are single bedrooms. They look clean and are cheaply, but in the circumstances fairly comfortably, furnished. The place so far has a good name, and even after allowing for the noises of the station and restaurant, distance from the town, &c., is likely to be more comfortable than any of the hotels in the town. The charge for a room is about £T. 6 a night, but varies according to the demand and to the supposed paying capacities of the visitor (so I was told by the waiter who showed me round in the absence of the proprietor). Rooms should be booked at least two days in advance, telegrams being addressed, "Station Hotel, Angora."

Cost of Living is about 35–40 per cent. higher than in Constantinople.

Mr. Walker, well known in Constantinople during the armistice, is in Angora, but I was unable to ascertain what or whom he represents. He has rented a house.

ALEX. K. HELM.

September 18, 1925.

[E 5862/32/65] No. 38.

Sir R. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received September* 28.)

(No. 723.)

Sir, *Therapia, September* 23, 1925.

THE daily comments of the Turkish press on the Mosul discussions at Geneva have on the whole provided but little of interest, as no newspaper in this country would dare to indulge in any independent criticism. Day by day we are served with the same fare, consisting of protestations of Turkish good faith towards the League of Nations and distortions of the British attitude. The main object is to prove that Turkey stands for peace and permanent security in the Near East, while England attempts either to browbeat the League of Nations or, failing this, to secure the postponement of any binding decision.

2. In this connection there are two questions to which attention has been called, viz., Tewfik Rushdi's proposal for a pact between Turkey, Irak, Persia and Great Britain and the reference of certain legal points to the Permanent Court. The suggestion to conclude a pact is, I am convinced, pure propaganda on the part of the Turks. For some days the press recorded the proposal without any comment. It was not till the 20th September that several papers appeared on the same day with leading articles on the subject, emphasising this further proof of Turkey's sincere desire for peace and of her friendly feelings towards Persia. An article in the "Gazette" called attention to the danger to which Persia would be exposed by British attempts to exploit Kurdish national sentiments. Persia should remember that in this respect her interests were identical with those of Turkey, as both countries contained Kurdish minorities. That Turkey was free from any imperialist designs was clear from her correct attitude with regard to Turkish populations living in Russia, the Caucasus and Persia. She also harboured no imperialist ambitions against purely Irak territory, and, once a just settlement of the Mosul territory was effected, there was no reason why Turkey, Persia and Irak should not live in complete harmony. The only doubtful element was Great Britain, and it was not yet clear what the British attitude would be towards the Turkish suggestion for a pact.

3. On the day following these articles on the pact the press reported the reference of certain legal questions to The Hague Court. Turkey, who had shown in such clear

colours her desire for peace, was again being exposed to British intrigues. The ground had been carefully prepared. The British, quite incapable of understanding that a new mentality now held sway in Turkey, were resorting to their old tricks and were trumping up the same old charges of massacres of Christians. These charges were to influence the League of Nations in their favour. And what had been the result? England had had her way with the League of Nations. From the very beginning, wrote the "Jumhuriet" on the 21st September, England had tried to secure the postponement of any decision. If the League of Nations had really felt uncertain as to its competence on the points now referred to The Hague, why had she not realised this before? Why had she not requested an opinion at the time the Commission of Enquiry was formed? The only explanation that could be given was that the League of Nations was controlled by England, and that England had brought the necessary pressure to bear upon that institution. Turkey, however, could not renounce her rights, and Tewfik Rushdi was fully justified in declaring that Turkey must preserve her liberty of action.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 5863/194/44] No. 39.

Sir R. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received September 28.)

(No. 724. Confidential.)

Sir, *Therapia, September 23, 1925.*

I HAVE little actual news of importance to report to you this week. At Angora none is to be obtained. Mr. Helm (see his report enclosed in my despatch No. 720 of the 22nd instant) tells me the town is perfectly quiet, and no talk is circulating. The French counsellor was there the week before to gather news, and found officials so reticent that he came back practically empty-handed. My German colleague spent three days in the capital last week to present formally a letter from President Hindenburg announcing his election, and tells me the same tale. A veil of secrecy is being drawn over the interior of Anatolia, and it is doubtless for this reason that the Turkish authorities are refusing permits to foreigners to travel over the Anatolian Railway further east than Konia. This measure has been applied to applicants of several nationalities indiscriminately even in cases where they desired to proceed to Cilicia on business connected with cotton, and as the development of the cotton industry is very near to the heart of the Turkish Government, it is a strong step on their part to have closed the province to foreigners at this season. Within the last two or three days the authorities have likewise been forbidding access by ship to the ports of the Black Sea.

2. There are, of course, rumours of the movement of troops eastwards, even in large quantities, but I have been unable to trace them to any good authority. I did, however, telegraph to you a report which the Italian Chargé d'Affaires had received from his vice-consul at Mersina to the effect that small bodies (a waggon or two, he said) of well-equipped troops, including field artillery, are despatched almost daily by rail to the east.

3. On Friday the 18th two Russian destroyers entered the Bosphorus and paid a visit to Constantinople, on their way, it is said, to Italian ports. This visit has not attracted much attention, and intrinsically it is a small affair. The press has devoted but little space to it, and reports the exchange of official visits between the ships and the local authorities, and a banquet at the old Admiralty at which speeches were exchanged, apparently of an anodyne character. I do not know whether the Russians may have wished to give greater importance to this affair, but it seems clear that the Turkish authorities, while willing to indulge now in an overt demonstration, have not desired that it should assume larger dimensions. I notice in the "Jumhuriet" of to-day an article attacking the British Empire in the usual style, and quoting as one of its weaknesses the fact that Russia is actively "working" the peoples of Asia and acquiring great prestige among the oppressed races.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 5864/51/44] No. 40.

Sir R. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received September 28.)

(No. 725.)

HIS Majesty's representative at Constantinople presents his compliments to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and has the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note from the Turkish delegation, Constantinople, dated the 20th September, 1925, respecting the appointment of legal advisers for Turkey.

Constantinople, September 23, 1925.

Enclosure in No. 40.

Turkish Delegation to British Embassy.

EN réponse à la note de l'Ambassade de la Grande-Bretagne du 4 septembre 1925, la délégation du Ministère des Affaires étrangères a l'honneur de porter à sa connaissance que le Gouvernement turc a choisi comme conseillers légistes MM. Goeman Borgésius (Hollandais), Sauser Hall (Suisse) et Sterzel (Suédois), qui en ont déjà été informés par l'entremise des représentants turcs respectifs.

Quant au quatrième candidat, il est sur le point d'être désigné.

Constantinople, le 20 septembre 1925.

No. 41.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Mr. Keeling (Athens).

(No. 115. Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 29, 1925.*

YOUR telegrams Nos. 145, 147 and 148 of 24th September: Græco-Italian Agreement.

It is difficult for us, without knowing exact scope of proposed agreement, to express an opinion. On the one hand, if proposal is merely for an amicable settlement of outstanding questions between Greece and Italy, we should hesitate to discourage Greek Government. On the other hand, M. Rentis's language and proposal that Italian Under-Secretary should proceed to Athens indicate that something far more important is envisaged. Should the agreement be in any way directed against third parties or include even by implication the assignment to either country of zones of interest or immigration in Anatolia, then His Majesty's Government (and, I presume, other signatories of Treaty of Lausanne) could not remain indifferent.

You should therefore reply to M. Rentis that His Majesty's Government cannot express an opinion without more precise information of what is proposed.

(Repeated to Rome, No. 275.)

No. 42.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Sir R. Lindsay (Constantinople).

(No. 126. Very Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 2, 1925.*

A MEMBER of Turkish Embassy here has assured an acquaintance that attitude of their Government regarding Mosul affair is not bluff, and that they would certainly fight if necessary; and that Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs has already drafted treaty with Russia, which only awaits signature in case of emergency.

Further reports reach me that Soviet Government is concentrating all its energy on driving Turkey into war with us.

I am not unmindful of your despatches Nos. 704 and 705 of 14th September, and realise your local difficulties. Please, however, make every endeavour to ascertain anything definite about Russian intrigue.

[E 6028/194/44] No. 43.

Sir R. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received October* 5.)

(No. 734. Secret.)

Sir, *Therapia, September* 28, 1925.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 704, paragraph 4, regarding the internal politics of Turkey, I have the honour to report to you that the President is becoming more and more clearly the absolute Dictator of the State, and the decisions taken, even in matters of the highest importance, are ever more likely to be in accordance with his personal wishes. The elements of uncertainty as to State policy which are inseparable from any dictatorship become very strongly marked. The Ghazi's health is thus a matter of importance, and I happen to know that he has just had quite a severe bout of fever. The danger of assassination is ever present, and I cannot help remembering that a prominent ex-Minister of the republic once told me that the Ghazi would never visit Constantinople, "because in Turkey we do our politics too much with Browning pistols." These are dangers which, as things are here, may almost be said to menace the structure of the State; but of more immediate importance to His Majesty's Government is the question of how the Ghazi's way of thinking is affected by his immediate surroundings, and I greatly regret to be unable to give you any very definite and certain information on this point.

2. I feel pretty sure that the Ghazi is naturally an unusually strong, determined man and endowed with a mixture of courage and caution which leads him to strike hard, but only to strike when he is confident that his blow will go home and achieve his object. He is inspired by a very genuine patriotism, and is earnestly desirous of building up his country's strength and prosperity, and at the same time convinced that he alone is fit to carry out the great task of reconstruction. The only check now on the excesses to which the mind of such an autocrat may be carried is the influence of Ismet Pasha, and I should dearly love to know how much it has been shaken. I cannot help hoping that the influence of Tewfik Rushdi, who, of course, is a mere Pandar, may be affected by the course of events at Geneva. He has been allowed to indulge in every extravagance, and yet it must be clear at Angora that he has only succeeded in bringing about a few weeks' delay.

3. I see that Rejeb is named as a possible successor to Ismet, and I think the appointment quite likely if Ismet were to go. Rejeb, whom I made a point of seeing at Angora last spring, is a burly, round-headed man, fairly alert and businesslike with more common sense than intelligence, and with no sentiment whatever. I fancy he is terribly rough, brutal and ruthless, and, so far as internal politics are concerned, would be an extremist of the extremists, but I do not think he has any predilections in favour of Russia. Though he has long stood close to the Ghazi, I doubt if he would exercise much restraining influence, at any rate, until he had had time to make sure of his position.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 6189/1976/44] No. 44.

Mr. Chilton to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received October* 12.)

(No. 1440.)

Sir, *Washington, October* 1, 1925.

I LEARN that Rear-Admiral Mark Bristol, the United States High Commissioner in Turkey, who is now in this country, is working vigorously to bring about the recognition by the United States of America of the present régime in Turkey. He is apparently working hard with representatives of the press and with such Senators and Congressmen as he can find who are now in Washington.

A friend of mine, who was present at a luncheon given by the Overseas Writers a few days ago, told me that Admiral Bristol made an impassioned address, using all

the arguments at his disposal to attempt to prove why the United States should recognise the present Turkish régime. He pointed out that whereas all the Powers who had fought against Turkey had now recognised her, the United States, who had only broken off diplomatic relations, but had never declared war, were standing out against recognition. He made much of the fact that Turkey was now a sister Republic, and pointed out that the United States of America were not asked to protect minorities, or to undertake any obligations, and that it would be very much to the advantage of the United States to recognise the Turkish Republic.

I am told that although Admiral Bristol has been careful not to criticise openly Great Britain's attitude towards Turkey, he has insinuated that he thinks Turkey has been hardly treated by us.

I understand that Senator Borah is in entire sympathy with Admiral Bristol's views.

I have, &c.
H. G. CHILTON.

[E 6197/1944/44] No. 45.

Sir R. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received October* 12.)

(No. 751. Confidential.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October* 6, 1925.

IN the conversation with the German Ambassador recorded in a preceding despatch (my No. 749 of the 4th October), I brought the talk round to the question of Russo-Turkish relations, touched on in your telegram No. 126 of the 2nd October, where it is suggested that the terms of a treaty between the two Governments have been drafted ready for signature if wanted. Herr Nadolny has spent years of his life in Russia; he speaks the language well, and for his own purposes he keeps on better terms with the Russian Embassy here than any other member of the Diplomatic Body.

2. He quite agreed that Comrade Suritz is now in a position of considerable influence at Angora, and that the Russian and Turkish Governments have drawn together; he volunteered the information, which I myself had only seen in your telegram under reference, that a treaty between the two Governments was being talked of. This was a matter, he said, in which he was closely interested, and he watched it very carefully. He was quite confident that no such treaty existed, and he was emphatically convinced that the Turks would not think of taking any such step. Their rapprochement with Russia was a purely temporary affair, and the Turks had no intention of committing themselves at present to the Russians in any definite or permanent manner. They were still obstructing all progress in the negotiation of the commercial treaty, which had been under discussion for eighteen months at least.

3. Herr Nadolny expressed his view with confident conviction, and I attach some importance to it.

4. M. Filality, the Roumanian Minister, has also spoken to me about Russo-Turkish relations. He tells me that M. Duca has come back from Geneva convinced that there is an understanding between the Turkish and Russian Governments, in virtue of which the former will offer its mediation for the settlement of the Bessarabian question.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 6200/1091/44] No. 46.

Sir R. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received October* 12.)

(No. 756.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October* 6, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge your telegram No. 125 of the 1st October mentioning the report that there has recently been a recrudescence of Kurdish unrest and enquiring whether I have any confirmation of the news. I regret to say that I have no very useful information on the subject to communicate to you. It is

quite remarkable how little Constantinople knows of events in the eastern vilayets, but perhaps hardly surprising; for there are very few Europeans there except in the coast towns, and no Turkish newspapers keep any correspondents in the provinces. Even during the actual rebellion the only news received here was that which the Government at Angora gave out to the local pressmen.

2. I frequently hear it said in Constantinople that the Turkish authorities are still uneasy about the Kurdish situation; and in the conversation I had with Tewfik Rushdi just before he went to Geneva he gave me to understand that the Government still found it necessary to keep a sharp eye on the disaffected in general. So far as the Kurds themselves are concerned, I have lately heard from a source that I consider reliable that the position is somewhat as follows: The late revolt only embraced a comparatively small number of tribes; the more important clans and chiefs, especially those of the Dersim district, stood aside; these men were unaffected by the repression that has followed on the defeat of Sheikh Said and his followers, but they share all the feelings of the late rebels and are full of resentment and suspicion; the Turkish Government, it is said, is afraid now of attempting to break the power of these powerful clans lest they should have on their hands at this inconvenient moment an even more formidable outbreak than that of last spring.

3. It is noticeable that I have had no sort of news from Mr. Consul Knight at Trebizond. He is quite aware how interested His Majesty's Government would be in information on this subject, and I think that at his post, at any rate, at this season of the year, he would pick up any intelligence that became known at Erzerum.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 6368/1786/44] No. 47.

Sir R. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received October* 19.)

(No. 769. Confidential.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October* 12, 1925.

I HAD an interesting conversation on the 10th instant with M. Radev, the Bulgarian delegate. He had spent the whole of July and most of August in Angora negotiating the terms of a Turco-Bulgarian Treaty. He returned to Sofia at the end of the latter month, and I unfortunately then missed him on his way through Constantinople; he was now on his way to Angora to conclude the negotiation. Tewfik Rushdi Bey had met the Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Affairs at Geneva and they had together settled the final points at issue and M. Radev professed the belief that he would merely have to stay at Angora long enough to sign a document of which the terms are all practically settled, after which he would go straight off to his new post at Washington. Perhaps he may be right this time, but one cannot help remembering that on several previous occasions Turco-Bulgarian relations have been at this same point of imminent settlement.

2. His remarks concerning the matters at Angora of interest to His Majesty's Government are deserving of attention, even though they represent observations made six weeks ago. He is quite convinced that every one in the capital is strongly and genuinely anxious to avoid a serious breach with His Majesty's Government. In the Irak frontier dispute they have two main objections: firstly, the town of Mosul, which they feel they must have, because the "Mosul Question" has been so much trumpeted in the press, and the flag has been nailed so high on the mast that any solution, they fear, which does not give them Mosul town will be regarded as a failure; and tyrannies can only live on successes. The second, and, in his view, far the more important, point is the Kurdish question. The Turks' one desire is that all Kurds shall be brought to the same level as their own, downwards, if necessary, and they dread British control of Southern Kurdistan. He mentioned to me the horror with which a Turkish friend of his had told him that the British authorities were building schools in Southern Kurdistan and actually translating school text books into the Kurdish language. Here are the Turks endeavouring to assimilate their Kurdish minorities, and just across the frontier the British authorities doing all they can to encourage Kurdish nationalism. To a Turk this all counts for nothing more or less than pure anti-Turkish propaganda.

3. The general idea at Angora is to attract into Turkey the largest possible number of the Turcophone populations—from Azerbaijan, Turkestan or anywhere else—in order to remedy the terrible depopulation of Anatolia. They think that in

ten or fifteen years they may be able to accomplish much in this direction, and that, with a steady pursuance of the present policy of progress and modernisation, Turkey may reacquire sufficient strength to view the future with calm confidence. They fear greatly lest in this interval there should be a reactionary revolution in Russia. From that country, as now constituted, they do not anticipate any actual aggression; but, under an imperialist or openly capitalist régime, they think the menace to Turkey would be very serious if it matured before Turkey had recuperated her strength. They therefore attach importance to keeping the strength of the British Empire available as a reserve both for the immediate and for the more distant future.

4. M. Radev told me that Ismet Pasha's position with the Ghazi is entirely unimpaired. It is true, he said, that, while Ismet is rather an austere man living a quiet home life, Tewfik Rushdi is a joyful fellow, who joins with others in relieving the tedium of the Ghazi's leisure moments. From the apparent intimacy thus arising between the President and his Minister for Foreign Affairs a marked jealousy has sprung up between the hangers-on of Rushdi and those of Ismet, but the relations of the latter with the President were as close and cordial as ever. I hope this is true, and that the apprehensions expressed in my despatch No. 704 of the 14th September last are unfounded.

5. You will recollect that when I was at Angora last May Ismet Pasha declined to receive me (see my despatch No. 381 of the 18th May). M. Radev on that occasion travelled back with me from Angora as far as Eski Shehr and I told him of the incident. He has since found out that the reason for it was that Zekiai Bey had asked for an interview with Mr. Baldwin and had been put off. The decision that Ismet should not receive me had thereupon been taken as a measure of retaliation, confirmed by the Cabinet and acted upon. I think this is a very likely reason for Ismet's behaviour, and I mentioned it at the time as a possibility in a private letter to the Foreign Office of last May. It is possible that it will not be repeated—and something that Ferid Bey said to me once rather makes me think so; but if the subject is ever mentioned to me by a Turk, I think I know how to reply.

6. M. Radev, as you know, was educated at Galata Serai and speaks Turkish; he has friends at Angora in influential positions who were his school mates and his information is good. It is reliable where it concerns subjects in which no Bulgarian interest is concerned, and I attach importance to what he told me about the Turkish attitude over Mosul.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Irak, Bagdad.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 6371/194/44] No. 48.

Sir R. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received October* 19.)

(No. 773.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October* 13, 1925.

THE President of the Republic has been absent from Angora for the past three weeks on a tour in Western Anatolia, beginning with Brussa, where he remained about a fortnight; he seems to have led rather a quiet life there, and perhaps he was recuperating from an attack of fever he had at the capital. He saw during this time a certain amount of Abbas Hilmy Pasha, ex-Khedive of Egypt; possibly they may have political dealings, but the more natural thing to suppose is that the link between them is one of business, as the Ghazi has a large part of his private fortune invested in the "Ish-Bankassi" (the Banque d'Affaires), which Abbas Hilmy founded early this year, and the papers were writing about the further investments of capital which the ex-Khedive is about to make at Brussa. In one of his speeches the President expressed the wish that he might see Brussa endowed with as many factories as she now had mausoleums, and likely enough Abbas Hilmy will have to contribute part of his fortune towards that admirable end. Anyhow, his yacht, the "Nimetullah," was had out, and President and all took a trip on her in the Marmora. Returning to Mudania late in the evening, they ran ashore and spent the chief part of the night on the mud.

2. After excursions in the neighbourhood of Brussa, the President proceeded viâ Panderma, Balikessri and Magnesia to Smyrna, where he is now staying. There have been enthusiastic demonstrations of affection wherever he has been and many speeches

have been uttered. The Ghazi's have struck the note of modernism and nationalism combined, as, for instance, at Smyrna, where he referred to that town's old appellation of "Giaour Ismir," and said that the reproach had been removed and would never again be allowed to sully the city. The striking feature in the addresses made to the President is the tone of almost incredible flattery which runs through them all. At Balikessri the mayor said: "If God had not told us in the Koran that Mahomet was the last of the prophets, I should say, 'Thou, O Ghazi, thou art a prophet.' Christ raised the dead and gave sight to the blind, but thou hast given life and self-expression to the Turkish people; thou art the grandiose dome towards which all hearts turn." The Ghazi receives these tributes with pleasure and emotion, and the papers reproduce them in columns and columns of print.

3. The political object of the Pasha's tour is doubtless to advance the campaign of modernism, with especial reference to the substitution of hats for fezes, which now, perhaps unfortunately, has come to typify the whole movement. Wherever the Ghazi has passed there have been holocausts of fezes, and in Constantinople even the change is marked. You can see little but European head-gear to-day in Pera, and the diplomats are beginning to talk to each other of putting their cavasses into hats. Stamboul is more conservative and lags behind.

4. The Grand National Assembly is to meet again on the 23rd October, and as the day draws near some interest in politics reawakens. In the first place there are a number of elections to be held to fill up parliamentary vacancies, and, needless to say, none but the purest Populists will be elected. At Constantinople there were two places to be filled, and to the general surprise two obscure and unknown individuals appeared as independent candidates against the official nominees of the People's party. The poll took place the day before yesterday, and showed 1,125 votes for the two official candidates against 6 abstentions. This can only be called inartistic. As electors came up to record their votes they were each invited to sign a summons addressed to Adnan, Raouf, Refet and Kiazim Karabekir, four members for Constantinople who were leaders of the now defunct Progressive party, calling on these gentlemen in vigorous and rather rude terms to resign their deputyships, as they no longer truly represented their constituents. About 800 electors only seem to have signed.

5. Angora seems to have been trying to coax the Progressives back into the fold, and I heard of a determined effort made on Ali Fuad Pasha, which, however, met with a very uncompromising answer. Refet, a few days ago, was saying that the Progressives —still eighteen or twenty in number—meant to go to Angora and attend Parliament as usual, not, indeed, as a party, but as individuals entitled to hold and to express their own views. It rather looks to me as if they may get into trouble.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[**E 6502/362/65**] No. 49.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to the Marquess of Crewe (Paris).

(No. 3485.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October 22, 1925.*

I TOOK advantage of a visit of courtesy paid to me by the French Ambassador this afternoon to speak to his Excellency about the passage of Turkish troops through Syria. I reminded him of the extremely friendly assurances given to Mr. Phipps by M. Berthelot on the 1st June (your telegram No. 207 of that date), and by M. Léger on the 9th September, as reported by Mr. Phipps in a private letter. I said that I was now informed that the Turkish Government was seeking permission for the passage first of 600, and later of 6,000, men; that this gave me some concern, not that I thought that the Turks were contemplating an attack upon Irak, but because there was no excuse for such movements, and they could only be intended as a threat. I trusted that, if any troops were allowed to pass, it would be only in small numbers, and that the French Government would insist that with the arrival of each detachment an equal number should be brought away before a further detachment was allowed to pass.

M. de Fleuriau told me that, from the Quai d'Orsay print which reached him in the ordinary course, he could tell me that he had seen that some such demands had been made, and that the French Government had instructed their Embassy in Constantinople to make strong objections. He would report to M. Briand what I had said.

I then told his Excellency that I must speak to him about Damascus. He asked rather eagerly if I had any news, and said that he had been intending to put this question to me.

I read to him, with very slight omissions and alterations, the text of telegram No. 20 of the 21st October from Consul Smart. I said that I thought it my duty to bring this report to his notice. Some account of the incident might reach this country in private letters, and I thought it better to speak frankly to him about it at once.

M. de Fleuriau thanked me for giving him this information. He said that as one who had had some experience of the East and Far East, the things which he had read had produced a very bad impression upon his own mind, which had been confirmed and strengthened by the telegram which I had just read to him. So much, he added, in all these Eastern countries, depended upon personality.

I then ventured upon the observation that such information as came to me made me feel that the French Government ought to be very vigilant, and that it might well be that a serious situation would develop in Syria. I wondered what part the Soviet or Turkish Governments had in these troubles.

M. de Fleuriau seemed to think that the Turks had little influence upon the disturbances, though they were not displeased by them. He thought the activities of the Soviet Government more dangerous.

I am, &c.
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

[**E 6527/175/44**] No. 50.

Sir R. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received October 26.)

(No. 785.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October 16, 1925.*

TURKS are never tired of saying that Mosul is the only stumbling-block in the path towards Anglo-Turkish friendship, and the statement contains more truth than is usually to be found in parrot cries. There is a very fair prospect that for some years to come general conditions of international politics will be favourable for a return to relations of confidence and even cordiality between Great Britain and Turkey.

Russia.

2. In spite of favours and sympathy received since 1920, in spite of the close relations of the present day, Turkey is quite conscious of intense Russian activity towards the south, and making allowance for changes of mottoes and battle-cries, finds that there is an unpleasant similarity between the policy of the Soviet Union and that of the old empire. The future holds out little or no prospect of alleviation, for Russian political thought can hardly be expected to move to the left, whereas it may well move to the right; and if the ostensible internationalism of to-day disappears, it can only be replaced by the open acquisitiveness of a former age. Nor is this all; the eclipse of Germany and the dismemberment of the Austro-Hungarian Empire have *pro tanto* removed two healthy checks on the Russian appetite, especially where Turkey is concerned.

Great Britain.

3. Similarly, Great Britain's relationship to Turkey should revert to something like what it was in a past age, and from Constantinople to Vladivostok the outlook of British agents is already that of their remoter predecessors. It is the Empire's interest to prop up a whole row of buffer States, and these States, of course with infinite tergiversations, blackmail, and playing off of north against south, will nevertheless come to recognise that on their national existence the British influence must exercise a preservative and the Russian a corrosive effect. For Great Britain the attainment of good Anglo-Turkish relations may be the easier because the problem of Christian minorities has assumed far smaller dimensions than it ever had in the past. On the other hand, the need for it is the greater owing to the existence of politico-religious nationalism in India and other Moslem dependencies.

Turkey.

4. Chastened by fifteen years of war, the young Turkish Republic, in common with the rest of the world, looks forward to-day to a breathing-space, and prepares to use it to the utmost advantage. Modernisation is the heart and soul of its policy; nationalism and secularisation are its necessary handmaids. In all that the Turks do there is and will be infinite muddle, and in their ideals there may be a plentiful absence of logic; but their convictions are deep and genuine, and they are pursuing the realisation of them with passion. In the modernisation part of their programme they have the Japanese example before their eyes, and they purpose not only to introduce everything that steam, petrol and electricity can provide, but also to remodel from top to bottom their codes and their administrative and social institutions. Secularisation should not be regarded as a mere outburst of crude atheism; it is adopted as a deliberate act of State with the purpose of making a programme of modernisation possible of execution, for it has been dinned into their ears by every European writer, and Turks have come to understand that Islam is a strait waistcoat within which reform is doomed to be suffocated. Nationalism came into being years ago, but recent events have made it for the first time a living force in the hearts of the people. It now constitutes the driving power behind the whole programme of the Government. More important still, it provides to the commonalty some substitute for that which is lost through secularisation. The Government's ideal is to have a compact rectangular Anatolian State into which it would welcome with open arms any and every Turkish-speaking peasant in the world. Aliens are not wanted, but Kurds are a necessary evil.

With this programme, the branches of which are indissolubly bound up together, it is hoped to bring Turkey within a few years to such a pitch of strength and prosperity that she will be able to face confidently any menace that may come from north or south. There is no sign at present of any genuine aggressiveness in Turkish foreign policy, and if His Majesty's Government could feel assured on this point as regards the future, it would be to their interest that the Turkish effort should be crowned with success.

Kurdistan.

5. The Kurdish rebellion of last spring was a terrible shock to this policy. There is a nationalism in Kurdistan, but it is Kurdish and not Turkish, and the Turkish nationalism, inculcated by the Government, is too narrow and sectarian in character to reconcile backward Kurds to the unpalatable programme of secularisation. Small wonder that the tribesmen broke into revolt. To reinduce contentment the Government has applied fiscal reforms (abolition of the tithe), but it feels its whole programme is imperilled by such outbursts, and that it must at any cost suppress Kurdish nationalism; and yet it finds that just across its southern frontier His Majesty's Government proposes to found a sort of Kurdish National Home. This is a direct menace to the very heart of Turkish policy. It is one thing for His Majesty's Government to stand aloof and have as little to do with Turkey as possible; but a very different thing to administer to her a heavy blow right on the mark.

And so we return to the point from which we started—that the Mosul question is the only stumbling-block in the path towards Anglo-Turkish friendship. After the agitations of the past month or two it looks as if the game is fairly in the hands of His Majesty's Government and that they can play it out as they like; but it may be well to remember that more is at stake than a mere frontier line. Perhaps His Majesty's Government are already irretrievably committed to fostering nationalism in Southern Kurdistan; if not, there are strong reasons for wishing that the League will not impose on the mandatory Power any obligation in that direction.

I have sent a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Irak.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[**E 6528/6528/44**] No. 51.

Sir R. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received October* 26.)

(No. 786.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October* 18, 1925.

TURKISH reactions towards events in Persia are always interesting, and on the 15th instant the "Hakimiet-i-Millié" published an interview with the Minister for Foreign Affairs on Turco-Persian relations. It was doubtless provoked by the recent disturbances in Tehran and by the impression that the Shah was returning to his capital, the news that he had postponed his journey not having then appeared in the local press. Tevfik Rushdi Bey said that, of course, Turkey could not mix herself up in the affairs of other countries, and her relations with Persia were marked by increasing cordiality. The best results were to be expected from the serious activity noted in Reza Khan, the head of the Persian Government, and he was convinced that the Persian nation would be able to overcome any difficulties that might arise.

2. This little pat on the back to Reza Khan is doubtless partly due to the wish of Angora that yet another Asiatic State should put itself under a republican dictatorship; partly, also, to Reza Khan's anti-Russian proclivities. I mentioned in the spring (my despatch No. 430 of the 2nd June) the concern displayed here when the Turkoman disturbances were giving trouble to the Persian Government, and it seems clear that Turkey, even if at Angora she may flirt with the Russians, is distinctly anti-Russian at Tehran.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY

[**E 6533/194/44**] No. 52.

Sir R. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received October* 26.)

(No. 791.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October* 20, 1925.

IN my despatch No. 785 of the 16th instant I submitted some observations on Anglo-Turkish relations of the future which, to a certain extent, were based on considerations of the internal politics of this country, and it may be useful that I should expand somewhat in a separate despatch the views therein expressed, especially in regard to the nationalism of the Turkey of to-day.

2. It is disaster rather than prosperity that turns men's and nation's minds to the task of introspection, and conditions of disorder and confusion in national affairs present to the reformer his best opportunity for cutting dead-wood out of the tree of the State. Many countries in the last twenty years have been bitten by ideas of what we may call Oriental nationalism, but whereas others during this period have led sheltered lives, only Turkey has undergone the influence in the conditions of stress; with the result that in the task of carrying through reforms Turkish statesmen have had a far freer hand than reformers in other Eastern lands, and even before the Great War things were done here which would have been quite impossible in, say, Orthodox Egypt. In the war Turkey alone of Mahometan countries espoused the wrong side, and the misfortunes which ensued, the Allied occupation of Constantinople, and still more, of course, the Greek occupation of Western Anatolia, have all contributed immensely to weld the nation together and to facilitate the task of the renovator; at the same time the susceptibilities of the ordinary Turk have been so hardened that, taking account also of his normal passivity, he has become almost callous to impulses which would intensely shock other Orientals. It must be remembered that he is now able to stand a good deal more than his more prosperous coreligionaries in other and more happy lands.

3. In the old days the State might be looked on as the private property of the House of Osman, and the Turkish soldier would fight for the glory of the reigning family and for the religion of which its head was the acknowledged leader. He was taught to call himself an Osmanli, and the term "Turk" was one almost of opprobrium, connoting something barbarous and backward. There was nothing national about the old Ottoman Empire—indeed, it was almost anti-national. The process of de-Ottomanisation began in a very small way many years ago in the shape of a literary movement, and though the original Committee of Union and Progress men kept the designation of Osmanli for themselves, even in their patriotic songs they began to invest the word "Turk" with a new dignity, with the idea of

exalting the nation rather than its nominal head as the object for whose benefit all national effort should be exerted. Other countries have succeeded in identifying their Royal Houses completely with the nation—in Turkey no effort in that direction has been made, partly, no doubt, owing to the effete character of the Ottoman princes, mainly, however, because the Caliph, as head of a rigid religion, could hardly be expected to take the lead in a movement of reform which must assume a strongly secular character. Indeed, the opposite course has been followed, especially in recent years, and every effort exerted to depress the prestige of the House of Osman, and with easy success; for in the events of a decade which have deeply moved the nation, what prince has won the smallest personal distinction? As a satire on the Imperial House, one newspaper reproduced the portrait of a minor prince—a sort of mincing barber's block—and under it printed the caption: "Is this the descendant of Selim the Grim?" De-Ottomanisation has gone a long way: the Ottoman Family has been dragged in the mud and has lost its prestige, and stone dead hath no friends in the East. On the other hand, "Turkism," as it is called, is correspondingly exalted; the rulers of to-day lose no opportunity of identifying themselves with the nation; every peasant in Anatolia knows that Mustafa Kemal threw the Greeks into the sea, and every townsman that Ismet signed a treaty with allied Europe in virtue of which his foreign fellow citizen has lost all his hated privilege. Oriental nationalism in Turkey has acquired a more definite object and a more genuine character of true patriotism than in other Islamic countries. A fairly sound basis has been laid on which a superstructure can be raised.

4. It is unnecessary to imagine that the programme of secularisation and modernisation now pursued so intensely will turn Turkey into a powerful State, for, however well-founded may be the basic conceptions of the present Government, the Turk has even been known for his instability of purpose, and muddle, maladministration and corruption are as rampant as ever. A prophet of reform, rather than make unending speeches about hats, might more wisely cry to the people: "Rend your heart, and not your garments!"

5. Nor can anyone maintain that the new and drastic reforms are, in themselves, widely popular; it is a considerable though minor worry to poor people to have to spend money on new-fangled clothes, and many are sincerely attached to their tekkes, now compulsorily suppressed. But rationalism, or rather irreligion, has spread so far in the class which, for lack of a better designation, may be called the *intelligentsia* that it would be hard to find in Western Anatolia any leaders for a religious reaction against the violent lay policy of the present Government. Moreover, an Islamic revolt would be greatly hampered by being inextricably mixed up with the ex-Imperial Family, and except perhaps in Kurdistan, an Ottoman prince counts for nothing nowadays. At the same time the army is not touched in its personal habits by the present phase of the modernisation programme—the hat order; it is more exposed and more susceptible, both officers and men, to nationalist and patriotic propaganda; the officers are better paid than any other servants of the Government, and there is no reason to suppose that they would hesitate to shoot down agitators for the Sheria law to-day just as they did in 1909. The death of the head of the State would of course greatly weaken the Republican Government, but observing the determination of the men of Angora and the manner in which they have succeeded in rallying the corps of officers to their new-fangled banners, it is difficult to see how a religious reaction—though not inconceivable—could be brought about except as the result of the whole country being overwhelmed by some fresh disaster.

6. Kurdistan constitutes the most serious menace in sight to the present régime. Abd-ul-Hamid played with Kurdish nationalism mainly as a means of keeping the Armenians in check, but he also attempted, through the Hamidieh cavalry, to attach the Kurds to his person and to play off rival chiefs and tribes against each other. Even before the end of Abd-ul-Hamid's reign the Young Turks were at loggerheads with Kurdish nationalism, and with the disappearance of the Armenians the last reasons for tolerating it have gone. An Islamic Government might possibly turn it to account, but between it and anything else, especially between it and the secular-minded young republic, there can be nothing but irreconcilable hostility; and the only question is whether, so long as the republic lasts, and until something radically different from it takes its place, we shall see a series of revolts followed by a series of repressions; or whether the task will be too great for the Government's strength, and Kurdistan will be left severely alone with its own local administration of Sheikhs-Beys, much as Albania was in the old days.

7. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Irak.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[**E 6544/1231/44**] No. 53.

Mr. Stevenson to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received October* 26.)

(No. 227.)

Sir, *Sofia, October* 22, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to report that, according to an official statement, three agreements concluded between the Bulgarian and Turkish Governments were signed at Angora on the 18th October by M. Radev and Tewfik Kemal Bey. These agreements are: (1) a treaty of friendship, in which is foreshadowed the future conclusion of an arbitration treaty; (2) a supplementary protocol dealing with minority rights and the question of the property of refugees; and (3) a convention laying down the rights of the nationals of either country residing within the territory of the other.

2. I have not as yet been able to secure copies of these documents, and only a vague summary has so far been published in the press. It appears, however, that the treaty of friendship is similar to those treaties concluded by Turkey with States which did not participate in the Treaty of Lausanne. According to the supplementary protocol the problem of nationality is to be settled by establishing in each case whether an individual has acquired the nationality of the country in which he resides in accordance with the laws of that country; the question of schools and churches is decided on the basis of the appropriate clauses in regard to minorities of the Treaties of Neuilly and Lausanne; while the vexed question of the property of refugees has been settled, according to the press, on a basis of complete reciprocity. The most important provision contained in the convention, from the Bulgarian point of view, is that which accords to the nationals of each country the right to acquire and own real estate in the other country—a right which Bulgarians have hitherto not enjoyed in Turkey.

3. Having been under the impression, which was substantiated by all the information in my possession, that the Bulgarian Government were the reverse of sanguine as to the outcome of M. Radev's final journey to Angora, I took an opportunity to-day to question the Secretary-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs on the subject. He informed me that while at Geneva Tewfik Rushdy Bey had proposed to M. Kalfov a formula in regard to the question of the property of the refugees which had hitherto seemed impossible of settlement. Tewfik Rushdy Bey was confident that his Government would accept this formula, but, such was the latter's fear of creating what might be undesirable precedents in the matter of refugee property, the Bulgarian Government had been unable until the day before the actual signature of the agreements to secure from them a decision on the subject.

4. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

I have, &c.
RALPH STEVENSON

[**E 6688/1231/44**] No. 54.

Sir R. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received November* 2.)

(No. 802.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October* 24, 1925.

WITH reference to Mr. Stevenson's despatch No. 227 of the 22nd instant relative to the recently concluded Turco-Bulgarian treaties, I have the honour to report the following additional information which I have received from M. Radeff.

2. The problem of nationality in Turkey, so far as I could understand, was to be settled by conferring Bulgarian nationality on as large a number as possible of the Bulgars who are not clearly Turkish subjects. Apparently the Turkish Government agrees to recognise as Bulgarian subjects persons who originate from districts detached from Turkey since 1912 provided they can show Bulgarian naturalisation papers. Minorities are, as stated by Mr. Stevenson, safeguarded by the clauses of the Neuilly and Lausanne Treaties, but provision is made for referring divergences of interpretation to the Permanent Court of Justice at The Hague (not to the League of Nations). M. Radeff also told me that the stipulations of the Turco-Bulgarian Treaty of 1913 signed at Constantinople, in virtue of which, mainly in Islamic questions, something like extra-territorial rights were conferred on Mahometan dignitaries, are all swept away in the new treaty now signed.

3. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Sofia.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 6692/6528/44] No. 55.

Sir R. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received November 2.)

(No. 809.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October 27, 1925.*

IN continuation of my despatch No. 786 of the 18th instant respecting the Turkish attitude towards Reza Khan, I have the honour to report that the Persian Ambassador called on me yesterday by appointment.

2. The conversation with his Excellency was as usual very much prolonged. We started on the subject of tea, and by imperceptible gradations moved on to land values in Constantinople, on the Bosphorus, at Tehran and in England. We discussed the principal buildings and sights of this town and a house in Prinkipo belonging to a rich Greek. This brought us to the Prefect of Constantinople, Emin Bey, and naturally enough to the coal depots on the Golden Horn. Thence we travelled to Turkish art, to the infinitely superior Persian art, to the Anglo-French Exhibition of 1908, and after a short excursus on the Persian derivation of the Turkish word "charshi" (*Anglicè* "bazaar"), to the subject of an exhibition of Turkish art now in progress here, and so, after fifty minutes of brisk work, we arrived suddenly and unexpectedly at the point and object of his Excellency's visit to me. With its nature I need not trouble you.

3. We resumed on more serious political topics. The wheat shortage at Tehran (which is no shortage at all), the manœuvres of the Russians, the Russian famine of 1922, and then suddenly to my alarm we were talking of Nusret-ed-Dowleh. This statesman occupies his Excellency's thoughts quite as much as King Charles's head did those of Mr. Dick, and if only I could properly concentrate my attention, I should know a lot to the discredit of Nusret-ed-Dowleh. Fortunately, a side wind carried his Excellency off into an affair he is now discussing with the Turkish Government. Many years ago one of his predecessors had indulged in some peculations here. Luckily the Turkish representative at Tehran had occupied himself in a similar way at the same time, and ever since then there had been uninterrupted correspondence between the two Governments about it all. His Excellency had that very day been down to see Nusret Bey and had handed to him no less than fourteen long notes on the subject. Having thus established the complete absence of logic in the mental processes of the Turk, we came to the matter of Tewfik Rushdi Bey's statement to the Constantinople press.

4. When his Excellency had arrived here he had soon realised that the Turkish Government were for some reason or other suspicious of Reza Khan, and he had tried to dispel their suspicions. When he first went to Angora he had spent five hours in explaining things to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. He believed he had made an impression; the Minister had admitted that Mohi-ed-din Pasha had reported favourably from Tehran, and he promised to think the matter over. Some time later, just as he was going up to Angora again, he had a telegram from Tehran saying: "What is the meaning of this mission that the Turks are sending us?" The mission, he ascertained, was to go to Tehran and enquire into and report on the situation. Sheikh Tabatabai had protested warmly. What could a mission do in a few days that Mohi-ed-din Pasha could not do still better? Failing Mohi-ed-din, was not he himself available at all moments? Why should the Turkish Government choose to give the Persian Government such unpleasant surprises? The Minister for Foreign Affairs had acquiesced and admitted that he had set to work in the wrong way; he would think the matter over again. Finally, at the beginning of this month, Tewfik Rushdi had seen his Excellency and said, that having thought the matter over, he had decided that the Turkish Government would like to be friendly with Reza Khan; he would shortly make a speech somewhere or other in which he would take occasion to say friendly things about the present Persian Government. And here, exclaimed his Excellency, comes a wretched little interview with some Stamboul journalist! He grudgingly admitted that the intention may have been good, but what was the meaning of this exordium about not wishing to mix up in the internal affairs of other countries? The Turkish Foreign Office might perhaps know a lot about Chile or Guatemala—it was possible, though his Excellency was not sure; but he was quite sure that it knew nothing about the neighbouring country of Persia. Who was Turkey that she should use such language? Was she an England or a France or an America, and was Persia for ever to be treated like a child of twelve? Reza Khan was a sensitive man on such points of punctilio, and his Excellency was confident that Tewfik Rushdi's interview had done more harm than good.

5. I fear it may be thought that this report, considering its length, is somewhat unsubstantial; all I can say is that it cost me an hour and three-quarters hard work to collect the material of which it is composed.

6. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 6858/498/44] No. 56.

Sir R. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received November 9.)

(No. 815.)

Sir, *Constantinople, October 29, 1925.*

AT a recent meeting of the Allied Ambassadors the question of the treatment of minorities in Turkey and of the observance by the Turkish Government of the minority clauses of the Treaty of Lausanne came under discussion, and it was decided to draft a further memorandum, supplementary to those enclosed in my despatches No. 869 of the 26th November, 1924, and No. 78 of the 3rd February last, bringing up to date the information already furnished. I have the honour to transmit this memorandum to you herewith. Copies of it have also been transmitted to the French and Italian Governments by my colleagues.

2. From the situation disclosed in this document it is clear that the entirely inequitable and arbitrary treatment to which the remaining Christian minorities of Turkey are exposed is continuing unabated. There is no sign whatever that the Turks are in the least bit wearying of their policy of intense nationalism or deviating from their intention of "purifying" their country. Indeed, it could hardly have been anticipated that their sentiments would show any marked change in this respect within the short space of only a year or so. The character of the action now in course of being taken is the same to-day as it was last February, but, perhaps owing in part to the Treasury's need of money, more active steps are being taken to realise the properties seized. At the same time, the prospects of the Turkish Government entering the League of Nations is no nearer now than it was earlier in the year—indeed, if Turkish hopes as regards the Irak frontier are disappointed, the prospects are probably even more remote.

3. On the other hand, the memorandum of to-day provides the Allied Governments with none of those definite cases of flagrant violation of rights on which they would prefer to base representations, and for lack of which it was decided this spring to postpone taking any action.

4. An interesting point, mentioned slightly only in the memorandum, is the tendency reported in the Armenian and Hebrew (but not in the Greek) communities here to deprive themselves voluntarily of their treaty privilege and assimilate themselves in all respects under the law to the Mussulman majority. It does not necessarily follow, as one would at first think, that such a movement is entirely engineered by the Turkish authorities, and the French and Italian Ambassadors had no evidence to that effect. The matter is worth investigating and I shall report to you any reliable information I can collect.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

Enclosure in No. 56.

Nouvel Exposé des Infractions commises par le Gouvernement turc aux Clauses concernant la Protection des Minorités contenues dans le Traité de Lausanne.

LES Ambassades de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie ont signalé à plusieurs reprises à leurs Gouvernements les infractions commises par la Turquie aux clauses concernant la protection des minorités contenues dans le Traité de Lausanne. Dans deux mémoires détaillés portant les dates du 24 novembre 1924 et du 3 février 1925, elles ont énuméré et exposé ces diverses infractions, en en précisant, autant qu'elles l'ont pu, les caractères et les modalités. Depuis l'envoi de ces deux mémoires aux Gouvernements alliés, aucune atténuation n'a été apportée par le Gouvernement turc aux mesures de rigueur tout à fait injustifiables, dont un nombre considérable de non-musulmans sont frappés en violation des engagements solennels consacrés par le

traité. Non seulement les mesures de spoliation n'ont pas cessé, mais leur application s'accentue de jour en jour. De temps en temps, de vagues informations de caractère favorable circulent dans la presse ou dans le public. Parallèlement à certains mouvements plus ou moins spontanés qui se sont produits récemment dans quelques éléments appartenant à deux communautés non musulmans en vue d'un accord direct avec les éléments turcs, à l'exclusion de tout appui étranger et en dehors des garanties du Traité de Lausanne, quelques bruits circulent, plus ou moins expressément, d'après lesquels une certaine atténuation serait envisagée aux mesures de rigueur dont souffrent si cruellement de nombreux chrétiens originaires de Turquie, résidant actuellement en dehors de ce pays, et qui, malgré leurs démarches pressantes, ne peuvent obtenir d'y rentrer. On parle plus ou moins ouvertement d'une autorisation qui serait éventuellement donnée à ceux de ces malheureux sur lesquels aucun grief sérieux ne pèserait de retourner enfin en Turquie, ce qui impliquerait pour eux la levée des saisies pratiquées sur leurs biens. Ces bruits favorables ont circulé déjà à diverses reprises. Rien jusqu'à présent n'est venu les confirmer et les Ambassades alliées considèrent comme un devoir de signaler de nouveau à leurs Gouvernements la situation de plus en plus douloureuse d'un nombre considérable de ressortissants turcs contre lesquels aucun fait délictueux ne saurait être relevé.

En dehors des expulsions en masse plus ou moins déguisées, de chrétiens ottomans du sud-est de l'Anatolie, qui se sont produites pendant les derniers mois de l'année 1923 et au commencement de 1924, dont le mémoire aux Gouvernements alliés du 3 février dernier a déterminé le caractère et la gravité, trois points principaux ont été relevés à la charge du Gouvernement turc, tant dans ce mémoire que dans celui qui l'avait précédé et qui porte la date du 24 novembre 1924. Ces trois points concernent: (1) les mesures de spoliation dont les chrétiens de Turquie ont été et continuent d'être l'objet de la part du Gouvernement turc par l'application rigoureuse de la loi sur les biens abandonnés, combinée avec les dispositions du règlement sur la circulation, de juillet 1924; (2) l'obligation imposée à toutes les sociétés turques à capitaux étrangers de renvoyer leur personnel chrétien et de le remplacer par un personnel musulman; (3) la non-affectation aux minorités non musulmanes de la part instituée par l'article 41 du Traité de Lausanne au bénéfice des sommes qui pourraient être attribuées sur les fonds publics par le budget de l'État, les budgets municipaux ou autres, dans un but d'éducation, de religion ou de bienfaisance. Avant d'examiner l'état actuel de la question à ce triple point de vue, il y a lieu d'indiquer une nouvelle violation des clauses du Traité de Lausanne qui s'est produite depuis l'envoi des précédents mémoires.

Aux termes de l'article 42 de ce traité, paragraphes 1 et 2, "Le Gouvernement turc agrée de prendre à l'égard des minorités non musulmanes, en ce qui concerne leur statut familial ou personnel, toutes dispositions permettant de régler ces questions selon les usages de ces minorités. . . . . Ces dispositions seront élaborées par des commissions spéciales composées en nombre égal de représentants du Gouvernement turc et de représentants de chacune des minorités intéressées. En cas de divergence, le Gouvernement turc et le Conseil de la Société des Nations nommeront d'un commun accord un surarbitre choisi parmi les jurisconsultes européens." Après avoir, pendant près de deux ans, complètement ajourné l'application de ces dispositions, le Gouvernement turc s'est décidé à convoquer des commissions appelées à remplir le rôle des commissions spéciales visées ci-dessus. Toutefois, au lieu d'être formées en nombre égal, comme il est dit dans le Traité, de *représentants* du Gouvernement turc et de chacune des minorités intéressées, ces commissions ont été composées de membres turcs et, selon le cas, de membres arméniens, orthodoxes ou israélites, en nombre égal il est vrai, mais tous indistinctement nommés par le Gouvernement.

Ces commissions ainsi composées, en dehors de toute participation des communautés intéressées, sont également présidées par un Turc qui est en surnombre. Celui-ci, comme ses collègues turcs, est un fonctionnaire en activité ou en retraite, émargeant par conséquent au budget de l'État et, par suite, pas entièrement indépendant. Enfin, une seule commission turco-arménienne, dans laquelle figurent, avec le président et deux membres turcs, un Arménien grégorien et un Arménien catholique nommés dans les conditions ci-dessus exposées, devra s'occuper de la codification des dispositions concernant le statut familial ou personnel de tous les Arméniens indifféremment grégoriens, catholiques et protestants, malgré les différences quelques fois très grandes qui existent entre les statuts de ces communautés. C'est ainsi, par exemple, que le statut des catholiques ne reconnaît pas le divorce, qui est admis par les Arméniens grégoriens et les Arméniens protestants.

Un tout au moins des membres chrétiens ainsi nommés s'est récusé. Il a été pourvu à son remplacement dans les mêmes conditions et les commissions spéciales ont

commencé leurs travaux, qu'elles poursuivent en dehors de toute participation ou reconnaissance des patriarcats intéressés.

C'est surtout par souci de ne rien négliger dans le présent exposé que le point ci-dessus est mentionné. En fait, et malgré l'irrégularité de leur composition, rien n'indique que les commissions dont il s'agit, dont le rôle doit se borner à la recherche des dispositions en usage pour le statut familial et personnel dans les diverses communautés non musulmanes de Turquie, puissent s'acquitter infidèlement de leur mission. Il y a lieu de signaler aussi à cette occasion que le Gouvernement turc s'occupe actuellement de réformer entièrement ses lois civiles. Il soumettrait prochainement au Parlement d'Angora un Code civil qui serait une adaptation aussi fidèle que possible, dit-on, du Code civil suisse. Cette réforme s'accorderait difficilement, il est vrai, avec l'esprit des dispositions du Traité de Lausanne concernant les minorités. On peut penser, cependant, que ces minorités elles-mêmes, malgré le sacrifice de certains usages et privilèges, auraient en fait un réel avantage à la promulgation d'une législation inspirée des principes les plus modernes du droit, qui s'appliquerait indistinctement à tous les ressortissants turcs, musulmans et non musulmans. La réforme atteindrait même plus gravement les musulmans, du statut desquels devrait disparaître la polygamie. Elle aurait d'un autre côté un grand avantage pour les Européens, dont les intérêts souffrent beaucoup du fait que les successions, par exemple, sont encore régies en Turquie par le droit religieux et que, par application de ce droit, un étranger ne peut hériter d'un ressortissant turc. Il semble donc qu'il n'y aurait pas lieu de relever, dans les circonstances actuelles, le grief ci-dessus indiqué pour mémoire. Les Ambassades alliées croient, en conséquence, devoir se borner pour le moment aux trois points déjà visés dans leurs précédents mémoires, en insistant principalement sur les mesures de spoliation, qui sont de beaucoup les plus graves. Elles rappelleront seulement rapidement les deux autres points qui étaient aussi visés dans leurs précédents mémoires.

En effet, par rapport aux actes de spoliation dont les chrétiens émigrés de Turquie sont victimes, ces deux autres points, quelle que soit leur gravité, passent pour le moment au second plan. Pour le premier, en ce qui concerne l'obligation imposée aux sociétés turques à capitaux étrangers de renvoyer leur personnel chrétien et de le remplacer par un personnel turc, le fait accompli est déjà assez près d'être atteint. L'application s'en est confirmée et généralisée, en effet, de plus en plus. Seuls quelques employés chrétiens, considérés comme indispensables à un service technique, peuvent encore être conservés par les sociétés. Pour l'autre point, aucun changement n'est intervenu à la connaissance des Ambassades. Les communautés non musulmanes continuent à être frustrées dans le budget de l'État et les budgets municipaux des attributions qui devraient leur être réservées aux termes de l'article 41 du Traité de Lausanne. Cette infraction est relativement bien peu importante par rapport aux mesures de spoliation. Il y a là cependant un nouvel exemple de la façon dont le Gouvernement turc entend l'égalité entre les diverses catégories de ses ressortissants.

Quant aux mesures de spoliation, elles se sont depuis quelques mois généralisées et aggravées dans des conditions qu'il est indispensable de signaler aux Gouvernements alliés. C'est une vaste entreprise de spoliation d'une population considérable qui se poursuit sans arrêt sur tout le territoire de la Turquie. Appliqué d'abord en Asie Mineure, elle commence maintenant de s'étendre à Constantinople et, si les Puissances alliées ne se décident pas à intervenir, soit directement par une action collective auprès du Gouvernement turc, soit par l'entremise de la Société des Nations, la spoliation sera bientôt entièrement consommée.

Pendant longtemps, en effet, le Gouvernement turc n'avait pris de mesures définitives qu'à l'égard de la partie mobilière des biens prétendus abandonnés. Les meubles étaient vendus dans des conditions désastreuses. Le préjudice causé de ce chef aux intéressés était certes considérable. Mais, les propriétés immobilières avaient été seulement saisies et inscrites au nom de certaines administrations qui étaient chargées de leur gestion. Les Ambassades n'avaient pas eu connaissance de vente aux enchères de biens immobiliers appartenant à des émigrés. Ce pas est franchi aujourd'hui. Il l'était, d'ailleurs, depuis quelques mois en Asie Mineure. Certaines ventes d'immeubles sont même annoncées dans la presse de Constantinople. Ces faits sont d'une gravité particulière, car la fortune immobilière des chrétiens de Turquie était et est encore considérable, et il n'est pas douteux que le Gouvernement turc n'en poursuive systématiquement, autant qu'il le peut, la suppression au profit de ses nationaux musulmans.

Le relevé ci-joint, établi d'après les journaux de langue arménienne de Constantinople, signale un grand nombre de ventes aux enchères d'immeubles appartenant à des Arméniens émigrés de Turquie ou même simplement venus de province à

Constantinople, car la loi sur les biens prétendus abandonnés frappe également cette catégorie de personnes, comme les Ambassades alliées l'ont signalé dans leurs précédents mémoires. Ces ventes ont eu lieu notamment à Smyrne, à Aïdin, à Saroukhan, à Angora, à Trébizonde, à Keskine, à Rodosto, à Eski-Chéhir et à Ismidt à des prix très au-dessous de leur valeur et souvent dérisoires. À Eski-Chéhir, une vigne de quelques deunums (le deunum a une contenance de 1,000 mètres carrés environ) aurait été mise aux enchères, dit-on, pour 8 livres turques, ce qui, au cours actuel, le plus élevé qui ait été pratiqué jusqu'à présent, équivaut à peu près à une centaine de francs.

Cette longue liste est loin d'être complète ; il faut y ajouter entre autres, parmi les faits dont les Ambassades ont eu connaissance, les mesures prises notamment à Tarsous, où l'église, le presbytère et une maison appartenant aux Arméniens catholiques ont été confisqués ; et à Mersine, où les mêmes mesures ont été prises contre l'église et ses dépendances, magasin, *han* et terrain appartenant également à la communauté arménienne catholique. Ces églises et propriétés ont été non seulement saisies, mais également mises en vente.

Quand on pense que ces mesures inqualifiables sont prises après la proclamation de l'amnistie contre de malheureux chrétiens que la crainte seule a poussé à quitter la Turquie, une crainte souvent provoquée à dessein par la population musulmane, et que des souvenirs terribles ne justifiaient d'ailleurs que trop ; quand on constate aussi que le retour en Turquie est, en fait, à peu près complètement, pour ne pas dire complètement, refusé à ceux des émigrés arméniens qui sollicitent le droit d'y rentrer et que ce refus entraine pour eux la perte définitive de leurs biens, alors que les 150 musulmans exclus de l'amnistie et considérés comme de véritables traîtres par le Gouvernement turc ont bénéficié des facilités nécessaires pour la liquidation de leurs biens en Turquie, on ne peut se défendre d'une légitime indignation contre une telle atteinte à la justice méthodiquement consommée sous le couvert d'une loi qui est en opposition flagrante avec le Traité de Lausanne, loi que le Gouvernement turc avait le devoir de faire abroger conformément à l'article 37 du traité, celui-ci, voté par le Parlement d'Angora, ayant lui-même force de loi en Turquie.

Ce n'est pas seulement les communautés arméniennes qui sont frappées par ces spoliations. Toutes les populations non musulmanes en sont plus ou moins gravement atteintes Il importe de signaler que tel est le cas notamment de nombreuses personnes originaires des pays détachés de la Turquie, Syrie, Mésopotamie, Rhodes, &c., qui ont acquis la nationalité de ces pays, mais qui avaient quitté le sol de la Turquie avant la ratification du Traité de Lausanne et dont les biens ont été l'objet de saisies ou confiscations comme tombant sous le coup de la loi sur les biens abandonnés. Certaines interventions ont été faites ou envisagées en faveur de ces personnes par les Ambassades alliées au titre de l'article 65 ou de l'article 30 du Traité de Lausanne. Il ne faut pas se dissimuler que la base juridique de ces interventions est faible, car, seuls, les individus qui étaient ressortissants alliés au 29 octobre 1914 peuvent bénéficier des dispositions de l'article 65 et, d'autre part, le Gouvernement turc ne manquera pas d'objecter aux demandes basées sur l'article 30 que les saisies ont été faites avant le changement de nationalité des intéressés, ceux-ci étant alors encore sujets turcs et, comme tels, soumis aux lois turques. Dans cette espèce, comme dans toutes les autres, la seule voie de recours vraiment juridique et sûre est celle qui est basée sur les garanties assurées aux minorités par les articles 37 à 44 du Traité de Lausanne. Les Puissances à mandat sont donc, en dehors du devoir qu'elles ont assumé de ce chef vis-à-vis des minorités, directement et hautement intéressées à ne pas laisser prescrire les garanties qu'elles ont stipulées en leur faveur.

Les Ambassades de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie à Constantinople ont, en conséquence, l'honneur d'attirer de nouveau la sérieuse attention de leurs Gouvernements sur la persistance, la généralisation et la gravité toute particulière des faits ci-dessus énumérés. Elles ne doutent pas que les Gouvernements alliés ne considéreront comme un devoir étroit d'intervenir sans délai pour mettre fin à de telles injustices et pour rappeler le Gouvernement turc au respect des engagements qu'il a assumés vis-à-vis des États signataires du Traité de Lausanne.

Le 27 octobre 1925.

Post-scriptum.

D'après un avis publié par un journal de Constantinople, de nouvelles instructions auraient été données par le Ministère des Finances concernant l'Administration des Biens abandonnés.

Ces instructions viseraient, notamment, les biens de certains étrangers séquestrés pendant la guerre générale. Les Ambassades alliées se renseigneront sur ce point spécial dont elles n'ont pas eu connaissance jusqu'à présent.

Elles croient devoir communiquer à leurs Gouvernements copie du document dont il s'agit, en attirant leur attention particulière sur l'appréciation émise au dernier paragraphe et ainsi conçue : " L'Administration des Biens abandonnés continue inlassablement les opérations des ventes. On espère que, grâce aux nouveaux employés qui ont enlargi le cadre de l'administration, un grand nombre de biens dissimulés seront mis au jour à bref délai."

ANNEXE I.

Renseignements tirés des Journaux de Langue arménienne de Constantinople.

Les propriétés ci-dessous ont été mises aux enchères publiques par la Direction des Biens nationaux de Smyrne à partir du 21 juillet :

	£ T.
Jusqu'au 9 août 1925 :	
La maison de Mariam, fille de Agop, pour ...	1,350
„ „ Mariam, Srpouhi, Miguirditch et Artin	850
„ „ Gulli, fille de Agop	400
„ „ Annitza, fille d'Adam	1,500
„ „ Vartan Sherbetdjian	300
„ „ Manouk Garabed	80
„ „ Armenak Minassian	2,000
„ „ Prêtre Hatchadour	650
„ „ Ève Aghassian	1,500
„ „ „ „	3,000
„ „ Takvor Spartali (avec ses meubles) ...	100,000
Jusqu'au 10 août 1925 :	
La maison de Marina Caloustian	7,000
„ „ Agop Varvara	9,000
„ „ Kirkor Aghazarian	6,300
„ „ Agop Artinian	10,000
Le *han* de Bedros Bekirian	7,500
Jusqu'au 20 août 1925 :	
La maison de Manouk Marco Nanassian ...	2,500
Le magasin de Kircor, forgeron	400
La maison de Marinos Avedis	1,800
„ „ Halvadji Kircor	850
„ „ Dulguer Oghlou Mardiros	350
„ „ Hadji Zakaria Artinian	200
„ „ Nourik, épouse de Jean, photographe	1,000
„ „ Lucia Miguirditch Mikaelian ...	1,400
„ „ Mardiros, natif de Césarée ...	1,900
„ „ Marie, fille d'Agop	950
„ „ Sarkis Israelian	1,400
„ „ Hadji Ohannes	1,850
„ „ Ilia Vartanian	600
„ „ Marie Sarafian	900
„ „ Garabed Papazian	3,000
„ „ Hadji Vartan Oghlou Ohannes ...	1,500
„ „ Varvara, fille de Kircor, forgeron ...	1,300
„ „ Zareh et Vartouhi	700
„ „ Marian Hadji Garabed Spartali (avec ses meubles)	10,800
Les cinq magasins de Ohannes Agop Arabadjian ...	500–2,500
La maison de Srpouhi Miguirditch Nalbantian ...	4,500
„ „ Rosina Garabed Andonian ...	4,000
„ „ Rosina Baldazar Djermakian ...	4,000

Jusqu'au 20 août 1925 (suite):

	£ T.
Le magasin de Virkiné Hadji Kasper	1,800
„ „ „ „	1,725
„ „ „ „	2,500
„ „ „ „	2,000
„ „ „ „	1,100
„ „ „ „	4,000
La maison de Mariam Agop Papazian	3,500
Le magasin de Hadji Agop Bedros Alexanian ...	2,800
„ „ Rosina Mangasar Djermakian ...	2,600
„ „ „ „ „ ...	2,200
„ „ Mme. Vartan Bagdasarian ...	350
„ „ „ „ „ ...	250
„ „ Indjé Setrak	900
La maison de Marie Manouk Enzbekian... ...	1,200
„ „ Gula, épouse de Miguirditch ...	9,500
„ „ Takouhi Lazaroff et Irma Barayanian	1,900
„ „ Kircor et Melcon, héritiers d'Élizabeth	400
„ „ Kircor Serkis Israel	210
„ „ Artin Soultana, forgeron	320
„ „ Helvadji Kircor...	1,500
„ „ Saghatiel Movsès	1,000
„ „ Agavni, épouse de Bedros	1,350

La Direction des Biens nationaux de Smyrne porte à cette occasion, à la connaissance du public qu'une commission spéciale a été constituée au defterdarat, à qui doivent s'adresser tous ceux qui veulent acheter des biens abandonnés ou qui désirent avoir des renseignements sur les biens mis aux enchères.

Les propriétés ci-dessous ont été mises aux enchères publiques au commencement du mois de septembre par la Direction des Biens nationaux de Smyrne, dont les contre-valeurs seront payées dans huit ans.

	£ T.
Le dépôt de Elmas, épouse de Garabed Balabanian ...	18,500
„ „ Kircor Couyoumdjian	18,500
„ „ Makrouhi Baliozzadé	17,500
„ „ „ „	20,000
La maison de Agop Husnian	9,000
„ „ Archag Kalpakian	17,000
„ „ Mme. Marie Ohannessian	19,700
„ „ Mme. Garabed Vraunian...	10,807
Le dépôt de Mihran Aznavorian	47,145
„ „ „ „ de Bella Vista... ...	25,170
La maison de Mme. Marie Baltazarian	4,070
„ „ Agop Takvor Altounian	1,000

A Aïdin :

14	deunums	de jardin d'olives de Nazar Djamdjian, du village Balatdjik.
4	„	champs de Fesdji Artin, du village Calfa.
15	„	jardin d'olives de Tchouhadji Hatchadour, du village Calfa.
35	„	jardin d'olives de Hadji Agop, du village Calfa.
132	„	champs de Hatchadourian, du village Kara-Agatch.

A Saroukhan :

	£ T.
La maison de Simon Simonian, originaire de Smyrne...	22,500
„ du coiffeur Artin	5,685
„ de Artin Keuleyan	5,875

A Saroukhan (suite) :

	£ T.
Les deux vignes de Papazoghlou Agop, originaire de Magnésie...	1,800
La vigne de Mikael, tailleur	1,422
„ „ Balaban Agop	340
„ „ Hadji Partik	1,610
„ „ Oudji Onnik	700
„ „ Missak	515
„ „ Tahnis Agop	1,350
„ „ Avedis	2,700
„ „ Oundji Artin	470
„ „ "Saatdji Erméni"	600
„ „ Hadji Agop, charpentier	300
„ „ Hadji Agop, marchand de vin	655
„ „ Caracashe, forgeron	1,320
„ „ Cara Kehia...	700
„ „ Kircor, forgeron	400
Les deux vignes de Arslan, tailleur	5,880

Les propriétés mises aux enchères à Constantinople.

Les propriétés ci-dessous ont été mises aux enchères publiques vers la fin de septembre.

	£ T.
La maison de Baghdik Baghdassar, fils de Garabed, située à Rouméli Hissar	1,200
„ „ Assadour Navarian, fils de Stepan, située à Férikeuy, Péra	1,000
„ „ Boghos Aghanour, fils de Bedros, située à Yeni Mahallé, Bechiktache	1,5 0
„ „ Hosrov, fils de Hatchadour, située à Yeni Mahallé, Arnoutkeuy	1,850
„ „ „ „ „ ...	1,550
„ „ l'avocat Tourian, fils de Abraham, située à Féridié, Péra	2,200
„ „ la femme du susdit avocat, située à Buyukdère	3,200
Les meubles et instruments médicaux du Dr. Hatchik Kapamadjian, Péra, Sakis Agatch...	583

N.B.—D'autres propriétés ont été mises aux enchères à Angora, Trébizonde, Keskine, Rodosto, Eski-Shehir et Ismid à des prix dérisoires. Une vigne à Eski-Shehir de quelques deunums a été mise aux enchères pour £ T. 8.

Annexe II.

Journal "La Gazette" du 26 Octobre 1925.

Nouvelles Instructions du Ministère des Finances sur l'Administration des Biens abandonnés.

On sait qu'une Direction générale des Biens abandonnés a été créée à Constantinople et est rattachée au Ministère des Finances. En vertu d'un ordre de ce département, les attributions de la direction se limiteront dorénavant aux biens abandonnés des Grecs, des Arméniens et des juifs fugitifs. C'est la direction du defterdarat qui s'occupera de propriétés des ressortissants étrangers.

Les biens administrés par la Direction générale se divisaient en quatre catégories, à savoir : (1) biens appartenant à des ressortissants étrangers actuellement absents de Constantinople et qui ont été séquestrés par le Gouvernement lors de la guerre générale ; (2) biens appartenant à des sujets hellènes absents de Constantinople et qui ont été dûment saisis par le Gouvernement en vertu de la loi de représailles du 19 janvier 1925 ; (3) biens appartenant à des sujets russes absents de Constantinople et

qui ont été affectés, par décision du Conseil des Ministres, aux sujets turcs établis en Russie et ayant subi les dommages qui ont été évalués par le Ministère des Finances;
(4) biens abandonnés des Grecs, Arméniens et juifs fugitifs.

Les biens des première, seconde et troisième catégories pourront être administrés par la Direction des Domaines nationaux; leur nombre est assez élevé.

On procède déjà aux formalités du transfert de ces biens à l'Administration des Domaines nationaux.

L'Administration des Biens abandonnés continue inlassablement les opérations des ventes.

On espère que, grâce aux nouveaux employés qui ont élargi le cadre de l'administration, un grand nombre de biens dissimulés seront mis au jour à bref délai.

[E 6859/1976/44] No. 57.

Sir R. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received November 9.*)

(No. 816.) *Constantinople, October 31, 1925.*

Sir,

WITH reference to Mr. Chilton's despatch No. 1440 of the 1st October, and to Mr. O. Essayan's letter to you of the 9th October respecting the ratification by the United States Senate of the Turco-American Treaty of Lausanne, I have the honour to report that the American Chargé d'Affaires called on me a few days ago to say that Senator King had been working up quite a campaign against ratification. The State Department had instructed him to furnish material wherewith to create a counter blast, especially in regard to how other Powers were satisfied with Turkey's observance of her treaty obligations in general and of the minorities clauses of the Treaty of Lausanne in particular. He asked me if I could help him. It seemed to me that it is to no one's interest that America, or any other State, should be in abnormal relations with Turkey, and I therefore told Mr. Crosby that I should have been glad to help him, but that unfortunately while he asked for blessings, I could only give him curses. Expressing sympathy for him in his task, I gave him an account of the situation of the minorities as it is known to the Allied Ambassadors, and I told him that nobody could honestly maintain that the Turks were scrupulous in the observance of their treaty obligations.

2. The real defence of the American treaty is to be found in argum other and broader lines than those favoured by the State Department; viz., that Turkey has been through so much in late years, and she is now so weak, suspicious and lacking in true self-confidence that she is in an abnormal mental state; and that she may get better and could hardly get worse; meanwhile it is inconceivable that a better treaty could be negotiated than that now under discussion. If, now, Mr. King cares to make a strong opposition based on the points which seem most to interest him, he can undoubtedly make an overwhelming case for rejection. Against him is only the fact that Senators, when speaking on foreign treaties, have talked so much nonsense in the past that perhaps, if to-day one of them could hardly exaggerate the truth, nobody will believe him. So out of the strong cometh forth sweetness.

3. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 6865/194/44] No. 58.

Sir R. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received November 9.*)

(No. 827.) *Constantinople, November 4, 1925.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that on the 1st November the National Assembly met for its new session and that proceedings were inaugurated by the annual address by the President of the Republic. The speech is of considerable length, and I will confine myself to giving you a summary only of its chief points.

2. *Kurdish Revolt.*—It has been established that it was due to reactionary propaganda carefully organised beforehand. Successful and appropriate measures taken

for its suppression have shown the nation's devotion to republicanism and to the cause of progress in the spirit and the letter. Nothing will stop the course of modernisation and no reaction to the conditions of the past is possible.

3. *Liberty of the Press.*—The republican principle was to throw on a free press the duty and responsibility of checking its own abuses; but this gave rise to an unscrupulous press "brigandage" and the Assembly had to intervene with energy. As a result the incorrigible journalism of a past era has stood naked and exposed and a new, pure and fertile republican press has arisen, under which alone the nation's task of civilisation can be facilitated. Until all citizens co-operate loyally in this task the Assembly must continue to apply necessary measures.

I may mention here that three or four days ago the Popular party, in one of its first caucuses, adopted the principle that sentences of the Independence Tribunals shall not be remitted without its own approval and that the party shall not support proposals for remissions.

4. *Economic.*—The maintenance of public order has given security to the workers of the country; mention is made of good work done and to be done in sanitation, agriculture, ports, banking, mining, and especially in railway construction. As regards the latter, four times as much more effort is wanted, for social no less than for economic reasons.

5. *Justice.*—The ground has been cleared by the abrogation of old laws, and the Assembly is exhorted to vote urgently the newly prepared Penal, Civil and Commercial Codes, which are in harmony with civilised principles.

We have known that commissions have been at work on these codes, and it has recently been put about that the Swiss Civil Code has been adopted almost *en bloc*. Apparently now the work of the commission is to be brought before the Assembly. Formidable as the task may seem, it may nevertheless not be beyond the Assembly's power to enact three whole codes in a short time.

6. *Public Instruction.*—The speech makes a special reference to the education of orphans. There is also a curious reference to the necessity of maintaining discipline among scholars.

7. *Foreign Affairs.*—Turkey has shown in the past year that she is no negligible element in the community of nations. Reference is made to the Bulgarian and Jugoslav treaties:—

> (a.) *Russia and other Countries.*—"Relations with our neighbour the Soviet Union are sincere; they are based on mutual confidence. In our relations with western countries we follow faithfully the prescriptions of the treaties. Questions in suspense follow the course laid down in the treaties."

This paragraph marks, though not too warmly, the close relations of the moment between Turkey and Russia.

> (b.) *Mosul.*—"Our legal position in this has again been demonstrated in the report of the League's sub-commission, yet the solution has again been delayed. Our rights are defined in the Treaty of Lausanne, won at the cost of the greatest sacrifices. We confidently await the execution of obligations undertaken and the recognition of right and justice."

This is as mild a reference to a burning question as could have been looked for.

> (c.) *Locarno Pact.*—"The efforts put forth in the political world on the question of security deserve attention. Mutual security is a principle which all the nations of the world must desire; but so long as security, rather than guaranteeing general peace, is not extended to all nations, it must be regarded as ensuring freedom to one group of nations against another group whose field of action has been extended. This point of view is notably enforced by measures taken to submit the international arms traffic to the control of certain nations."

Since the conclusion of the Locarno Pact there has been a complete absence of all editorial comment on its meaning, and I had inferred that neither the Government nor the journalists had made up their minds what view to take of it. The natural Turkish reaction to any approximation of western Powers to each other is one of suspicion that plots against Turkey are being hatched. I admit to having hoped that this view would not be adopted and to being now correspondingly disappointed at finding it voiced in its crudest, narrowest and most distorted form by the President of the Republic. It is obviously the result of Russian inspiration.

8. *Army.*—The usual laudatory notices of the republican army are uttered.

9. *Finance.*—The nation is congratulated that in a year when a wide mobilisation was necessary and an important tax like the tithe was abolished, it has yet been possible to carry on uninterruptedly a programme of reform and railway development. Old taxes, however, still require readjusting and readaptation, and it is intimated clearly that fresh sacrifices will be required from the taxpayer.

10. In general, it is to be noted that far the greater and more important part of the speech is devoted to internal affairs, and this shows once more how very much self-centred the nation is and how much preoccupied with its own concerns. The policy to be followed by the Government is to be one of intensive reform and modernisation, with repression as necessary to smooth the path of progress. I may mention in passing the extraordinary change that in the past few days has come over the outward appearance of this town. For forty-eight hours before the festival of the republic on the 29th October a house-to-house campaign for hats took place, and with such thoroughness and success that on the day of the holiday not a fez was to be seen, even in Stamboul; nor does the old head-dress seem likely to reappear.

11. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Irak.

I have, &c.
R. G. LINDSAY.

[E 7046/194/44]

No. 59.

Sir R. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received November* 16.)

(No. 841.) *Constantinople, November* 10, 1925.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that yesterday, at the first debate of the new session of the Angora Assembly, Ismet Pasha made the customary review of the Government's achievements, present position and programme. He began by referring to the Kurdish rebellion and the reactionary movement which, he said, accompanied it. It had been a challenge to the strength of the State and demanded firm measures. for a belief had at that time gained ground that even the decisions of the Assembly itself must be ratified by the people. This belief the Pasha described as "sophistry," and he was doubtless trying to dispose of the contention of the Opposition that courts-martial or other extraordinary tribunals should be subject to the Assembly rather than to the executive.

2. On assuming office in these critical circumstances, the Prime Minister continued, the Government soon restored the power of the State and respect for the law, and the re-establishment of order had a beneficent effect in all departments of social life. The independence tribunals set to work energetically. Convents had to be closed for the maintenance of order, but care was taken to respect the rights of those connected with them. Another precaution was the suppression of the Progressive party. Ismet Pasha paid the usual tribute to the heroism of the army thanks to which these measures had been successful. With the end of this reactionary movement had come the dawn of brighter days. The people in the area of the rebellion were now in direct touch with the Government and every day were obtaining the redress of old wrongs. The people of Turkey now enjoyed a congenial atmosphere for the realisation of their aspirations.

3. Perhaps it was not to be expected that Ismet Pasha would attempt any serious defence of the despotic measures which have been introduced in his time—the forcible disruption of the Opposition party, the dissolution of the religious orders, the muzzling of the press, and the arbitrary use of the independence tribunals for the repression not merely of rebels, but of any class or any individual at all likely to give the Government trouble. The Pasha probably felt that, as no criticism worth mentioning was to be expected in the Chamber, the simplest course was to mention these things as slightly as possible, but he did commit himself to the peculiarly feeble statement that he could, if necessary, prove the Government's conviction that these measures were necessary. He was rather nearer the truth when he said that these were measures to enable the Government to watch over the well-being of the people. Brutal as these measures are, the idea underlying the policy is that the people must be driven by a despotic hand along the only path which is conceived to be one of progress, and that is, indeed, the only possible justification of such a policy.

4. It had been suggested that in the vacation a reconciliation had come about with the Opposition, and that the Opposition leaders would at this debate recant their views and be taken into the bosom of the Popular party. Nothing of the kind happened, although Kiazim Karabekir Pasha, who spoke for the Opposition, seems to have assumed the mildest of tones. He pleaded the critical external position of the country as an excuse for not criticising Ismet Pasha's speech, and he stated that his only object was to see that the Government secured the interests of the country. He pointed out, however, that the Government had given no reason for closing down the Progressive party, but had merely let it be known that it regarded it as an instrument of subversion and reaction. That charge he utterly and solemnly denied.

5. On foreign policy Ismet Pasha spoke as follows:—

"During the last session our relations were still further extended. We concluded agreements with countries with which hitherto we had no relations, in accordance with international law, and, as is our new custom, on lines of reciprocity.

"As regards our relations with Russia, the Russo-Turkish Boundary Commission is continuing its work smoothly and satisfactorily. It is expected that its labours will be complete shortly. Both our general relations with Russia and our relations in respect of this boundary commission are carried on in the happy atmosphere created by goodwill and mutual confidence.

"Our relations with Persia have been marked by a frontier incident. The incident consisted of certain brigand bands in Persian territory crossing the frontier and attacking our posts. In following up the incident the Persian Government behaved with genuine goodwill and showed every disposition to employ all available means to suppress these bands which appeared in its territory. Incidents like this are bound to arise, but that is no matter so long as there is proof of friendship between the two parties in stopping them and preventing their recurrence."

"Our relations with Afghanistan are following that course of cordiality which is laid down by the treaty with that country.

"In speaking of our relations with Europe I would first of all mention the Balkans. This honourable Assembly knows that we are also a Balkan Power. We are directly interested in Balkan peace. While we have no aggressive intentions in the Balkans, we are a really serious factor of Balkan peace. We had not hitherto made a treaty of friendship with Bulgaria. This treaty has now been signed. It will be presented to your honourable Assembly. We have concluded with the Serb-Croat-Slovene State the treaty of friendship which was not signed at Lausanne. We regard these events with satisfaction. We have thus established diplomatic relations with all the States in the Balkans. The Government is making satisfactory progress towards settling questions in suspense with Greece, in accordance with existing treaties. I hope that these treaties and arrangements will be ratified by the Powers concerned. Your august Assembly is in a position to examine and ratify them. We have begun negotiations in Constantinople with the French and at Rome with the Italians for the conclusion of consular conventions on favourable lines.

"As regards the coupons, or rather the question of our debts, the procedure laid down by the treaty for the division of the capital with the parties concerned has not yet been completed. Our representatives have entered into touch with representatives of the other parties regarding the nature of the sum to be paid and discussions are continuing. Our position and point of view are well known. We have always followed with care the provisions of the treaty regarding debts. We cannot be reproached with delay or evasion. Furthermore, we are disposed to pay regularly the debts enumerated in the treaty and imposed on us thereby. But when it comes to a consideration of the nature of the sum to be paid, account must be taken of our right to live and of the duty which we have of reconstructing this ruined country; in short, account must be taken of our capacity to pay. However ready we are to pay such debts regularly, we must needs be equally careful to avoid any extraordinary arrangement which would prejudice the country's right to live.

"Let me offer a few remarks about the Mosul question. The Lausanne Treaty lays down that after its signature the Mosul question shall be discussed at a conference. As you know, this conference met at Constantinople and reached no result. But I want to make our point of view clear. When the Constantinople Conference proved sterile, we said that the conference failed to

enter into the question referred to it by the treaty, but that it dealt with questions not laid down in the treaty, and that it therefore broke up without really entering upon a discussion at all. For we were confronted with proposals which were outside the spirit and sense of the treaty. Subsequent events proved the correctness of our view as to the reason why the conference was broken off. What I mean is that the question under discussion is the fate of the Mosul Vilayet. That is what we are to talk about. This principle has been made clear both before the League of Nations and in the report issued as a result of the enquiries conducted by the League of Nations Commission. You know what happened at the League of Nations after that. During the discussions before the League we kept within the lines laid down by the Treaty of Lausanne. That treaty was obtained at the cost of great sacrifices. We wanted to settle the Mosul question in accordance with our rights under the treaty. From first to last we have shown that we have been endeavouring to settle the question honestly and in accordance with the principles of the treaty, and that we are always imbued with the same spirit of honesty. But that does not mean that we must give up all the rights which have been assured to us."

6. You will observe that in discussing Balkan relations Ismet Pasha reaffirmed Turkey's interest to which I alluded in my despatch No. 825 of the 4th instant. With regard to coupons and Mosul, Ismet Pasha had, of course, nothing new to say, but so far as concerns Mosul, the moderation of his tone is, at any rate, satisfactory.

7. After Ismet Pasha had replied to Kiazim Karabekir Pasha, the Government got a vote of confidence by 180 to 21. If there was anything surprising about this, it was that, after months of repression, as many Deputies as before should be found to vote against the Government. While suppressing all opposition outside the Chamber, the Government seem to tolerate this degree of opposition within it—in order, perhaps, to lend colour to the theory that this is a constitutional country.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY

[E 7226/1231/44] No. 60.

Mr. Erskine to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received November 23.)

(No. 244.)
Sir, *Sofia, November* 19, 1925

WITH reference to Mr. Stevenson's despatch No. 227 of the 22nd October, I learn that the Thracian Society, which claims to represent some 100,000 Thracian refugees, is about to initiate a public campaign against the recently concluded Turko-Bulgarian treaty with a view to prevent its ratification.

2. Their main grievances are, I understand, that the provisions of the Treaty of Constantinople, whereby was recognised the right of Bulgarian emigrants to return to their former homes in Thrace, have now been set aside and that they will not receive adequate compensation for their properties in view of the facts that (1) the abandoned Turkish properties in Bulgaria have, for the most part, already been occupied by Macedonian refugees, and (2) the value of Turkish properties in Bulgaria is only 110 million levas, whereas that of Bulgarian properties in Turkey amounts to 10 milliards. As the details of the new treaty have not yet been disclosed it is impossible to say how far these grievances are justified.

3. The society claims to have already obtained the promise of support, not only from the Opposition, but also from a considerable number of members of Parliament belonging to the Governmental party.

4. I am informed that a deputation from the society recently visited the Ministry for Foreign Affairs to formulate their objections, and that, in reply to their enquiry why, when in deference to their views the conclusion of the treaty had been delayed for two years, it had now suddenly been signed and their interests entirely sacrificed, they were told that the international situation of Bulgaria was such as to render the immediate conclusion of the agreement essential—a reply which naturally failed to satisfy them. They were further informed that the treaty would not be published until it was presented to Parliament for ratification.

5. Not possessing a secret terrorist organisation on the lines of the Macedonian Brotherhood and being of comparatively recent origin, the Thracian Society is far from exercising the same influence in Bulgarian politics as does the former. It is none the

less a factor to be reckoned with, and the projected campaign, if persisted in, may prove a cause of serious embarrassment to M. Tsankov's Government and possibly lead to the rejection of the treaty.

6. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

I have, &c.
WILLIAM ERSKINE

[E 7378/7378/44] No. 61.

Sir R. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received November 30.)

(No. 863.)
Sir, *Constantinople, November* 23, 1925.

I HAD a certain amount of conversation at Angora with the Prime Minister and with the Minister for Foreign Affairs about the Locarno treaties, and the language used about them by the President in his speech to the Assembly on the 1st November (my despatch No. 827 of the 4th November) had prepared me to find them unfavourably regarded. Ismet Pasha, indeed, quite frankly admitted that Turkey did not like the treaties, though he was not as frank, I think, in stating the reasons of that dislike. Of course, he said, the principle of security was of benefit to the world, but of what use was it if not applied universally, and of what use to Turkey if she was excluded from it? I explained Locarnism to Ismet in the sense in which you have set it out in your notes; the treaties so far concluded were certainly not meant to be exclusive in the sense that it was desired to direct them against any State or group of States, or to prevent other States from following the example of the Western Powers, but for the present it was clearly not possible to make them universal. To this Ismet answered that if we would guarantee Turkey's frontiers Turkey would be prepared to guarantee ours—an answer on which further conversation was impossible.

2. With Tewfik Rushdi, too, I had some talk on the treaties in general, and, in particular, on the application of their principles to the Balkans, and he seemed not unwilling to favour some sort of security arrangements with the Balkan States, but what he said was very, very vague and intangible. I gathered that what he aimed at was a series of treaties with each of the Balkan States, and that Turkey would be unwilling to guarantee any frontiers in which she was not directly concerned. He told me that some sort of initiative with the League of Nations had been taken at Athens more or less at your instigation; I did not then know what he was referring to, as it was only on my return here that I saw the record of your conversation with M. Caclamanos of the 4th November, but I thought that any active initiative by yourself in Balkan security was unlikely, and that it might drive the Turks, in their present state of mind, in the direction opposite to that desired; so I expressed my surprise to Tewfik Rushdi, and said I did not think you would act otherwise than with the utmost caution. You would, I was sure, welcome any form of security pact among Balkan States; if you thought you could help, you would gladly help; but you would feel that precipitancy might defeat its own object, and that the utmost caution would be required in recommending to others arrangements of however undoubted benefit to Western Powers.

3. The truth as regards Turkey's reaction to the Locarno treaties is that she has always profited by the dissensions of Western Powers, and she inevitably feels concerned when they compose their differences. Just now there may even be a fear that Russia—even Russia—may be tempted to attempt some rapprochement to London and Paris, and that at the present very awkward moment Turkey may, indeed, stand alone, for M. Chicherin's activities in Berlin can hardly have passed quite unperceived. This general view is confirmed by an article in the officially inspired "Hakimiet-i-Millié" of the 21st November. Taking as his text the visit of M. de Jouvenel to London, the writer attacks certain organs of the French press for ascribing the difficulties in Syria to pan-Islamic and Turkish influences. Some Stambul papers may have suggested these ideas to French journalists, but the official and unofficial Turkish press has avoided any illusions of a nature to hurt French susceptibilities, while the English papers have spread a campaign of lies about Syria over the whole world. It is England who is France's real enemy in Syria; England whose aim is to found a pan-Arab confederation under its puppet, King Fuad. It

is Turkey who is France's real friend; who is the continuation of France in the East; who fills her schools with French professors and French culture, and inspires her legislation with French ideals. Surely M. Saurraut, who is now so familiar with the ideals of Angora, will be more grieved even than Turks at these aberrations of his press and will be able to correct them.

4. This rather clumsy effort to divide France and Great Britain is rather like a serpent biting on a file; but, so far as Locarno and Mosul are concerned—and everything here comes back to Mosul—the most important element is the eventual reaction of Russia to the new treaties. So far, I should say, Locarno is having a restraining influence on the Turkish Government.

5. I have sent a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Bagdad.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 7370/109/44] No. 62.

Sir R. Lindsay to Mr. Austen Chamberlain.—(Received November 30.)

(No. 865.)

Sir, *Constantinople, November 23, 1925.*

I HAVE been re-reading a despatch (my despatch No. 226 of the 24th March last) which I wrote on returning from my first visit to Angora last spring, and I venture now to revise some of the impressions I then received, in the light of the observations I made there last week. We again had glorious weather, worthy of an English August at its very best; the whole place is inches deep in dust, as they have had no rain for five months, and when there is a wind you cannot see 20 yards; but while we were there the air was providentially still.

2. The town gave us the impression of being frightfully busy; the streets are crowded with people passing to and fro, all in hats, of course, and what with the building that is going on and the railway towards Sivas, the municipal factories, the Ghazi's vast farm and the military workshops, there is work for all. My Italian colleague tells me he has nearly 1,000 subjects between Angora and Sivas working as masons, carpenters and artisans and earning good wages of 6 to 7 liras a day (14*s.* to 16*s.*), and the number is the more impressive as it is all unauthorised emigration. The building in progress is chiefly governmental or municipal, especially offices, but the main street has been widened by expropriation and its surface greatly improved. The famous Temple of Augustus is being freed from the mud houses plastered against its side, so that the magnificent Greek text of the Emperor's Testament will be visible. Electric light while we were there really did make its appearance at last, though nearly ten months overdue, but it was being whispered that there was still a hitch about paying the contractor and that it might again vanish. Eight new and larger Eckaf houses are very near completion at the entrance to the town, one of them being earmarked for the new diplomatic club. This is to be very select, and undesirables are to be kept out by a high entrance fee—£T. 500 (about £60). "What does it matter to you or me?" says Tewfik Rushdi; "*our* Governments will pay our subscriptions." The Post Office is finished, so, too, the Ministry of War, while the Auditor-General's office is getting on very nicely. Alas! the stately hotel which foreigners look at with such longing eyes seems hardly to have progressed at all. It has had a sad series of mishaps, but now an Italian engineer has been turned on to the job, and hope rises again. Meanwhile visitors continue to fight with ingenious contrivances against armies of bugs in horrible hovels. As for the marsh, I am not sure whether it has been drained or not; ditches traverse it in every direction, but water stands in the bottom of them, and, as the main stream runs briskly through the middle, I cannot help suspecting that there is something wrong with the levels of the ditches. Be that as it may, the summer having been exceptionally dry, there have been very few mosquitoes, and the result is just the same, drainage or no drainage. The forest planted on the marsh has unfortunately died.

3. The garden city on the road to Chankaya is really quite impressive, and proves the great determination of the prefect. When I was there in May they were marking lines out on the ground; now there are 100 houses, some with roofs on and some just rising from the ground; they are small, it is true, the largest only having seven or eight rooms, but they will meet a need; also, they are rather expensive,

costing about double what was estimated in the spring, for many mishaps occurred, *e.g.*, the tile factory broke down and tiles had to be imported from Marseilles after all. When I saw the place I found an elaborate drainage system being put in, but though the settlement is planted in the desert, I could not, for all my enquiries, find out what provision was being made for water. Still, I am greatly impressed by the progress made, and I should never have believed it possible.

4. There is now some private building also in progress in the town, and there would be more but for lack of capital. Turkish banks have no funds but what the Ottoman Bank will let them have, and the latter is very shy. The Turkish Government is 8½ million liras overdrawn, whereas by its concession the bank is not required to advance more than 5 millions in current account, and with all its efforts it cannot get the excess repaid to it. Still, Angora is in the midst of a primitive sort of boom. land values in the centre of the town are at fantastic levels—at least, the prices asked are, for I suspect there is no real market. But rents have to be paid, and they beat anything in Mayfair. Everyone is excited and out to get rich quick, and the wildest companies and syndicates are formed. Last summer there was much talk about how wild boars were becoming a plague to the agriculture of Anatolia, and in two twos a company was formed to get a concession for killing wild boars and turning them into ham. I am surprised that no stock exchange has been started, but I have no doubt that the inaction of the authorities is wise, if it is not due to mere inertia, for the spirit of the place to-day is such as to bring about a magnificent gambling frenzy.

5. In one other important respect I must revise my previous views. Angora's fate as the capital of Turkey is inextricably bound up with the fortunes of the present régime, and just as I have in some recent despatches pointed to the increasing strength and stability of the latter, so with regard to Angora I feel now that, looking at things merely as they are at the moment and comparing them with what they were early in the year, the town may reasonably hope for something more than semi-permanence as the capital, and yet, even as I write, I cannot close my eyes to the dangers from violence, revolution and assassination that may threaten the existence of State and capital alike at any moment in the future. State and capital are not only bound up inextricably together, but they also resemble each other, and the whole structure of the Government is like the Angora garden city, planted in a desert, with an elaborate drainage system and no water. We often laugh at things here, but some of us feel that we ought not to, for these people are mere children, and *maxima debetur reverentia pueris;* yet if we did not laugh we should have to cry or to go mad. Still, we should try to remember that, with all their roughness and brutality, Turks to-day are filled with passionate earnestness, and that they are engaged on work of high enterprise, albeit with puzzle-headed muddling. It may be that, like children, they may require to be treated with sternness; but, again like children, they will surely deserve a meed of sympathy.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 7326/175/44] No. 63.

Mr. Austen Chamberlain to Sir R. Lindsay (Constantinople).

(No. 1151.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, November 30, 1925.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 785 of the 16th October, in the final paragraph of which you suggest that there are strong reasons for wishing that the League of Nations will not impose on the mandatory Power in Irak any obligation in the direction of fostering nationalism in Southern Kurdistan.

2. I fully appreciate the force of your contention that Anglo-Turkish relations could be placed on a satisfactory footing, if only means were found to eliminate the "direct menace to the very heart of Turkish policy" which is implied in the proposal to found a sort of Kurdish National Home in Northern Irak, just across the south-eastern frontier of Turkey.

3. His Majesty's Government are, however, to a considerable extent committed in this matter. The commission appointed by the Council of the League laid down in the "Final Conclusions" of its report, as an essential condition for the union with Irak of the whole territory south of the Brussels line, that "regard must be paid to the desires expressed by the Kurds that officials of Kurdish race should be appointed for the administration of their country, the dispensation of justice, and teaching in

the schools, and that Kurdish should be the official language of all these services." The commission held that it would be more advantageous for the territory to remain under Turkish sovereignty if this condition were not fulfilled and if League of Nations control were to terminate on the expiry (in 1928) of the existing Anglo-Irak treaty It was evident that the League Council would be loth to disregard so emphatic a recommendation by the commission which it had appointed for the express purpose of laying before it "all information and all suggestions which might be of a nature to assist it in reaching a decision"; and Mr. Amery accordingly informed the Council on the 3rd September that "His Majesty's Government gladly gives an assurance that the existing system, which does to a large extent carry out the recommendations of the commission, will be continued, and made even more effective." On the following day (the 4th September) Mr. Amery spoke with still greater emphasis: "The Kurdish population enjoys a wide measure of racial autonomy at this moment, and we are prepared to extend it. I notice that the representative of Turkey has nowhere in his speech suggested that, if this territory were handed over to Turkey, these privileges would be conferred on the Kurdish population, and I should like to ask definitely whether, in regard to any Kurdish population which might be included in Turkey or is in Turkey to-day, the Turkish Government is prepared to give the assurance to the Council that we have explicitly given." Tewfik Rushdy Bey, in his subsequent reply, evaded this point.

4. His Majesty's Government clearly cannot now recede from these explicit assurances, and it is, indeed, evident that if they were to do so, or if they had evaded the issue at Geneva, their action would be tantamount to inviting the Council to allot the disputed territory to Turkey in accordance with the commission's recommendation mentioned above.

5. I am ready to admit that, from the diplomatic point of view, there is a certain British interest to be served by reducing as far as possible the number of Kurds for whose government the Irak authorities are responsible, and, as regards administration also, the turbulent Kurdish element in Northern Irak is a constant source of trouble. It so happens, however, that the retention of the Kurdish districts—which form the greater part of the Mosul Vilayet—is a *sine quâ non* for the very existence of the State of Irak. To abandon them would create the situation which Mr. Amery described as follows at Geneva:—

> "Any frontier which deprived Irak of its richest corn districts and of a substantial part of its revenue, as well as of some of its best human material for the recruitment of its forces, and then left it, financially and militarily weakened, with the problem of defending a strategically indefendable frontier, would impose upon it a task which would be entirely beyond its capacity, and for which the League could not expect the British Government or the British taxpayers to make themselves responsible."

6. It would beyond doubt be most helpful, both as regards Anglo-Turkish relations in general and with a view to secure a satisfactory settlement of the Irak frontier dispute, if means could be devised of allaying the Turks' apprehensions in regard to a quasi-autonomous Kurdistan over their border. I fear, however, that having regard to the undertakings given by His Majesty's Government to the League and to their responsibilities towards Irak, it is impossible to attain this object by withdrawing the measure of autonomy already granted to the Kurds in Irak or by declining to extend it in the sense of Mr. Amery's declaration at Geneva. There is, however, no idea in this of creating anything in the nature of an autonomous Kurdish State for the Kurdish districts of Irak or of reviving the policy contemplated in the Treaty of Sèvres, and there is no reason why you should not, on a convenient occasion, make this clear to the Turks.

I am, &c.
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.

No. 64.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 5.)

(No. 138.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, December* 3, 1925.

HIS Majesty's consul at Trebizond reports that he learns on good authority that a consignment of land battery guns (115 millim.) and field guns [? including]

lumber carts and shells, said to be German, were landed at Trebizond from steamship "Akdeniz," coming from Constantinople. Nothing has transpired with regard to their departure from Trebizond or their ultimate destination.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 55.)

[**E 7512/194/44**] No. 65.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 7.)

(No. 880.)
Sir, *Constantinople, December* 1, 1925.

I HAVE the honour to report that during the past week news has come in from the interior of disturbances in a variety of places. Ismet Pasha announced in the Assembly on the 26th ultimo that under the influence of certain sheikhs—*i.e.*, Kurdish sheikhs—who had once been in the pay of Tsarist Russia and other evilly disposed persons, a mob had demonstrated before the Vali's house at Erzeroum and had shouted out, "We don't want any ghiaour officials," meaning that they did not want to be governed by people who wore hats and tried to behave like Europeans. The Government took prompt measures and set up a court-martial in Erzeroum. Over a hundred people have already been arrested, six sheikhs or hojas executed, and thirteen lesser penalties inflicted.

2. When the above news was made known, it also transpired that there had been disturbances of the same kind at Sivas as long ago as the 12th November, when a notice was posted up inciting the people to rebel against the present form of Government. Various members of the vilayet and town councils were also alleged to have encouraged the populace to resist the wearing of hats. The Angora Independence Tribunal moved to Sivas to deal with the situation, and has now executed a man said to be the author of the seditious notice, and condemned to various terms of prison some thirteen persons, including the mayor, two town councillors, an ex-Deputy, a lawyer and a former officer.

3. Having re-established order at Sivas, the Angora Independence Tribunal is now moving to Samsun, where, it is stated, disturbances have been caused by the intrigues of mischievous persons who make instruments of the ignorant and foolish. From Marash much the same kind of trouble is reported. A crowd went to the mosque, took out some sacred flag and marched round the town shouting, "We don't want any hats." Severe measures followed, and forty people are awaiting trial. At Rizeh, too, some kind of agitation has occurred, but of this we only know that the cruiser "Hamidieh" has been sent to the spot. From Trebizond I have a private letter from Mr. Knight, dated the 24th November, from which I quote the following extract:—

> "The most extraordinary rumours are circulating here in connection with a reported scene in the Chamber some days ago, when Ismet is said to have been wounded, a Deputy for Gumush Haneh killed, &c., and all about hats and veils. It is now even whispered that a certain exalted personage himself has been done in, and it is undoubtedly a fact that a *détente* has been produced, fezes and bashliks have begun to reappear in the streets, and everybody, including the officials, is asking everybody else what it all means. Our local gazette is silent on the subject, and the Constantinople papers, received up to the 18th, give no inkling of anything being amiss. We are quite cut off by telegraphs, ostensibly owing to the weather, and yesterday's Seiri Sefain steamer, 'par extraordinaire,' brought no letters, only a few papers, which has increased the wonderment."

4. The occurrence at the same time of outbreaks in five different places might suggest that there has been another attempt at a general rising. But the distances separating these towns are so great that I incline rather to think that they are independent movements caused by the simultaneous application of the regulations for wearing hats. The hat is the outward and visible sign of the whole policy of secularisation and modernism. During the last few months the people have seen incredible changes—their Padishah driven out, dervish orders abolished, religious schools closed, priests reduced in number and influence. The last straw was to see their irreligious leaders wearing the hat of the infidel and to be told to wear hats themselves. It is surprising rather that the reaction has not been stronger. The Government seems to have mastered each rising with ease and to have the general situation well in hand. An Independence Tribunal can be created at a moment's notice, and sent to any place

where there is trouble. Under the Law for the Consolidation of Public Security of the 4th March, 1925, the Government has power for a period of two years to use these tribunals for the repression of any kind of sedition. The Assembly has recently waived for a further period of six months its right to veto death sentences imposed by the Independence Tribunals, and the Popular party has already decided that next spring, when martial law has run for a year in the Kurdish vilayets, it must be extended for another twelve months. Meanwhile, the Independence Tribunal in the Kharput district is still dealing with the aftermath of the Ghenj rebellion, and executions and other penalties are announced from time to time. So long, therefore, as the army is not occupied with other things, there seems to be little chance of another rebellion on a large scale.

5. When the draft law on the wearing of hats came up for discussion the other day it was opposed by Nureddin Pasha, who was commander-in-chief in Mesopotamia during the war and is now Deputy for Brussa. The pasha is perhaps the strongest reactionary in the Assembly, and he denounced the proposed law as contrary to the whole principle of liberty so elaborately embodied in the present Turkish Constitution. The Minister of Justice, Mahmud Essad Bey, replied with vehemence, and for want of better arguments was fain to observe "The advantage of the country is far above all senseless legal forms"—an utterance remarkable even in this country upon the lips of a Minister of Justice. When the draft law for the closing of convents was under discussion yesterday, occasion was taken by Government Deputies to attack Nureddin Pasha in unmeasured terms as being the real author of the trouble at Erzeroum. Ignorant persons, it was urged, would naturally follow the lead he had given in the Assembly. The Government is clearly not anxious that reaction should at the present moment find a spokesman in the Assembly.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 7513/2386/44] No. 66.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 7.)

(No. 883.)

Constantinople, December 2, 1925.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a report by Mr. R. A. Leeper on his recent visit to Angora, with especial reference to what he ascertained as to the political situation in general and the Mosul question in particular. I considered this information important enough to be telegraphed to you immediately, and I added a strong recommendation that you should strengthen the hands of the peace party at Angora by uttering plain warnings in Parliament and to the Turkish Ambassador that an invasion of Mosul will inevitably lead to the direst results. I trust you will have understood that to meet our purposes here the wording of your warnings could not possibly be too clear and unequivocal.

2. There are two or three elements in Mr. Leeper's analysis that are more or less new to me and of very great importance. In the first place, the President of the Republic is not now as much of an autocrat as I had imagined, and it is in some great questions only after a struggle that he is able to have his way. When I was at Angora last month, I did receive an indication in this sense, but only one, from the Greek Minister, and I pigeonholed it, to await the further confirmation that is now forthcoming. A second element is the forward part in affairs now being taken personally by Fevzi Pasha, the Chief of Staff. I had always heard that Fevzi kept himself very much aloof from politics and devoted himself entirely to looking after the army, though I have always known that he was generally looked on as the most likely person to succeed the Ghazi in the presidency in case of need. His position as Chief of Staff is particularly important in an essentially military country like Turkey, but the more so in virtue of the very peculiar and vague definition of his office and functions contained in the Constitution (see my despatch No. 303 of the 9th April, 1924). On account of his vague and independent position the Ghazi has always shown great deference and attention to him, with an obvious desire to secure his loyalty; and if Fevzi now has acquired active personal ambitions in the direction of the presidency, I should attribute them tentatively to the disorderly life which the Ghazi has been leading in a degree so increasing lately as to constitute an open scandal; for Fevzi is an austere man, with strong religious

principles. It has always puzzled me to know how he could reconcile his personal views with the strong laic tendencies of the present Government, and I had always imagined it could only be due to his loyalty to the Ghazi himself. If this loyalty is now sapped the President's position must indeed be threatened; for everything depends on the army, President and all; and if the corps of officers—naturally inclined to warlike courses—find in the Mosul question a popular rival leader who will lead them to such enterprises as they love, there is no saying what complications may ensue.

3. From what precedes it will be clear that Major Harenc was right in his report of the 9th November (my despatch No. 840), when he said that Turks were in earnest and not bluffing, and I have brought the point out in my telegram No. 134 of the 30th November, urging you to send a flash of lightning from the top of Mount Olympus bright enough to illuminate the darkness of even Angora; for Mr. Leeper brings out again in his report the almost incredible remoteness of the capital from all considerations of European politics and the astounding ignorance which envelops the minds of the average Turkish Deputy. To us it is clear that if Turkey wished to make an aggression on the British Empire, she could hardly choose a moment more unfavourable from the diplomatic point of view or circumstances in which His Majesty's Government would be more favourably placed for resenting it. But these men have forgotten everything that has happened since the battle of the Sakaria, and the foolish manner in which the Turkish Government has fostered their illusions and encouraged their hopes during the last few months now recoils on itself, and creates a situation which really brings the present régime into some peril. The best hope of peace lies now in the great strength of the British Empire, for nothing but force can appeal to the Angora mind. Great Britain has seldom been more hated than she now is, but fortunately she is still feared, and this may avert disaster on a wide scale.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

Enclosure in No. 66.

Report on a Visit to Angora.

I LEFT Constantinople for Angora on the 26th November, accompanied by Colonel Woods and Mr. Eric Whittall, of Smyrna, and returned on the 30th November. This gave me two full days in Angora, and, as this was my first visit, any observations in this report (apart from actual facts) are merely the result of first impressions.

General Impressions.

The approach to Angora lies along a wide, treeless and unpopulated plateau. As the train crawls along this barren waste during the early hours of the morning one has the impression of immense distance from the civilised world. The monotony is suddenly broken by the sight of new buildings, cultivated land and motor-tractors. This unexpected activity is the direct result of the Ghazi's personal efforts to build a new capital in the wilds of Anatolia, and it is very fitting that the first view of Angora should be the Ghazi's model farm.

The town itself makes a strong impression at first sight, representing as it does a violent contrast between what Turkey was and what the Ghazi is determined it shall become. The hill upon which the old town is built is surrounded by a rapidly increasing number of new houses and public buildings in the European style. Motor omnibuses ply between the station and the town, and the bracing air of the plateau seems to have entered into the bones of the inhabitants, creating quite a different atmosphere from that of Constantinople.

I do not wish to exaggerate the progress that has been made. The town itself is still very primitive, and, in spite of the European veneer, there is, of course, much that remains Oriental. All that I wish to emphasise is the contrast between the wilderness outside and the very real activity of the town, as this contrast has, I believe, an important political effect. Isolation from the world and pride in what has already been achieved is creating a rabid form of nationalism, which is a real danger. I felt this from the first day that I arrived, and I found myself comparing Angora with another young capital—Kovno—which is developing out of a dirty

provincial town on the same lines. Kovno, like Angora, has a disputed frontier problem, and the talk of the Angora Nationalists about Mosul is strangely reminiscent of what I have heard from Kovno Nationalists about Vilna. There are, of course, differences, but I cannot help wondering whether a definite decision on Mosul would not produce the same result at Angora as the definite decision on Vilna has at Kovno. It is difficult to believe that the present nationalism can reconcile itself quickly to an unfavourable verdict.

The strength of this nationalism was quite a surprise to me. I had intended during my short stay to attempt to get into touch with a few Deputies, with whom I might discuss the new social reforms, such as the growth of education and the position of women. I soon found that this was impossible, especially when I learnt through a third party that quite a moderate man was unwilling to see me owing to the very acute position of the Mosul question. This individual had been spending the previous evening with the Ghazi and a number of officers, and was apparently much disturbed at the views he had there heard expressed. In the light of this information, I abandoned my previous intention and devoted myself entirely to finding out what decisions were being taken on the question of Mosul.

Course of Enquiries.

To give an accurate picture of the atmosphere in Angora, I will give a more or less chronological record of the enquiries I made. For the information I obtained I am mainly indebted to Mr. Whittall, who, through his many Turkish acquaintances, was in an excellent position for tapping many reliable sources.

On the first day I must confess to having been considerably disturbed. Two interviews which I tried to arrange through Mr. Whittall fell through owing to the fear, quite freely expressed, of being seen in conversation with any member of His Majesty's Embassy. One of these individuals, Nejeti Bey, a Deputy, and a close associate of the Ghazi, told Mr. Whittall that before agreeing to an interview he would have to consult the Minister for Foreign Affairs. Needless to say, the interview did not take place. Mr. Whittall, who before his visit had little real anxiety about the situation, admitted that he was amazed at the atmosphere of Angora, and was very much disturbed at the danger of an attack on Mosul. That same evening Colonel Woods and I saw M. Boggetti, the manager of the Ottoman Bank in Angora, who made no secret to us of his fear that an act of folly would be committed. He told us that, whereas the usual monthly advances he was called upon to make to the Turkish Government amounted to 300,000 liras, this last month he had had to furnish 700,000 for the troops at Diarbekir, which now consisted of 80,000 men. He added that he thought the money was to be used immediately for transport of supplies before the winter set in. He told us that last week the situation had been extremely dangerous, but that he now thought that immediate danger had been averted.

The next day I did not succeed in obtaining any accurate information until the evening. During the morning I heard that the Ghazi had been ill, that he had had a fit a few days before as the result of his excesses, and that people had been visiting him to enquire after his health. This information was somewhat contradicted by what I saw with my own eyes. In the afternoon I attended a debate in the Assembly, and during the discussions the Ghazi himself entered his box. The unusual shininess of his face suggested late nights and heavy drinking, but he was very much master of himself and seemed full of energy and his eyes travelled round the Assembly. An interesting point, which both Colonel Woods and I noticed but which may have been mere chance, was that the uproar in the Assembly, which had been fairly vigorous, subsided entirely after the Ghazi's arrival. It gave one the impression that he still had complete control over this body which he had himself created.

By the evening, therefore, I had arrived at the following conclusions: It was clear that the air was charged with electricity (I am quoting the words of a Turk who had spent the previous night carousing with the Ghazi), that the nationalism of the capital was more rabid than ever, that people not actually in the Government were afraid to speak to British officials, that the danger of an attack on Mosul was very real. I had put all this to Mr. Whittall during the afternoon and asked him to make an effort to piece together these loose threads and endeavour to get a complete picture. Late at night he returned to the hotel with an analysis of the situation which appeared to me accurate and which supplemented what I had already heard and what His Majesty's Ambassador and military attaché had also gathered from different sources. Mr. Whittall's informant was a young Turk, Ismail Bey,

the secretary of the manager of the Smyrna–Aidin Railway, whom I had met at dinner and who had struck me as well-balanced and intelligent. I will set out this information under a separate paragraph as it deals with the general political situation with special reference to Mosul.

General Political Situation.

In internal politics the Ghazi and Ismet, who are on excellent terms politically, have far and away the greatest power. Amongst the Assembly they have from twenty to thirty Deputies who are prepared to vote blindly for any measure they propose and who also work actively amongst their fellow-Deputies to secure a majority. In internal politics Ismet is far from moderate. He is prepared to put down with an iron hand anything or anybody that threatens the supremacy of the People's party. Fortunately, in foreign affairs he has sufficient understanding to counsel moderation, but he has a difficult battle to fight. The Deputies, with little knowledge of foreign affairs, wish to give vent to their nationalism in that sphere as violently as they do in internal affairs.

The Mosul Question.

The present position is that the whole Assembly, with the exception of Mustafa Kemal's bodyguard of twenty to thirty, are in favour of an attack on Mosul to present His Majesty's Government with a *fait accompli*. In addition to this all the members of the Government, with the exception of Ismet Pasha and Tewfik Rushdi, are of the same mind. Outside the Assembly the whole of the army leaders under Fevzi Pasha are clamouring for action. The Ghazi, in spite of this, has so far given his full support to Ismet and has prevented any act of violence. A week ago matters came to a head. When the advice of the Hague Court became known Fevzi Pasha came forward with a report advocating an immediate attack on Mosul, which he guaranteed to occupy in forty-six hours. There was a meeting of the Cabinet to discuss this plan, and Mustafa Kemal and Ismet, acting together, succeeded in defeating it. This was the meeting which the newspapers reported to be concerned with the question of the Bourse; it was really called solely to discuss Fevzi's report. It is common talk among Deputies and officers that there would be no real danger in occupying Mosul, as England would not go to war. Turkey, after the occupation, would be in a stronger position to negotiate with His Majesty's Government. It is clear that it would assist Ismet and counteract this propaganda if His Majesty's Government could make their position absolutely clear before the meeting of the League.

As regards the Ghazi himself he is still in effective control and his health is still good owing to his robust constitution. At the same time, one of his doctors has told him in writing that unless he changes his way of life he will break down completely. Ismet has also pleaded with him in the same sense. What is, of course, uncertain is how far the Ghazi would be prepared to fight the opposition if the League took a decision unfavourable to Turkey. He would certainly find the task much easier if it were clear to Angora in advance that an attack on Mosul would mean war. The dangerous man at the present moment is Fevzi, who is looked upon as the successor of the Ghazi if the latter breaks down. He has a strong position in the army and is anxious to pose as a national leader by a success at Mosul. The Ghazi has to be careful because of Fevzi's influence with the army, but unless something unexpected happens the opinion is that the Ghazi and Ismet together will be too strong for the opposition.

R. A. LEEPER.

[E 7712/498/44] No. 67.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received December* 14.)

(No. 892.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December* 8, 1925.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 815 of the 29th October last, in which I mentioned the possibility that the Armenian and Jewish communities might renounce the minority clauses of the Lausanne Treaty, I have the honour to report that a big step in this direction has now been taken. The Turkish Government last summer appointed three mixed committees, each with a Turkish chairman, two other Turkish

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

members and two non-Moslems belonging respectively to the Greek, Armenian and Jewish communities, but chosen by the Government. Some appearance of giving effect to the second paragraph of article 42 was thus made. At the same time, the Government let it be known that it was going to adopt the provisions of Swiss law as regards personal and family status. Confronted with the question whether the Swiss law would not be acceptable to the non-Moslem communities, the three committees soon decided that each community as a whole must be consulted. The Turkish authorities then approached the Armenian Patriarchate and the Grand Rabbinate semi-officially, and urged that as personal and family status in Turkey was to be regulated in accordance with the practice in such a well-ordered State as Switzerland, they should formally renounce the provisions of article 42. The Armenian Patriarchate replied that, as all but its purely spiritual functions had been taken from it during the war, it was unfortunately unable to pronounce on such a matter. The Grand Rabbinate answered to much the same effect and suggested a plebiscite, hoping that the impracticability of such a measure might defer the evil day. But the Turks were not to be daunted and continued to press both communities. The Armenians yielded first. The spiritual and lay councils attached to the Armenian Patriarchate have remained in being since the war, and in the end the Turks obtained from the Acting Gregorian Patriarch, these two councils, all the local Gregorian bishops and a number of Armenian notables, a signed statement that they would accept the Swiss law on personal and family status, including civil marriage. They did not, however, make an explicit renunciation of article 42, and they had no legal capacity to represent the Armenian community. The Armenian Catholics and the Armenian Protestants took up the same attitude as their Gregorian brethren, holding that resistance was useless, and that if the new law made possible marriages contrary to the law of their Church, the Church would merely refuse to recognise them. The Armenian Catholic Church has managed to avoid signing any declaration. In the same way the Jewish community, although it felt that merely theoretical right was better than nothing at all, had no serious objection to the proposed law, and decided to bow to the inevitable. A committee of Jews, with no legal representative character but including, I believe, the Grand Rabbi, therefore signed the same declaration as the Armenians had done.

2. With the Greek community, which is more numerous, the Turks had much more trouble. The Greeks felt that the treaty's provisions about personal and family status were the most important part of the minority clauses. It was not so much a privileged position that they sought as something to differentiate them individually and collectively from the Turks at a time when Turkish policy is to Turkify every aspect of what remains of Greek life in Turkey. Scenting resistance in the Greek community, the Turks appointed a so-called "Commission d'Initiative," composed of some half-dozen Greeks. When the commission showed a tendency to negative the Turkish proposals, the Turkish authorities brought its numbers up to twenty-two by adding other Greeks, whose interests in this country made them particularly susceptible to Turkish official influence. This commission was considerably moved by the speech which a Greek lawyer had the courage to make, in spite of the presence of Turkish police, denouncing the proposals as an attempt to make the Turkish Government violate an article which had become law through its ratification by the Grand National Assembly and to bring into disrepute so sacred an instrument as the National Pact, the fifth article of which guarantees to the minorities their treaty privileges. The commission then added to itself some thirty more members, who were reluctantly elected by the various parishes and as reluctantly came to the discussion, in some cases under compulsion by the police. A few days before the meeting the authorities arrested, on an absurd charge of supplying political and military information to Greece, eight or ten members of the commission who seemed likely to oppose the Government's wishes, and kept them under arrest until the day after the discussion was over. This simplified the course of things in the commission considerably, but, even so, the delegates showed such reluctance to commit themselves to any decision that the police, who were present as before, received orders to lock the doors and allow no one to go home until he had signed a formal renunciation of the first paragraph of article 42. The position of the Greek community is therefore rather worse than that of the Armenians and Jews. They realise that even if the Swiss law is adopted there is nothing, for example, to prevent the Grand National Assembly from repealing it one day and reverting to polygamy.

3. The Turkish authorities have made great efforts to secure the consent of the Greek Patriarchate, but the patriarchate, by pleading its legal incapacity and

by using other pretexts, has so far been able to avoid compliance Nevertheless, the Greek community fear that as the Patriarch is an old man in failing health, his signature may yet be obtained by some trick. The influence of the pariarchate is indeed feeble nowadays. During the armistice it excommunicated a man named Diaminidi, who had broken into the Phanar with a mob of roughs. Diaminidi went to law against the patriarchate, but abandoned his claim before any verdict was given. After Allied evacuation, however, the Public Prosecutor continued the case, and in the end the Holy Synod was condemned individually and collectively to pay £T. 2,000 damages. The verdict was confirmed in cassation, and the patriarchate has had no choice but to pay.

4. In common with the Jews, the Greeks find their schools more and more paralysed by increased Government control and increased insistence on the use of Turkish. In common with the Armenians, the Greeks continue to suffer from a ruthless application of the law on abandoned property. All three communities are dwindling because their young men leave the country rather than face service in labour battalions. And now the Turkish authorities show signs of gradually taking over Greek, Armenian and Jewish hospitals and other charitable institutions. The whole tendency of Turkish policy is to assimilate the non-Moslems as far as possible to Turks, and to make their situation so unfavourable that numbers of non-Moslems will continue to leave the country.

5. I had some conversation a few days ago with M. Jean Politis, who, till last summer, was Greek Chargé d'Affaires at Angora, and is now the Greek delegate to the Mixed Exchange Commission. He spoke in the most depressed tone of the position to which the Greek community was being brought by these manœuvres, and at one moment hinted at the fact that the Great Powers were also signatories of the Treaty of Lausanne, article 42, of which was being so flagrantly violated in the spirit. I replied that the Powers were certainly aware of the drift of events in Turkey, and if they took no action it was because they thought that any protests they might formulate might make things worse for the local Greeks and certainly would do no good. This proposition M. Politis did not attempt to dispute; he and I agreed that if Turkey were a member of the League of Nations, that body might undertake action with some slight hope of beneficent result, though both of us are unfavourably impressed by the weak manner in which the existing Mixed Exchange Commission understands its duties. But we also agreed that, while there are no signs whatever of the Turks meaning to relax their pressure on the native non-Moslem communities, the day when Turkey will join the League of Nations now seems more distant than ever.

6. If His Majesty's Government consider that something should be done, the only thing I can think of would be a note by one or more Governments, as you may think best, addressed to Angora and aimed at preserving rights. The note might recite that information has been received about renunciations of rights under article 42 by certain non-Moslem communities; that the information comes only from the press; that it is a principle of law that the provisions of a treaty can only be varied with the consent of all its signatories, who have the right to exercise their own unfettered judgment in deciding whether or not they will assent to any variations that may be proposed to them; and that it would therefore be interesting to know whether the Turkish Government proposes to bring before the signatories of the Treaty of Lausanne the action of the non-Moslem communities, if, indeed, any action by them has been taken.

7. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Minister at Athens.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY.

No. 68.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received December* 17.)

(No. 142.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, December* 16, 1925.

MILITARY activity in Trebizond district.

Your telegram No. 141.

Consul reports movement of heavy guns by night towards Erzerum and constant appearance of new officers. This may be connected with disaffection of Laz elements

as result of recent abolition of the fez, which has recently necessitated severe repressive measures in the Trebizond district.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 57.)

No. 69.

Sir W. Tyrrell (for the Secretary of State) to Sir R. Lindsay (Constantinople).

(No. 149.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, December* 17, 1925.

MY despatch No. 1159 of 4th December: Mosul.

Turkish Ambassador recently went from here to Paris, where he saw Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs. It is, however, not known whether he communicated to him substance of my conversation of 4th December, or whether the serious language which I held has in fact reached Angora.

Have you in any way repeated the warning at Constantinople, or can you ascertain whether Turkish Government have been fully informed of views expressed by me? If not, can you take appropriate measures for leaving them under no misapprehension?

[**E 7918/194/44**] No. 70.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(Received December 21.)

(No. 908.)
Sir, *Constantinople, December* 15, 1925.

IN my despatch No. 880 of the 1st instant I had the honour to report upon the internal situation. On the 12th instant Ismet Pasha made another long statement in the National Assembly, from which a little more information may be gathered. The Prime Minister stated that as the revolts in the different areas were simultaneous, as the time chosen was when the Government was busy with the Mosul question, and as emissaries who had been caught had newly arrived in the different districts, he had come to the conclusion that the whole thing was one movement which had been worked "from abroad." He did not specify whether he meant that it had been instigated by a foreign country or by the ex-Sultan or ex-Caliph, but since he spoke of it as "a new manifestation of a reactionary system," I presume he meant to suggest that it originated from San Remo. The Government would naturally seek to throw on the ex-Imperial family the blame for a situation which seems in reality to have been produced by their own hasty measures.

2. The Pasha quoted various rumours which were current in the affected areas —namely, that on the reopening of the Assembly in October there had been such indignation among the Deputies that the Opposition had risen from 20 to 170, that Ismet Pasha himself was dead, that another nakshbandi dervish had arisen as successor to Sheikh Said, and that Turkish widow women were being sent away to Russia. He also gave a few more details of the disturbances. In Erzerum two priests had led a mob to the Government House and threatened the Vali. At a village near Rizeh on the Black Sea, the inhabitants, led by a priest, had risen to the cry, "We are heading straight for irreligion. We must stop the Government from irreligion." These few admissions of Ismet Pasha's suggest that the Government has had to deal, and is indeed still dealing, with a very nasty situation. The population of Eastern Turkey, being much less open to intercourse with Europeans, clings more grimly to religious custom and has naturally been more resentful at the introduction of the hat. Mr. Knight at Trebizond has found since the movement began that no one has dared to come near him, but such information as he has been able to obtain is to the same effect. He reports that it is the hat which has caused all the trouble in Erzerum and in Trebizond itself. The whole population, he says, resent deeply this attempt to civilise them, and even the army officers appear to be altogether against the emancipation of women. Fear of the Independence Tribunal—which, wherever it goes is welcomed with speeches and bouquets—alone keeps the people quiet. Mr. Knight's information about the Rizeh district is that the Laz country seemed about to rise, and that the "Hamidieh," which was finally driven back by bad weather, bombarded the Laz villages to keep them quiet. According to the press the Lazes had planned an armed attack on Rizeh, and over 130 people are being tried there, although Ismet Pasha, who seems to have concealed

the true dimensions of the various risings, only admitted that there were some thirty under arrest. There seems to have been trouble enough at Kerasund for the Independence Tribunal to propose to visit it shortly. At Marash the agitators appear to have by no means been a mere rabble, as the Prime Minister at first intimated, but to have included at least two ex-Deputies.

3. Information which I have received from another source confirms the report of general disaffection in North-East Anatolia. The placemen of the Government, the army officers, the spies and the agents of the Popular party are happy. The rest of the population is much more openly opposed to the Government than is Constantinople or Smyrna. The disaffection is not only Kurdish in its origin but also Turkish. As information from the east of Turkey is so scarce, I think it worth while to enclose notes, which I have received from an informant, of the observations of M. A. Mille of the "Journal des Débats." M. Mille is a Levantine, and I fancy inclined to sacrifice truth to rhetorical effect, but his remarks may be taken as substantially correct. He penetrated from Trebizond viâ Baiburt and Erzerum as far as Kars and Mush, and you will observe that one of his main impressions was the desolation of the country.

4. Nearer home we hear that even in Panderma, which should be grateful to the Ghazi for the elimination of its Greek majority, some twenty people have had to be arrested, while in Stambul the publication by a priest of a tract entitled: "Hats and imitating the Frank" has led to the arrest of the author, of an Armenian charged with printing it, and of about thirty other people, of whom some belong to the professional class. Constantinople is therefore threatened with a visit by the Independence Tribunal, but meanwhile preparations are being made to set up a colossal statue of the Ghazi on the most historic spot in Constantinople, Seraglio Point.

5. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner for Irak.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

Enclosure in No. 70.

Report of a Conversation with M. Albert Mille, Correspondent of the "Journal des Débats," on the Subject of his Journey in Trebizond, Erzerum, Kars and Mush.

General Impressions.

The strangled feeling in one's breast ("serrement de cœur") which is caused by the sight of the ruined condition of Trebizond develops and deepens as one advances into the interior. About 20 kilom. from the east one enters the wilderness —nothing but waste and desolation, with hardly a stone left standing in the ruined villages one passes. Outside of the towns M. Mille reckons that there cannot be more than three or four inhabitants to the square kilometre. And if conditions were bad between Trebizond and Erzerum, they were worse between Erzerum and Kars. He was not able to go to Bitlis from Mush, but he was told that things were even worse down there.

Roads.

The roads, generally speaking, were very bad. Travelling by car, an average of 15 kilom. was rarely attained. It was constantly necessary to leave the main road for by-tracks. There was no pretence of a *chaussée* between Erzerum and Mush. The magnificent road built by the Russians from Kars to Trebizond is falling rapidly into ruin. Although there is abundance of metalling piled by the roadside there is hardly any attempt at upkeep. Crushing machines and heavy rollers worked by mazout are lying by the roadside every few miles, but they have rusted into unusableness. In one place M. Mille saw some superficial repairs being rolled in by roller pulled by two bullocks.

Railways.

Of the railway from Erzerum towards Trebizond (42 kilom.) and Erzerum Sarikamishe, barely 19 kilom. are in a condition to be used. Most of the locomotives have been dismantled, the engines being sold to Laz boat-owners and used as auxiliaries.

Security.

Public security seemed to be efficiently maintained by gendarmerie all along the routes travelled by M. Mille. There are guard-houses every few kilometres along the main routes as well as in any inhabited villages and at all passes into the hills. The men are smartly turned out and seemed well shod on the whole, some wearing sandals. Brigandage seems to have been pretty well stamped out, even in the Dersim district. The roads are frequently patrolled, and it is customary to accompany villagers with one gendarme, a rifle being also given to a villager and exchanged at each stop as he goes along.

Military.

There were very few troops to be seen in the whole of this region. Even in Sarikamishe and Kars there seemed to be a great scarcity of men and a striking disproportion in the number of officers. When Feizi Pasha visited Sarikamishe it was difficult to get together 250 men for his guard. The officers were all smartly dressed: the men frequently in rags. The officers were abominably chauvinistic, but in spite of their smart uniforms were content to live in filthy unhygienic surroundings. Even in Kars the paucity of men was noticeable and the forts appeared to be very neglected. The old Russian stone barracks near the station are used by the Turks but looked half abandoned.

Population.

In Erzerum the population has fallen from 60,000 to barely 19,000 souls. The depreciation in other towns is proportionately heavy. Baiburt seemed to be the only exception. Kars was practically a heap of ruins except for one-quarter on the hillside. Greeks have been deported, Armenians massacred, Circassians and Russians driven away. On the road to Kars were several villages which looked as though they might have been prosperous but which were quite abandoned. An attempt had been made to settle some Moslem Circassians here, but the policy was negatived from Angora, which did not want a local settler with affiliations across the frontier. Consequently, the once-smiling region is rapidly degenerating into a wilderness. The population, both urban and rural, has shrunk so greatly that there is a tendency on the part of the peasants to take up pastoral pursuits rather than agriculture, as there are no towns to supply and no means of exporting cereals. The cost of transport is prohibitive.

Politics.

In the towns, the equivalent of the *bourgeoisie* and the wealthy landowners are bitterly, if secretly, hostile to Angora. The Ghazi is generally referred to ironically as Sa Majesté. But the terror of the Independence Tribunals daunts any outspoken opposition. The people, and especially the serfs in the villages, are more sympathetically inclined to Angora. They are glad to see the influence of sheikh and tekke crushed and do not particularly care about the suppression of the sheriat and Caliphate. All they say is: Give us roads and railways and let us work and trade in peace. M. Mille found that everybody regretted the departure of the Greeks and yearned for a restoration of the conditions of Tsarist occupation. The impetus given to all trade by the roads and railways policy of the Russians is the one bright spot in local memory. The Bolsheviks are disliked very generally and thoroughly. They are held responsible for the downfall of Tsarist Russia and their doctrines find no echo in native philosophy. Nevertheless, the best buildings in all these internal towns are usually in the occupation of the Bolshevik consuls, surrounded by staffs of from fifteen to twenty sub-agents, mostly Jews and Armeno-Russians. M. Mille says three circumstances have contributed to dispose the people to progressive ideas: first, the misery from which all are suffering, which has destroyed their faith in the old order. Secondly, the influence of the four divisions who returned from the Austrian front. These men belonged to these regions, and while they suffered less than any other Turkish troops, they came into contact with European conditions and had their eyes opened. Also quite a number brought back Hungarian and Austrian wives. Thirdly, the benefits of the Russian occupation were also very educational.

Economical.

Apart from the reduced trade in nuts and tobacco in the coastal regions, there is very little doing at any of these places in the interior. The herds of cattle and

sheep that used to be driven up towards Erzerum from the south seemed to have found more profitable outlets into Mesopotamia and Syria; in Erzerum it is believed that it was in order to hide this fact that the authorities decreed a quarantine against the southern regions alleging the oubreak of cattle disease and sheep-rot. A caravan arrived from Diarbekir for the first time in two years just previously to the visit of M. Mille. This lack of trade has led to a crisis in Erzerum because on the one hand the shopkeepers have been unable to sell their goods and equally unable to pay for those imported.

Educational.

M. Mille was much impressed by the work of the lady teachers in some of the places he visited, notably Erzerum, where there are thirteen pluckily doing their best in adverse surroundings. He thought less of the male teachers. He visited the *école normale* in Erzerum and found that they were teaching 300 youths to be the most outrageous chauvinists he had encountered. It was denied that Greece had ever made any contribution to civilisation and humanity.

Mosul.

M. Mille raised the question of Mosul in his talk both with officers and civilians. They all seemed to think that Mosul could easily be captured, but thought that it would not be worth while risking war with Great Britain to obtain. All said it would be better to come to terms with Britain and accept the sum of £20 million. This figure of 20 millions was so generally mentioned that M. Mille was very struck by it and gained the impression that it might have been inspired.

Travelling Conditions.

M. Mille did most of his travel in motor-cars. They are fairly plentiful in Erzerum, and the Russian drivers are very popular. Food and lodging were the great difficulties. The hotels were unfit for human accommodation and the food equally unfit for consumption. At several stops he got the greatest comfort by hiring a big wagon full of straw for sleeping quarters for the night.

No. 71.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received December* 21.)

(No. 145.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, December* 20, 1925.

YOUR telegram No. 149.

I ascertained that Turkish delegate had not heard of your conversation of 4th December. Of course this does not mean that it has not been duly reported to Angora, but I made it a pretext for handing to delegate copy of your despatch No. 1159, and of declaration you made after delivery of League's decision.

No. 72.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(*Received December* 24.)

(No. 147.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, December* 23, 1925.

TEXT of Russo-Turkish Treaty signed at Paris on 17th December is published in papers this morning. Substance is as follows:—

1. If either of contracting parties is attacked by one or several States the other contracting party will maintain neutrality.

Note.—Military manœuvres which do not injure interests of one of the parties are not to be defined as military action.

2. The contracting parties will not attack one another or join in any political alliance directed against military or naval security of the other party.

3. The agreement comes into force from date of ratification for a period of three years. If not denounced six months before date it expires it will be prolonged automatically by one year.

Three protocols annexed provide for following points :—

Outside obligations already mentioned, both parties reserve for themselves complete freedom in their relations with other Powers.

Political alliance of above-mentioned article 2 of treaty embraces financial or economic agreements with other States directed against the two contracting parties.

The contracting parties agree to discuss procedure to be followed for settlement of disputes which cannot be solved through ordinary diplomatic channels.

Text as published by bag.

Treaty seems intrinsically unimportant and is probably intended to reassure Turkish public opinion and to restore prestige of Government by suggesting idea that secret articles exist. Official press organ in its comments hints that such is the case.

(Repeated to Bagdad, No. 59.)

[**E 8099/1944/44**] No. 73.

Sir R. Lindsay to Sir Austen Chamberlain.—(***Received*** *December* 29.)

(No. 930.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December* 23, 1925.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 147 of to-day's date, reporting the signature of a Russo-Turkish treaty at Paris on the 17th December, I have the honour to transmit herewith the full text of the treaty, together with the three protocols annexed thereto, as published in the "Hakimiet-i-Millié," the official organ of the Turkish Government at Angora.

2. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Bagdad and His Majesty's Minister at Tehran.

I have, &c.
R. C. LINDSAY.

Enclosure in No. 73.

Text of Russo-Turkish Treaty, signed at Paris on December 17, 1925.

Préambule.

LE Gouvernement de la République turque, d'une part, et le Gouvernement de l'Union des Républiques socialistes soviétiques, d'autre part, considérant qu'il est conforme à l'intérêt des deux pays de rechercher et de fixer les bases nécessaires pour le renforcement des relations normales suivies qui existent entre les deux pays, et de l'amitié sincère qui les unit, ont désigné, à cet effet, comme délégués, Tevfik Ruchdi Bey, Ministre des Affaires étrangères de la République turque, et M. Georges Tchitchérine, Commissaire aux Affaires extérieures de l'Union des Républiques socialistes soviétiques, lesquels ont arrêté, d'un commun accord, ce qui suit :

1. Dans le cas où un ou plusieurs États se livreraient à une action militaire contre l'une des parties, l'autre partie contractante s'engage à garder, envers la première, la neutralité.

(N.B.—Les manœuvres militaires qui ne lèsent pas les intérêts d'une des parties ne rentrent pas dans la définition d'action militaire.)

2. Chacune des parties contractantes s'engage à ne se livrer, contre l'autre partie, à aucune agression. Elle s'engage également à ne faire partie d'aucune alliance ou entente de caractère politique contractée avec un ou plusieurs États et conclue spécialement contre l'autre partie, et, également, à n'entrer dans aucune alliance ou entente de caractère politique contractée avec un ou plusieurs États et qui serait dirigée contre la sécurité militaire et maritime de l'autre partie.

Chacune des parties contractantes s'engage également à ne participer à aucun mouvement hostile dirigé par un ou plusieurs États contre l'autre partie.

3. Cet accord entre en vigueur dès la date de sa ratification, pour une période de trois ans

Dans le cas où, six mois avant la date de l'expiration de l'accord, une des parties ne le dénoncera pas, il demeurera en vigueur une année encore, par tacite réconduction.

A ce traité sont joints les trois protocoles que voici :

Protocole No. 1.

Les deux parties tombent d'accord pour déclarer qu'en dehors des limites des obligations prévues par le présent traité, les parties se réservent pleine et entière liberté dans leurs relations de toutes sortes avec les tierces Puissances.

Protocole No. 2.

Les parties contractantes sont tombées d'accord pour déclarer que le terme "de caractère politique" employé dans l'article 2 du traité signé à la date d'aujourd'hui comprend également tous accords financiers ou économiques que des États concluraient entre eux et qui seraient dirigés contre l'une des parties.

Protocole No. 3.

Les parties contractantes s'engagent à entrer en pourparlers pour fixer d'un commun accord les procédés à suivre pour résoudre tous litiges qui surgiraient entre elles et qui ne pourraient être résolus par la voie diplomatique ordinaire.

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